EXAM 3 NOTES Nuclear Weapons Deterrence and Proliferation Nov 3 2015 I Why don t we use our nuclear weapons A Destructiveness Firebombing Daisy Cutter B Battlefield Utility Tactical Nuclear Weapon C They re Wrong Immoral 1 Nuclear Taboo Nina Tannenwald 2 Human Tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki II Effects on Policy A NPT 1968 B Biological 1972 and Chemical Weapons 1993 C Disarmament vs Deterrence III Arms Control History see slide from MAD to MAP IV Nuclear Proliferation Realists on Weak New States V Constructivism and the nuclear norm of non use Additional terms balance of terror first strike second strike capability nuclear triad balance of capabilities mutual vulnerability ICBM SDI I Why don t we use our nuclear weapons A Destructiveness maybe the answer to why we don t use our weapons but isn t this the point of weapons Firebombing Daisy Cutter WWII conventional and unconventional bombing Germany and Japan WWII firebombing Dresden Hamburg Tokyo Daisy Cutter fitted to a gravity bomb and set to explode before impact increases effect of bomb B Battlefield Utility Tactical Nuclear Weapon missiles with nuclear warhead torpedoes land mines etc we can fit traditional nuclear weapons with battlefield utility now but we don t use them the reason were not using them isn t because we don t have them C They re Wrong Immoral it would be morally wrong to use these weapons especially now that we know how deadly they can be 1 Nuclear Taboo Nina Tannenwald everything about these weapons can be considered a taboo so off the ta ble shouldn t even threaten using them international taboo norm in int l community int l moral code so would it be worth it to disrupt the int l moral code to win a war NO reputation costs etc 2 Human Tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 80 of US supported the use of the atomic bomb chose these cities because others had already been destroyed we didn t know what the level of damage would be like Hiroshima was surrounded by mts so it would contain the damage and we could assess we were fighting and enemy that refused to surrender facing potential takeover of islands needed them to surrender without invading most of our military thought these were the weapons of the future we rarely go backwards from innovation in weaponry usually continues to ad vance immediately tried to find battlefield utility for these bombs but our perception of these weapons changed and world opinion changed realized they were different not just the destruction immediate damage didn t look different than regular bomb shadows were burned into walls survivors had long term affects of radiation deaths on impact at Hiroshima 1945 70000 doubled at end of the year from long term effects and end of decade raised to 200 000 this bomb had the capacity to continue killing birth defects human and animals from radiation decrease of intelligence birth defects being passed down we didn t have the stomach to continue to see the deaths from the bomb after we were in peacetime fear of atmospheric contamination where does the radiation go when the bomb is used atmosphere All lead to a new perspective and a norm of NON USE we have the weapons but we are all committed to not using them Balance of power in the nuclear age gave us a balance of terror everyone with nukes is a threat of destruction II Effects on Policy the US didnt want to get rid of them the Soviet Union had them eradicating controlling these weapons we see a reaction against most weapons we see as being unconventional A NPT 1968 not a ban but an attempt to control the weapons 5 states recognized as nuclear powers US GB F Russ China all committed to non use of nuclear weapons by NPT and cannot help anyone else become an offensive nuclear power everyone else thats part of the agreement can t try to develop these weapons enforced through monitoring B Biological 1972 and Chemical Weapons 1993 states agreeing to get rid of chemical weapons bio weapons unconventional weapons we tried to eradicate C Disarmament vs Deterrence specifically looking at the US and the Soviet Union complete Disarmament would remove the great threat from the world there was no way either 2 states would get rid of their weapons not realistic in the Cold War environment Deterrence before Cold War US and SU in a nuclear arms race for the sake of deterrence the more weapons the more kill power the better we can deter the other state needed to deter enemy have to be able to survive the 1st strike to initiate the 2nd strike 1st strike 2nd strike capabilities spread nuclear arsenal need to be disbursed one strike and you wouldn t be able to take out all weapons Nuclear Triad maintained our nuclear capabilities in 3 realms on land in the air and at sea we were afraid the nuclear arms race would end with war like usual possibility of a security dilemma so high that the opponent would strike change in policy 1960s follows detente cooling off maintaining deterrence but through arms control III Arms Control History see slide to limit s of nukes maintaining deterrence through arms control had to set a balance of capabilities we had equal ability to destroy each other and developed into more formalized ap proach to policy mutual vulnerability which is maintained by limiting defensive capa bilities why would we want to be vulnerable if both sides are who will push the button the benefits have to outweigh the risks and there are no benefits in ta nuclear war both side will destroy each other and there will not be a clear winner basically suicidal to launch nuclear war from MAD to MAP Mutually Assured Destruction MAD if we pushed the button we would both be de stroyed and it was assured more formalized approach in US and SU MAP Mutually Assured Protection we shifted strategies and focused on defending against a nuclear attack instead of nonproliferation SLIDE arms control history 1963 Partial test Ban Treaty banned testing of nukes limited development 1968 NPT 1968 SALT I Strategic Arms Limitation Talks focus on limiting s of nuk weapons 1972 ABM Treaty limited ICBM interceptors anti ballistic missile treaty interconti nental ballistic missile interceptors limiting our ability to intercept missiles limiting out defensive capabilities but both sides limited and not neither can defend themselves both sides vulnerable and neither side likely to launch attack 1979 SALT II intercontinental ballistic missile interceptors and delivery systems and missiles themselves and reducing of nukes again not ratified by
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