Carina Tenaglia INR 3003 Reading Notes Exam 3 Week 11 12 Jervis The Symbolic Nature of Nuclear Politics I Psychological Effects a Intro i Nuclear weapons race to war peculiar psychological overtones ii Eisenhower said that weapons were not so much for war as military weapons but for psychological importance iii Weapons of mass destruction used as methods of persuasion paradox 1 Nuclear weapons lack military utility but wield great political utility iv A sense of security is subjective v Questions to answer 1 Are analyses of national security part of the solution or problem 2 What s the extent to which one state can exercise influence a Credibility in the eye of the beholder i The USSR could quickly add large of warheads to arsenal ii Incoherence of many claims regarding significance of nuclear superiority 1 Does not explain how political efficacy is generated iii Strategic balance measured in inappropriate ways iv Claims that state has to act in certain way to convey a message when actions won t improve military position v Chance of war lower during d tente than early mid 80 s but d tente saw b Some Puzzles II more crises than latter period Symbols and Politics in the Nuclear Arena a Intro i Four assertions 1 Study of symbols in psychology is understudied 2 Study of symbols in politics must be linked to political psychology 3 Symbols are central to int l politics 4 Symbols psychology particularly important in the political arena ii Mutual second strike capability opening for play of psychology symbols etc iii Nuclear strategy must remain hypothetical we ve never experienced it yet 1 Talks about an escalation ladder levels of violence iv Nuclear weapons have increased importance of symbols and psychology not created it b Perceptions of Vital Interests i Perceptions of other actors to be influenced major importance 1 Can influence other states perceptions of superpower s future c Perceptions of Success and Failure i Focusing on successes rather than failures President Reagan ii Defeats can be used to rally public opinion iii To claim victory can humiliate the other or legitimize its claim iv States may want to downplay victory or loss to stress mutual interests pave the way for future cooperation Judgments about victories and losses are subjective v d Echo Effects i Sometimes unrealistic assumptions become accepted ii Sometimes colleagues try to determine situation at hand credibility collectively possibly more accuracy III Resolve and Credibility a Intro i Ultimate threat risk start all out war not highly credible ii Problem states need to establish resolve by influencing others beliefs 1 States look to other states past behavior ex US USSR Cold War a Problem Vietnam on different scale than nuclear war iii Defeated actors should not have any special incentives in the next confrontation 1 Kissinger thinks a state must be prepared to react rapidly and to the extent that the opponent can no longer afford to experiment b Unnecessary Capability as an Indicator of Resolve i Superiority matters because others think it matters 1 Political advantage as being seen as superior regardless of facts is more useful than actually being superior ii The primary purpose of procuring nuclear weapons willingness to fight iii Eisenhower didn t see the need for nuclear blackmail IV c Strategic balance may be safer than searching for other tests of strength Need for Hard and Expensive Tasks a Intro i Money spent to show resolve in increased defense spending not necessary ii Spending lives to show resolve more significant b How Not What i Outcome isn t always as important as what is achieved ii States do not want to appear to act under influence from other states iii Military force used as a means of intimidation sometimes 1 NATO taking the form of an alliance more psychological political than military 2 Europeans saw withdrawal of missiles as making them vulnerable Impressing Ourselves a A country must exercise national will to provide self reassurance b Comparison of decision maker making moves to bolster his own resolve to a man V VI drinking to bolster his courage Implications a Intro i 5 implications 1 Many strategic policies create their own difficulties 2 There are opportunities for avoiding such pitfalls 3 Good deal of strategic planning operates autonomously on basis of self defined problems 4 Many possibilities for and against arms control must be seen in psychological not military terms 5 Beliefs about whether wars are inevitable important to determine whether peace will be maintained b Self Inflicted Wounds i These methods require states to stress usually exaggerate own weaknesses c Opportunities i Validity doesn t always lie in the factuality of statements Reagan example ii Many states define interests motives in a way to avoid challenges d The Momentum of Strategic Planning i War planning can take on a life of its own ii Military commanders take orders preparation seriously but then are criticized for taking actions too far 1 Do not need to limit military but demands imposed upon them e Arms Control A Psychological Endeavor i Arms agreements should not be made for sake of agreeing 1 Need to establish if it would make US or Russia better worse off 2 Arms control agreements are bad because they produce psychological demobilization and undermine readiness to compete a People take these agreements to symbolize the state of f Belief that War is Inevitable Soviet US relations i Many cause of major wars in past that war couldn t be avoided 1 Ex imperialism as indirect cause of WWI ii Treaties will determine our fates not arms Huntington The Clash of Civilizations I The Next Pattern of Conflict a He quotes new phase as end of history similarity to Fukuyama i Return of traditional rivalries decline of nation states b Thesis the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural i Between nations groups of different civilizations c Previously i After Peace of Westphalia only really conflict among princes monarchs attempting to expand territories ii French Revolution between nations instead of princes iii Russian Revolution conflict of ideologies communism fascism Nazism liberal democracy 1 ALL WESTERN CONFLICTS 2 William Lind calls them Western Civil Wars II d Now focusing on interaction between West and non West The Nature of Civilizations a 1st 2nd 3rd
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