04 09 2013 Nuclear Deterrence I Nuclear deterrence Why don t we use our nuclear weapons Morals ecological destruction end of everything no justification Destructiveness point Nukes are the most destructive Aren t weapons supposed to be more destructive Isn t that the Since the Industrial revolution we ve been trying to kill each other better and doing it on a wider scale Firebombing daisy cutter o WWII yup everybody fucked everything up o Dresden and Hamburg firebombing o Tokyo firebombing 85 200K civilians killed Hiroshima and Nagasaki o Do or die either drop the bombs or an invasion would be a battle to the last man o No blow back from the bombs dropping Bombs on Japan was better than an invasion and Generals did not find a problem with ordering those attacks Lack of Opportunity Nope there were definitely chances to use nukes o Korean war McArthur wanted to use them and Truman said no Smaller and for everything that has ever been created to go BOOM Battlefield Utility Tactical nuclear weapons We ve got them Depleted uranium Can put it on anything Shells bullets That s right They re wrong immoral Creates more force on impact Are you telling me we can kill shit harder They are now After WWII people have been lashing out against nukes being Exponential death 75K on impact and then 200K had died by 1950 due to used developed kept Human tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki Radiation the bombs and their radiation People s IQ s have gone down due to the radiation New norm of deterrence Balance of terror sums it up no one will ever use these weapons but no one will ever fuck with the country crazy enough to have them Not a balance of power any more unacceptable amounts of destruction could be sent either way USA or USSR Countries that didn t have nukes helped push this new norm of deterrence of not actually using nukes Effects on Policy Neither the USA or USSR banned nukes they didn t trust each other They can control who has them and who develops them NPT 1968 Nuclear Proliferation Treaty to control who can get use or develop nukes Pretty much everyone has signed Except India Pakistan Israel and Taiwan North Korea is withdrawn from it Biological weapons treaty 1972 and chemical weapons convention 1993 Disarmament Liberal idea struck down Nobody wanted to disarm US USSR Realists what if a nation hasn t gotten rid of their nukes Or develop them Have so many nukes nuclear triad land air and sea that no matter what after the fact Screws the security dilemma Deterrence via Extreme build up USA and USSR Focus on nukes and tactical nukes you will be able to launch an attack back Can t take out all the nukes in the first strike Actually enhanced the security dilemma Deterrence via Arms Control and MAD Don t get rid of them but keep them Number cap Everyone is allowed to have them but no arms race Same level of capability to use arms Mutual vulnerability MAD mutual assured destruction All powers are vulnerable to destruction But there must be a strike back or else there isn t any MAD Arms Control History see slide From MAD to MAP MAP Hold the politicians liable Real history of Arms control 1963 Partial test ban treaty 1968 NPT 1968 SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 1972 ABM Treaty limited ICBM interceptors 1979 SALT II 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 1990 s START 91 93 97 1972 Biological Weapons Treaty 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention Nuclear Deterrence March 28 2013 Nuclear Proliferation I Nuclear Taboo Nina Tannenwald II Meaning of Proliferation Rogue States III Deterrence and Small New States A Preconditions B Problems C Regional Conflict A Individual Norms B International Norms Shapes Strategy C Nuclear Norms D Do Norms Matter IV Constructivism and Identity Perspective I Nuclear Taboo Nina Tannenwald Idea that use of Nuclear weapons is morally wrong When they began to understand how destructive they were Indiscriminant in killing Kept killing even after it went off o Birth defects in Japan Potential of radioactive contamination that came with using the weapons not just affect 1 country but potentially everyone If country wants to use them then they are looked down upon as pariahs Nuclear Taboo Nina Tannenwald o world has come to agree that use of nuclear weapons is wrong and even suggestion of it has become a taboo this is the threat you DON T make SO many people had nuclear ability that we realized if there was a nuclear war it would mutually destroy everything deterrence MAD developed ways to control limit and reduce II Meaning of Proliferation Proliferation spreading of offensive nuclear capabilities to non NPT states Not U S France Britain China instead Iran N Korea Sanctions if defy NPT and have signed Criticism Bullying by U S Not bullying Why defy nukes NPT enforced by U N where U S member but not only member Not for defense so raises red flags because in age where we don t use Rogue State State that seeks to acquire nuclear weapons In complete defiance of our international agreements and norms Motives are questioned o North Korea o Iran III Deterrence and Small New States Offensive realist view Argued more nuclear weapons means more deterrence Apply to large powers not small new states If new states became nuclear states Potentially does opposite and increases Deterrence and non use require certain preconditions and thought new security dilemma states don t meet them A Preconditions are some preconditions if possession of nuclear weapons is going to provide deterrence then there Have strong stable government Sophisticated technology Have model communication system Large stock piles that are spread out ideal nuclear triad Precautions built into system along with good security Second strike capability if want deterrence Criticism who is talking about and does it apply to smaller weaker new states post 1945 Would having this technology make stronger or increase likelihood of war instead of deterrence B Problems Apply to larger powers NPT nuclear powers but not smaller or newly forming states Often new states didn t have strong governments and were vulnerable Many dictatorships Leader who doesn t use restraint and if weak command in control might not have good security to protect nuclear facility and more vulnerable to accidents occurring Also inadequate arsenals for newer states may not have second strike capabilities and may be more vulnerable to attack NEED nuclear triad Limited technology in communications not enough technology for security no adequate forewarning bad
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