CPO 2002 Introduction to Comparative Political Science Suggestions for reviewing for Exam 2 The exam will be multiple choice using scantron forms so you will need to bring your own 2 pencils The questions will be similar to the types of questions you have seen on the homework Exam 2 will cover the following chapters lectures Ch 7 8 9 10 12 List of general topics likely to appear on Exam 2 non exhaustive Definitions and Concepts Bottom up transition Bottom up transitions to democracy East Germany 1989 Protests on the streets of Leipzig and Berlin forced the Communist East German government to open up the Berlin Wall and allow free multi party elections o Emergence of democratic east Germany o Unification of Germany in 1990 Perestroika economic restructuring was a reform policy aimed at liberalizing and regenerating the Soviet economy Glasnost openness was a reform policy aimed at increasing political openness Top down transition Top down transition to democracy Policy of liberalization on part of authoritarian elites themselves o Designed to stabilize dictatorship but may lead to democracy Game theoretic model of top down transitions The story Split between soft liners and hard liners in authoritarian regimes Policy of liberalization entails a controlled opening of the political space and might include the formation of political parties holding elections writing a constitution establishing a judiciary opening a legislature and so on Goal of soft liners it to incorporate opposition groups into authoritarian institutions o Co opt oppositions groups divide and control them o Broadened dictatorship The Model Soft liners preference orderings CPO 2002 Introduction to Comparative Political Science o Broadened dictatorship Status Quo Narrow dictatorship Democratic transition Insurgency Preference ordering for democratic opposition o Democratic transition Broadened dictatorship Status Quo Insurgency Narrow dictatorship Complete information game is one in which each player knows all the information that there is to know about the game o Identity of the players o Choices available to each player o The order of the choices o The possible outcomes o Preferences of the players over the outcomes Soft liners know what type of opposition they are dealing with o Strong or weak Top down transitions occur if authoritarian soft liners are uncertain about the type of opposition they are facing Transition games have two implications o When we are likely to see institutionalized dictatorships Those with legislatures political parties elections etc o It is possible to have authoritarian soft liners who would like to open up the political system by introducing liberalizing reforms but who choose nevertheless to do nothing because they know that they cannot control the liberalization process if they start it Broadened dictatorship A less repressive form of dictatorship in which some liberalizing reforms have taken place Collective action problem theory Refers to the pursuit of some objective by groups of individuals Typically the objective is some form of public good CPO 2002 Introduction to Comparative Political Science Collective Action Theory Focuses on forms of mass action or collective action Provides a possible explanation for the apparent stability of communism in postwar East Germany and why public demonstrations are rare in dictatorships Collective action refers to the pursuit of some objective by group of individuals Typically the objective is some form of public good o Revolutions o Interest group activities o Strikes o Elections o Public television fund raising drives o Fraternities sororities Public good a non excludable and non rivalrous good o Clean air o Lighthouse o Public radio o Public park o Fire stations o National defense Non excludability means that you cannot exclude people from enjoying the public good Non rivalry means that there is just as much public good for people to enjoy no matter how many people consume it Collective action free rider problem refers to the fact that individual members of a group often have little incentive to contribute to the provision of a public good that will benefit all members of the group Analytically o Group of N individuals o K individuals in the group must contribute or participate for public good to be provided o Benefit B o Cost C o If K 1 K less than or equal to N B greater than 0 Irrespective of whether everyone participated in the pro democracy rally or not C great than 0 Paid by those who participates or contributes o Assume B great than C If not no one would contribute Makes no sense to participate because only cost C would be incurred Makes no sense to participate because a lot of people are already CPO 2002 Introduction to Comparative Political Science C 0 o If K or more participating B C Might as well free ride o If exactly K 1 B Participation is crucial Success of the protest depends on it B C 0 o ONLY TWO POSSIBLE TYPES OF EQUILIBRIA No one participates in the pro democracy rally Fewer than K 1 or K or more No one will want to individually deviate by participating because they will pay the cost and a one person rally will be a failure Exactly K individuals do Exactly K 1 If K individuals participate then none will want to stay home because rally will fail without them None of the other group members will want to protest because their group participation is costly and not crucial to the rally s success o Two factors that are crucial for determining likely success of collective action Difference between K and N Incentive to free ride becomes greater the larger the difference between K and N o If K is only slightly smaller than N most members will still think that their participation is crucial o If K is much smaller than N most members will think they are not crucial and can get away with free riding Size of N CPO 2002 Introduction to Comparative Political Science Size of N matter because it influences the likelihood that you will think of yourself as critical to the form of collective action under consideration o Influences the ability of group members to monitor and punish free riders o Larger groups are harder to monitor and identify and harder to punish those who don t participate High levels of free riding Low levels of success o Small groups increased ability to solve free rider problem External imposition of democracy Democracy imposed by military force from an outside source However fails to increase the level of democracy in
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