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CHAPTER 8: DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS Experiments and Culture- We examined how culture might affect democracy using surveyevidence and statistical analyses.- We not look at some experimental results.o Ultimatum and dictatorship games.Ultimatum Game- The Set-up o Players: there is a “proposer” and a “responder.”o The proposer is given a divisible pie: money.o Subjects play anonymously- The Procedure o Step 1: The proposer offers some of the pie to the responder.o Step 2: The responder knowing the offer and size of the pie has to accept or reject the offer.- The Outcome o If the responder accepts, she gets to keep the offer and the proposer keeps the rest.o If the responder rejects, then neither player receivesanything. Dictator Game- The dictator game is exactly the same as the ultimatum gameexcept that the responder is not given an opportunity to accept or reject the offer.o The proposer (dictator) merely dictates the division.o Test of fairness (as opposed to the ultimatum game).o Anonymity means no chance of social repercussions. Ultimatum Game- If the players are self-interested we would expect the proposer to offer ε, where ε is close to zero, and keep therest (1 - ε) for himself.o Because E is better than nothing. Otherwise, you know you will get nothing.Dictator Game- If the players are self-interested we would expect the proposer to offer zero and keep everything for himself.o Because nothing will happen. These games have been played in numerous experimental settingsusing students in virtually all of the industrialized democracies of the world. Proposers nearly always make positive offers. Responders reject a lot of positive offers, especially if theyare low. (20%) Players seem to care about fairness. Several scholars wondered whether these deviations from the theoretical predictions were evidence of a _________________ pattern of human behavior or whether the deviations varied with an individual’s economic and cultural setting. Fifteen small scale societieso Twelve countries on fivecontinents. Three foragingsocieties. Six slash-and-burnhorticulturesocieties.  Four nomadic herdinggroups. Two sedentary,small-scaleagriculture societies.o These societies exhibited a wide range of cultural andeconomic environments.o All groups had mean offers of at least 25%.o Huge variation in offers, means range from 26-58%.o Rates of rejection varied too.o What explains the variance across cultures? Why might some societies differ in their norms of sharing or allocation?o 50% of offers in Tsimane and Machiguena were below 30%.o Tsimane and Machiguenga rarely work together and are almost entirely economically independent at the familylevel.o The mean offer for the Lamelara is close to 60%.o The Lamalera are Indonesian whale hunters and must collaborate to survive.o Au and Gnau in PNG rejected both unfair and hyper-fairoffers. Some groups rejected high offers.o Reflects culture of gift giving in these societies. Accepting gifts commits one to reciprocate at somefuture time to be determined by the giver. Thus, excessively large gifts likely to be rejected.o Ache do not reject low offers but still make offers greater than 40 percent. (So they make generous offersdespite no threat of punishment.)o Ache hunters often leave their kill at the edge of village and will say that their hunt was fruitless. They let others find the food and get first go at it. How might we explain these results?o What about social institutions or cultural norms of fairness? Payoffs to cooperation: how important and how large is a group’s payoff from cooperation in economic production with non-immediate kin? Market integration: how much do people rely on market exchange in their everyday lives? Payoffs to cooperationo Machiguenga and Tsimane were lowest: horticulturalist,family farming. o Lamelara were ranked highest: whale hunters. Market integrationo Hadza were ranked lowest: foraging society, no market integration.o Orma were ranked highest: buy and sell livestock. Higher market integration and payoffs to cooperation led tohigher mean offers.o Account for 66% of variance. Explanationo When faced with novel situation, they look for analogsin their daily experience, saying, “what familiar situation is this like?” and then they act in a way appropriate for analogous situation.o Culture is perhaps a shared way of playing games. Lifeis made up of lots of strategic situations and our culture affects how we play in these games. We can think of a democracy as a game that individuals mustplay. Some countries will find it easier to support democracy than others because the individuals in those countries willhave analogous games in their everyday lives that make it beneficial and easier for them to play the democracy game. In other words, culture (a shared way of playing games) maywell affect the emergence and survival of democracy. We need more research on this question-we just don’t know at the moment.Chapter 8: Democratic Transitions-Despite the consensus that now exists in favor of democracy, it is only since 1992 that the number of democracies worldwide has actually been greater than the number of dictatorships.- The mid 1970s, though, ushered in an era of democratizationthat Samuel Huntington has called the “third wave of democratization”.o Third wave of democratization: refers to the surge in democratic transitions that have occurred around the world since 1974.o Samuel Huntington has argued that the spread of democracy around the world has come in waves, where a wave “is a group of transitions from non-democratic todemocratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that timeperiod. o Three waves of democracy:  First wave of democratization: 1828-1926 First reverse wave: 1922-1942 Second wave of democratization: 1943-1962 Second reverse wave: 1958-1975 Third wave of democratization: 1974-present Bottom-up Democratic Transition- Bottom-up democratic transition: one in which the people rise up to overthrow an authoritarian regime in a popular revolution.- East Germany 1989o East Germany in November 1989 when protests on the streets of Leipzig and Berlin forced the Communist East German government to open up the Berlin Wall and allow free multiparty elections.o The end result was the emergence of a democratic East Germany, and


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FSU CPO 2002 - CHAPTER 8: DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS

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