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CPO2002 Final Review Minimum winning coalition least number of parties needed for a majority Least Minimal Coalition least number of parties with the least surplus seats closest to 50 1 Class Review MC and LMC How many parties What parties I E Party A 40 seats Party B 38 seats Party C 12 seats parties would be a MC I E Party A B C 90 seats Tipping Model A 1 2 3 4 9 10 B 0 1 2 3 9 10 Party A B 78 seats would be a Minimum winning Coalition any combination of 2 of the 3 Party A C 52 seats would be a Least Minimum winning Coalition Majority Surplus Coalition More parties than necessary to hold a majority In A no revolution would occur because the first person needs 1 other person to join and the second person needs 2 other people to join In B there would be a revolution until the fifth person because he needs 9 people to join but there are only 4 ahead of him Broadened dictatorship government contains some opposing factions in the election As ratio of W S increases more public goods will be provided 1 is the max it can be Proportional election vs Majority election 2 3 parties instead of a one party system Allowing elections Public Private Goods Large Winning Coalition public goods Small Winning Coalition private goods IE Party A 33 seats Party B 33 seats Party C 34 seats In majority Party C would get all seats In Proportional election they would share seats based on votes and Party C would be leader Chapter 7 Culture and Religions CULTURE Types of arguments Primordial view Strong cultural argument Some cultures are not combatable with democracy Culture exists prior to and remains unchanged by political interaction Constructivist View Weak cultural argument Culture is constructed or invented rather than inherited Cultures can change some will find it easier to adopt democracy than others Aeschylus noted difference in Asia authoritarianism and Athens democracy Modernization theory Immature Society Large agriculture Small industry Small service Primitive culture dictatorship Mature Society Small agriculture Large industry Large service Civilized culture democracy Problems with culturalist arguments in 18th and 19th century Vagueness no specifications on the parts of culture that are incompatible with democracy so it couldn t be tested Causal relationship culture economic development and democracy are all interrelated so you can t tell which causes the other Religion Clash of Civilizations by Sam Huntington argues that Islam and Confucianism isn t combatable with democracy Arguments against particular religions are based on time Idea that Protestantism is good for democracy mostly Protestant world Idea that Catholicsm is bad for democracy time when very there were few Catholic democracies Idea that Islam is bad democracy present because of the very few Islamic democracies Empirical evidence shows Catholic countries are more likely to become democracies Protestant or Muslim majority has no effect on democracy transitions Overall ethnic religious and cultural diversity DON T aid or harm democratic transitions but ethnic and cultural not religious diversity DOES harm democratic survival Chapter 8 Transitions External Imposition Intervention may promote democratic reform in the short run but produces political instability in long run Bottom up Top Down Democratic reform because of revolts inside the country Democratic transition from a liberalization policy on the part of the government Often meant to strengthen the dictatorship but sometimes leads to democracy Liberalizations opening the political space to include elections more political parties a constitution a legislature a judiciary etc Goal is a Broadened Dictatorship Collective Action Concerns the pursuit of public goods by groups of individuals Problem not all individuals will participate in achieving the public good that benefit all K or more Player 1 has the incentive to not participate if there is already the required number of people to get the public good K Tipping Model A 1 2 3 4 9 10 B 0 1 2 3 9 10 In A no revolution would occur because the first person needs 1 other person to join and the second person needs 2 other people to join In B there would be a revolution until the fifth person because he needs 9 people to join but there are only 4 ahead of him Private preferences and revolutionary thresholds may move against the regime but not actually produce a revolution Chapter 9 Performance Democracy vs Dictatorship growth Przeworski and Limongi studied and found that neither is better worse for growth than the other Democracy is sufficient for good performance and growth Selectorate theory Types of governments do have a clear effect on policy and outcomes Political leaders are motivated by desire to gain and maintain office Competitive nature of politics Some act in ways that benefits society other in ways that benefits themselves depending on the environments they struggle to stay in office Selectorate and Winning Coalition Winning Coalition W part of the selectorate whose support is necessary for the Selectorate S people who play a role in selecting the leader leader to stay in power Disenfranchised those who don t have a legal right to participate in choosing the government Leader must keep the W happy with either public or private goods The incumbent must compete with the challenger s offers of public private goods See class review section for more info on the size of W and W S and goods Loyalty norm If W S is large there is a weak loyalty norm members of W have a credible exit threat and opposite for a small W S Leaders want small W and large S Members of W want large Members of S not W want large W S but small W W S and large W Better government performance as both W and Bad when W and W S are small W S get larger Autocracies Small W small S seem to perform better than small W big S systems Chapter 11 Governments Formateur and Informateur Informateur nominates the formateur Formateur NORMALLY not always the leader from the party winning the most seats Majority Government Single party majority a single party controls a legislative majority Surplus majority government more parties than necessary to control a legislative majority Common in times of crisis may be required to change the constitution strategic interest Minimal winning coalition MWC just enough parties to control a legislative majority Least minimal winning Coalition the MWC with the lowest number of surplus seats Goals of actors Office seeking interested in


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FSU CPO 2002 - Final Review

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CHAPTER 1

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Test 1

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Exam 1

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Exam 2

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