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Chapter 2 Comparative Govt Study Guide Exam 1 Categorical Syllogism consists of a major minor premise and a conclusion Major premise is in form of If P then Q P antecedent Q consequent ex If a country is wealthy then it will be a democracy 1 Affirming the Antecedent valid argument P The country is wealthy Q therefore the country is a democracy 2 Denying the Antecedent invalid argument P The country is not wealthy Q therefore the country is not a democracy 3 Affirming the Consequent invalid argument P the country is a democracy Q therefore the country is wealthy 4 Denying the Consequent valid argument P the country is not a democracy Q therefore the country is not wealthy Scientific Statements has to be falsifiable meaning the statement must be potentially testable Necessary v s Sufficient Condition Necessary Condition a circumstance that if the condition was not presence then t he particular phenomenon could not occur Sufficient A circumstance in whose presence the phenomenon in question must occur Falsification is an approach to science in which scientists generate or deduce testable hypotheses from theories designed to explain phenomena of interest Deduce formulate an expectation about what we ought to observe in light of particular theory about the world and then sets out to see if our observations are consistent with that theory Inclusion who is allowed to participate Politics subset of human behavior that involves use of power or influence all forms of social interaction are of one subject trying to influence or avoid influence of the other a k a someone always in power Game Theory fundamental tool for analyzing strategic situations the choice of one subject depends on the choice made by others Rule 1 players always choose to do what is in their best interest Rule 2 players prefer outcomes with higher payoffs to outcomes with lower ones payoffs game indicates how the players value each of the possible outcomes Chapter 3 Two versions to play 1 Normal strategic form games where players make decisions at the same time use game theory box ex two guys are at a bar they see three girls 2 brown 1 blonde blonde is valued more the outcome they value most is 4 and least is 1 possible outcomes player 1 player 2 F F F B B F B B player 1 payoffs B F F F B B F B player 2 payoffs F B F F B B B F Equilibrium both go for blonde 2 Extensive players take turns to make decisions use game tree and solve with backwards induction ex Outcome Player 1 goes up Player 2 goes down Player 1 goes right Payoffs 4 5 SGP up right down EVL Game there are 2 players the citizen and the state When there is a negative change in your environment you have three choices Exit you accept negative change and alter your behavior to achieve the best outcome possible in new environment Voice complain protest lobby or take direct action to try to change the environment back to its original condition Loyalty you accept the fact that your environment has changed and make no change to your behavior E exit playoff value varies C value will be given L loyalty payoffs state gets If L 1 state is autonomous If L 1 state is dependent C cost of using voice C 0 1 value of benefit to state 0 loss to the citizen for remaining loyal Assume E 1 C Outcome list expected outcome Payoffs what did each player end up with SGP list all the actions each player took Example 1 State has a creditable exit threat and state is dependent meaning E 0 and L 1 Solve using backwards induction 1 Does Citizen want to exit or remain loyal Meaning does citizen want a pay off of 0 C or E C Knowing that E and C are numbers bigger then 0 lets assume they re 1 Would citizen rather have 0 1 or 1 1 or 1 v s 0 Citizen will chose 0 or E C because it is a higher payoff 2 Does the State want to respond or ignore KNOWING the citizen will remain loyal So does the state want a payoff of L or of 1 Since we know L 1 the state will chose L 3 Does the Citizen want to exit remain loyal or use their voice knowing the state will respond The citizen must chose between E or 0 or 1 C We have to assume E 1 C Knowing C is greater than 0 citizen must chose 1 CC and therefore use their voice The outcome Citizen uses their voice the state responds Payoffs 1 C L SGP voice exit respond Example 2 Citizen does not have a credible exit threat and the state is autonomous meaning E 0 and L 1 Solve using backwards induction 1 Does Citizen want to exit or remain loyal Does the citizen want a payoff of 0 C knowing C 0 assume 1 or E C knowing E 0 assume 1 so does citizen want 1 or 0 0 Therefore the Citizen will remain loyal 2 Does the State want to respond or ignore KNOWING the citizen is going to remain loyal Does the state want a payoff of L knowing L 1 assume 1 or 1 1 because L 1 So the State will ignore 3 Knowing the state will ignore and the citizen will remain loyal does the citizen want to exit loyal or voice so E 0 or E C We know E 0 so the citizen will not exit We are assuming E C is 0 but it could be more negative considering E 0 therefore the citizen will pick 0 and remain loyal Outcome The citizen remains loyal Payoffs 0 1 L SGP Loyal Loyal Ignore Chapter 4 State an entity that uses coercion and the threat of force in a given territory Weber human community that claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a territory Douglas North organization with a comparative advantage in violence extending over a geographical area whose boundaries are determined b its powers to tax constituents Charles Tilly relatively centralized differentiated organizations the officials of which more or less successfully claim control over the chief concentrated means violence within a population inhabiting a large contiguous territory Failed State is a state like entity that cannot coerce and is unable to successfully control the inhabitants of a given territory ex Somalia had no army no state bureaucracy no police force or courts and no state to provide electricity water road maintenance schools health or immigration services State of Nature a term used to describe situations in which there is no state Thomas Hobbes states even the weakest individual in the state of nature had enough power to overcome the strongest either by trickery or by joining forces with others threatened by the power of the strongest So each citizens could hurt their neighbor but knows their neighbor is doing the same thing The citizen basically has two choices to steal or refrain from stealing Hobbes …


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FSU CPO 2002 - Chapter 2 Categorical Syllogism

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