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UCLA HIST 127C - Political Instability

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History 127CGetty2012 FallWeek 5Lecture 9October 30Announcements- Required reading: Darkness at Noon (Koestler) Outline of Last Lecture [10-23-12]; Midterm [10-25-12]I. Midterm InformationII. Trotsky and Stalin on the PartyIII. “Scissors Crisis”IV. How to Close the Scissors?V. NEP Problems: 1927VI. “Extraordinary Measures”VII. Bukharin / The “Right Opposition”VIII. Stalin v. BukharinIX. Lenin and Trotsky: “permanent revolution”X. 1920sXI. 1929XII. 1930Outline of Today’s Lecture I. StalinII. Collectivization III. 5 Year PlanIV. “Bolsheviks can storm any fortresses”V. Social TypesVI. Social ConflictsStalin – Three Components- 1) The rapid promotion of the New MenA. The creation of a new intelligentsia- 2) Collectivization of agricultureA. The end of free market and agriculture- 3) Rapid industrialization on a planned basis- Significance: These three policies (above) are going to determine the social and economic policies of the Soviet Union through Stalin’s death and even afterwards- Significance: Foundations of the Soviet regime are laid in this periodCollectivization- The decision to collectivize was taken in 1929 on the basis of bad information- RapidThese notes represent a detailed interpretation of the professor’s lecture. GradeBuddy is best used as a supplement to your own notes, not as a substitute.A. Bad informationi. Kulaks – Stalin and company believed that the problem with agriculture was a conspiracy by the kulaks (rich peasants) to control agricultural marketing by withholding grainii. Ideological blinder – incorrect informationiii. Stalin’s class instinct told him that the class enemy in the villages were theones causing the trouble  temporary measure “dekulakizing” (arresting and deporting kulaks)  full scale agricultural collectivizationiv. Stalin also thought that poor peasants supported collectivization of agricultural; incorrect notionv. Peasant support?vi. Stalin has a class view of the countryside that is divided between the rich (bourgeoisie peasants) and the poor (proletariat peasants)vii. Naturally believed that the poor were against the rich and would support a proletariat collectivized policy the way industrial workers supported industrialization in the cities viii. He also decided on the basis of this and other factors to go as quickly as possible in terms of collectivizing. He also decided to stay committed to this policy (collectivization of agriculture) B. Regional Push-Pulli. 70 provinces ran by a party secretaryii. Party secretaries were always looking out for things that would benefit their province’s budgetsiii. Regional governors supported collectivization because by nationalizing agriculture, they (as chief of their provinces), would have control over agriculture  increase in their own power iv. Regional governors also wanted to collectivize because collectivizing would lead to several arrests (opponents of this policy, i.e. kulaks, other peasants, etc)  create a new class of forced labor / slave labor v. Regional governors wanted to show that they supported Stalin’s ideas andpromised that they could do this and do it fastvi. Because of bad information, input of regional governors, and regional push-pull  Collectivization was implemented fast and everywherevii. [1929]: The new plan was to collectivize everything by 1930  enormous peasant resistance  entire provinces erupted in revoltC. Fear of getting back i. Stalin and the politburo realized that this was a mistake to collective fast but there was a fear of changing slowing down collectivization because it would represent government instability, government uncertainty  collectivized even faster because they couldn’t imagine getting back ii. A number of leftwing communists (supporters of Trotsky) supported fast collectivization - ForcedA. Moscow policyB. “Enthusiasts”C. Wasn’t just politicians who were enthusiastic; a lot of urban, young, party members saw collectivization as the first step of the golden era of communism  even more reason to collectivize faster)D. Urban workers thought it would solve the food supply problems (no more bread shortages) if we take it out of the hands of peasants E. Urban communists thought it was good because it sounded like communism and the abolishment of capitalismF. At first peasants protested against the collective farms by refusing to plant their fields G. Peasants imagined that the regime would turn back if they wouldn’t plant their fields & that the regime wouldn’t let them starve but the regime did in fact let them in starve- 4 million starvedA. Possibly 5-6millionB. Famine beginning in 1931 and 1932C. Famine in 1932 was the worst in Russian history and was one of the worst in European historyD. Some arguments that Stalin purposely initiated the famine to destroy the peasantry and to destroy the Ukrainian peasantry  popularized story in Ukrainetoday + Stalin tried to commit genocide against the Ukraine with a man-made famineE. The famine was not engineered; it was a result of bad policy combined with bad weatherF. Stalin was terrified by this famine because if Ukraine was fatally weakened by lotsof starvation she would be easy pickings for foreign invasionG. Stalin sent food to Ukraine to avert the famine that his policies createdH. The famine was the result of Stalin’s stupid policies; it was not a genocidal planI. Moscow’s constant increasing demand for grain also contributed to the famine- Stalin and company were worried about the DraftA. In a given year, draft-able men are those who were 18 and/or 18+B. Born in 1914 if you were 18 in 1932  1914, the beginning of WWI + the beginning of WWI casualties and Civil War devastation and deathC. Stalin worried that not enough people were born 1914-15; not enough men could be drafted 18years later  draft short, Soviet army weakenedD. Stalin was dependent on Ukrainians young men for the army so the mass famine was man-made (bad weather + bad policy) but not deliberately engineeredE. Reluctance to slow down collectivization  famine, devastation, death - 4 million deported A. Loaded into boxcars and sent to Siberia if they resisted collectivization- 2 million (estimated) in Kazakhstan fled to Afghanistan - Collectivized peasant householdsA. Graph (shown in class) forced, high velocity collectivizationB. Caused by Bolshevik class blinders, false information fed by agents in the provinces, and by this explosion of


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