In a world of sovereign states how can the international community contain states to do what is right If there is no world government does international law affect behavior Chapter 11 International law What is it A body of rules considered to have status of law Warfare Human rights Trade Primary v secondary rules Primary rules don t do x or you must do y Secondary rule rules about how law is made e g constitution Example 1st Geneva Convention Primary rules Two types of international law Customary Develops slowly overt time States recognize practice as appropriate or correct Example diplomatic immunity Treaties Officially negotiates and ratified by states Example the international military tribunal of the far east Example laws of war 1 Geneva convention 1 Treatment of wounded soldiers 1864 2 Treatment of members of armed forces at sea 1906 3 Treatment of prisoners of war 1929 4 Protection of civilians in wartime 1949 R2P responsibility to protect 2001 Endorsed by UNSC in 2006 Fully dead after the first invocation in 2011 Examples laws of war II International laws characteristics Obligations Degree to which states are bound to standards Precision Specificity of obligations Delegations Third party interpretation obligation Soft law Non obligatory Non delegated Imprecise Hard law Obligatory Precise Delegated Example international criminal court ICC the Hague town in the Netherlands A pretty special international legal institution Leaders can be held accountable for crimes against their citizens Important institution for prosecuting crimes against humanity Rome statute of the ICC Establishing in 1998 ratified in 2002 treaty not customary Defines crimes against humanity violent acts when committed as part of a planned and systematic attack directed against any civilian population high precision Empowers the ICC to prosecute punish violators high delegation Whether or not in violation of the domestic la2 of the country where perpetrated Different purposes of international law Coordination easier delegation actually helps make this efficient Obligation and precision can be high without anyone minding Constraint harder States would resist delegation here Obligation typically lower precision varies Does international law matter Depends on how u look at it Proponents point out Compliances rates are high Law gets precise obligation y over time Existence creates compliance constituencies Chayes and Chayes failures to comply mostly caused by imprecision or lack of capacity Skeptics respond Laws too imprecise to constrain bad actors Law follows existing state interests selection Maybe law lacks teeth rarely self enforcing R2P When does international law matter Works better with Punishments provisions delegation Does law have teeth Repeated interactions Think of the prisoner s dilemma Reputational concerns Weak targets Chapter 12 International Norms What are international norms obligations Community belief Shape our ideas Shape our interests Codified Independent of law Norms are Not necessarily contrary to interests Sometimes hard to observe Often most visible when broken Types of norms Standard of behavior for a given identity defined terms of rights and Establish social institutions Constitutive Procedural Regulative How are decisions involving multiple actors made How should actors behave in their interactions with other actors Transnational Advocacy Networks TANs The norm Life Cycle what TANs are trying to achieve Convince Cascade Internalize Roles of TANs TANs as norm initiators Define whats right Name and shame TANs as norms endorsers Participate in treaty negotiations as expert witness Provide public legitimacy Why comply with norms Why do TANs work at all TANs as norm monitors Third part monitors of compliance Why does transnational matter The boomerang model of TANs Either Interests align well coordination TANs not really necessary External costs exist collaboration TANs Summary Human Rights States behavior is constrained by laws but imperfectly and incompletely Laws and norms aim to shape states interests and pref Why do states ever take costly actions to protect the human rights of people outside their borders Given widespread support Defining human rights is not that easy What is a human right Western ideal of human rights one conception of the good life that happens to animate most international HR law Which should take precedence individual rights or stability and order Not something on which there is universal agreement The universal declaration of human rights UN charter article 55 1945 UDHR 1948 Dignity Liberty Equality Brotherhood UDHR binding treaties Two binding agreements International covenant of civil and politicals rights ICCPR Signed in 1965 came to force in 1969 International covenant on economic social and cultural rights ICESCR Signed in 1966 in force 1976 Softer Has the us ratified these Nope Some individual rights to consider ICCPR Should individuals have a right to Physical integrity Freedom from slavery Freedom from torture Arbitrary arrest and detention Fair trial Right to vote Example capital punishment Vague consensus on right masks major differences in definition Conceptions of human rights differ even when culture economies are similar Death penalty right to healthcare are key examples Same social economic rights to consider ICESCR Example education ICCPR article 4 Nonderogable rights Rights cannot be suspended for any reason Why violate human rights Lack of capacity Foreign threats Sovereignty To maintain power National security exceptions Three reasons to sign human rights treaties Lock in prove they are serious Empathy identify with a common humanity Inducements linkage Do human rights treaties make a difference Pessimistic view No third party enforcement May be simply expressive For some treaties signing is correlated with abuse Optimistic view Positive effects may be longer term human rights is a new concept historically speaking TANs can generate pressure Need to be combined with strong domestic institutions Enforcement Why might states not enforce human rights treaties abroad Depends on Cost benefits analysis Motives to punish violators may be weak or provide too few Interests benefits States are less likely to enforce when They experience domestic pressure Serves larger geopolitical interests Can be consistent with sovereignty noninterference Will protection improve Traditional justice Individual petition Universal jurisdiction International
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