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1Study guide for the midtermPreface/Chapter 21) The definition of cooperation and bargaining.Cooperation: An interaction in which two or more actors adopt policies that make atleast one actor better off relative to the status quo without making others worse off.Bargaining: an interaction in which actors must choose outcomes that make one betteroff at the expense of another. Bargaining is redistributive: it involves allocating a fixed sum ofvalue between different actors.2) The conditions under which cooperation is promoted (even without institution) --Number of members? Size of privilege groups? and so on…-Smaller numbers of actors and groups makes for better cooperation-firms can organize easier to lobby their governments for trade protection thancan consumers who are typically more numerous3) The concepts of institutions and actorsInstitutions: sets of rules, known and shared by the community, that structure politicalinteractions in specific ways.Actors: the basic unit for the analysis of international politics; can be individuals orgroups of people with common interests.4) Definitions of the coordination/collaboration problems and examplesPrisoner’s Dilemma: Coordination-Gain by making the same choices and subsequentlyhave no incentive to not comply. Collaboration-Gain from working together but nonetheless haveincentives to not comply with any agreement.5) Definition of public good and the example of collective action problemPublic Good: individually and socially desirable goods that are non-excludable and non-rival in consumption, such as national defense.Collective Action Problem: Obstacles to cooperation that occur when actors haveincentives to collaborate but each acts in anticipation that others will pay the costs ofcooperation. (Working in groups/if others are working why should you when you benefit fromtheir work?)6) The condition under which actors have an advantage from bargaining -- The concept of reversion outcome and how is it related to the advantage?-----Reversion outcome is what happens when no bargain is reached. Interestson reversion outcome affect the bargaining and the one more satisfied with the reversionoutcome has less incentive to make concession. 7) The definition of anarchy and how is it related to international cooperation?With international cooperation there is lack of centralization, therefore there is nobody toenforce the actions of others. 8) The function and nature of international institutions2Facilitate cooperationChapter 31) The cause of war?War happens from bargaining failures.-incomplete information-commitment problems-indivisible goods2) Why do people bargain? To resolve disputes over the allocation of a good.3) What make bargaining fail? How can we decrease the probability of war?- more information or less information?o Less information=bargaining failure.o More information=decreased probability- costly signal or cheap signal? o Cheap signal=bargaining failo Costly signal=decrease probability- future power shift or stable power distribution? o Future power shift=bargaining failo Stable power distribution=decrease probability- preventive war?o A war fought with the intention of preventing an adversary from becomingstronger in the future. Preventive wars arise because states whose power isincreasing cannot commit not to exploit that power in future bargaininginteractions.Chapter 41) Types of domestic actors?1) Leaders who make foreign policy decisions: have the authority to make decisions.2) Organized groupsa. Bureaucraciesb. Interest groups3) General Public: matters when political leaders depend on public’s support.2) Why would some domestic actors be willing to risk conflicts?-take the people’s minds off of economic hardship-secure their hold of power-re-election into office3) General vs. narrow interestsGeneral: Something most actors within a country desire3-security, economic well beingNarrow: Only some within the state desire it, or only some desire it very highly.-very difficult to distinguish between them.4) Definition of diversionary incentive - why it occurs?-the incentive that state leaders have to start international crises in order to rally publicsupport at home.5) How can interest groups influence foreign policy? More precisely which problem do they faceand how can they overcome it? -Influence foreign policy because they are small groups of highly motivated andinformed people and are better able to organize.-Collective Action Problem: cooperating (organizing) is more difficult as group sizeincreases.6) Definition of democracy and democratic peaceDemocracy: a political system in which candidates compete for political office throughfrequent, fair elections in which a sizable portion of the adult population can vote.Democratic Peace: Democracies less likely to fight each other. Less likely at bargainingfailure.7) The mechanism of democratic peace- interests explanation  May have higher audience costs Leaders appear to pay higher political costs for making a challenge and then backingdown Means challenges are more credible Less likely to engage in preemptive wars.- information explanation Less likely to fail at bargaining Better at information problem (transparent) Democracy can make more credible statementsChapter 51) Definition of alliance-institutions that facilitate military cooperation:offensive alliances:defensive alliances2) The reason of forming alliances-Because of common interests-Security3) The conditions under which alliances are successful1) Strong common interests42) Alliance alters member preferences such that fighting is preferred to abandonment3) Alliance is credible to the adversary4) Alliance limits the risk of entrapment4) Why might an alliance entrap a state?-A state can avoid entrapment by making ambiguous commitments, but then the alliancemay be more likely to be challenged. 5) Alliance commitment is always credible? why or why not? -Alliance commitment is NOT always credible.:carrying out an alliance commitment is costly:alliances are not binding contracts; there is no reliable punishment mechanism6) Tradeoff between the credibility of alliances and keeping control of alliance partners-Alliances involve a Credibility-Entrapment Tradeoff. :Ironclad promises can deter challengers, but they


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FSU INR 2002 - Midterm

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