Exam 3 Study Guide Material from Exams 1 2 15 questions on the exam Chapter 3 1 What do states fight over in war They have a conflict over something that they value over the cost of war We should think about the problem of war as a problem of bargaining over objects or issues that are valued by more than one state 2 Why do states go to war despite the fact that a bargaining range exists that they would prefer to war Bargaining failure Positive expected utility they think they ll gain but only 1 side does uncertainty why not communicate Conflicts of interest 3 What is crisis bargaining What is bluffing Crisis bargaining bargaining under the threat of war coercive diplomacy Bluffing misrepresenting information so as not to reveal information ex threatening war when realistically the threat of war can seem too costly to be a reasonable option 4 What are audience costs and how do they influence the possibility of war Audience cost how the public holds their leader accountable the amount of support they have after the outcome of a war negative repercussion for failing to follow through on a threat or to honor a commitment It allows for costly signaling which can mitigate information and commitment problems Leaders appear to pay a higher political cost for making a challenge and then backing down Chapter 4 1 What is the rally round the flag effect and why does it occur Rally round the flag increase in government support during times of crises WHY Greater attachment to in group diversion from other problems allow leaders to scapegoat or blame problems on foreigners 2 What is the diversionary incentive and why might leaders use it How do the benefits of war influence the size of the bargaining range diversionary incentive leaders reason to spark some international conflict in an attempt to keep attention away from problems in own country when things domestically suck it s a way to gain support by creating a conflict and diverting attention elsewhere They can use this to either make the bargaining range larger or shrink it depending on what the cost of war is 3 How is losing a war costly for democratic leaders How is it costly for nondemocratic leaders Autocrats may have larger private gains from war than democrats yet can face extreme punishment over the cost of losing Democratic leaders can lose office and reputation they have higher audience costs and will be more accountable for their actions 1 Why would a country restrict trade Chapter 7 National trade policy depends on economic interests political institutions and interactions with other nations 2 What is the difference between comparative and absolute advantage Comparative Advantage the ability of a country or firm to produce a particular good or service more efficiently than other goods or services such that its resources are most efficiently employed in this activity The comparison is to the efficiency of other economic activities the actor might undertake not to the efficiency of other countries or firms Absolute Advantage The ability of a country or firm to produce more of a particular good or service than other countries or firms using the same amount of effort or resources QUALITY comparative OVER QUANTITY absolute 3 What does the Ricardo Viner theories say about trade policy preferences Ricardo Viner asks why whole industries often act together some factors of production are specific to particular industries a worker s interests flow from her sector of the economy rather than the factor she owns don t look at the factor production look at the industry industry specific not mobile 4 What are the problems associated with creating cooperative trade policy and how can they be remedied International trade bargaining problems can resemble a Prisoner s Dilemma o Both sides would be better off reducing trade barriers o But concerns about cheating cause both sides to act non cooperatively Trade disputes often over dumping implies selling goods below the true cost of production in order to drive out competitors and gain market share allegations can impede cooperation How can they be remedied o Linking issues allows governments to trade cooperative policies if you cooperate on my problem I ll cooperate on yours o International institutions can help overcome collective action and other strategic problems Ex World Trade Organization WTO North American Free Trade Agreement NAFTA o Small numbers information repeated interaction o Hegemonic stability The existence of one very powerful nation helps solve collective action and free riding problem Chapter 10 1 How can domestic interests institutions help hurt economic growth Government policies have a significant effect on a country s economic growth Domestic political institutions that cater to narrow interests are likely to stunt economic growth Domestic political institutions that cater to broad interests are likely to foster economic growth 2 What explains the difference in development of Latin American colonies versus North American colonies Type of economic activity and degree of equality influences the development of democratic political institutions 3 What is import substituting industrialization ISI produce everything domestically to hell with trade bump up trade barriers ISI is based on the premise that a country should attempt to reduce its foreign dependency through the local production of industrialized products 4 What is export oriented industrialization Develop industries specifically to export goods much more successful than ISI Chapter 6 terrorism portions only 1 What is the definition of terrorism Terrorism violence against civilians for political purposes by non state actors 2 Why do some groups resort to the use of terrorism What is asymmetrical warfare Due to bargaining failure incomplete information commitment issues Asymmetrical warfare weak actors vs strong actors 3 How do terrorists go about accomplishing their goals Who do they generally target Using violence through purposive behavior to bypass the other sides military Civilians noncombatant targets 4 How do the concepts of incomplete information and commitment problems play into bargaining and terrorism Incomplete Information Terrorists have private info they can t credibly reveal to targets Commitment problems Hard for terrorists to commit to no future attacks also hard for govt to not violate any agreement 5 What strategies policies do governments use to respond and deter terrorism Coercion trying to get what
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