CH 3 Why Are There Wars VOCABULARY WAR an event involving the organized use of military force by at least two parties that satisfies some minimum threshold of severity INTERSTATE WAR a war in which the main participants are states CIVIL WAR a war in which the main participants are within the same state such as the government and a rebel group CRISIS BARGAINING a bargaining interaction in which at least one actor threatens to use force in the event that its demands are not met COERCIVE DIPLOMACY the use of threats to influence the outcome of a bargaining interaction BARGAINING RAGE the set of deals that both parties in a bargaining interaction prefer to the reversion outcome When the reversion outcome is war the bargaining rage is the set of deals that both sides prefer to war COMPELLENCE an effort to change the status quo through the threat of force DETERRENCE an effort to preserve the status quo through the threat of force I Purpose of War Defining war o The force has to be organized o Force has to be used by at least two sides o Scholars often require that a war have at least 1000 battle deaths o If both parties are states we call this interstate war o If the parties are actors within a state this is a civil war States fight either to increase their own power or decrease the power of others What do states fight over o Territory Most common source of war Territories might contribute to the wealth of a state Especially with valuable resources Also economically valuable If it has military strategic value Might be valuable for ethnic cultural or historical reasons o National policy regime policy One state that enacts a policy benefits itself but harms the interests of another More often war over regime type than leader Then replace with friendlier regime Why some wars happen and others don t incomplete expectations of war institutions o International system lacks reliable legal judicial and electoral So they must settle their conflicts through bargaining o Different interests don t always make them go to war US Canada have total different interests and very friendly o Misperception II Bargaining and War They misunderstood the power and the outcome The bargaining process does not always imply that differences will be split in many cases states assume all or nothing o We then enter coercive crisis bargaining when a state seeks to influence the outcome of bargaining by using military force o The costs and likely outcome of war define the range of acceptable outcomes Because war is costly a settlement that all sides prefer to war generally exists o The set of deals that State A prefers to war and the set of deals that State B prefers to war overlap creating a bargaining rage Types of bargaining failures o Incomplete Information Problems About their capability the state s physical ability to prevail in war About their resolve a state s willingness to bear the costs of fighting and how much the state values the object of the dispute relative to those costs But why not just communicate You don t want to reveal your cards till the end Poker You have the incentive to bluff or misrepresent to have the other give in Important ways for resolving uncertainty Brinkmanship Adversaries take actions that increase the risk of accidental war in hope the other will blink first and make concessions o Ex Cuban Missile Crisis Make public threats that make it difficult to Tying hands back down o Audience cost the penalty you pay if you back down from your word You increase audience cost if you tie hands Paying for power Committing resources in order to communicate your willingness to go to war Ex increasing military power When there s a large and rapid shift in power a state cant make a credible commitment that it wont exploit that power in future bargaining interactions So a state might go to preventative war to stop them from gaining power and facing worse damage in the future Or preemptive war when they feel an attack by the other state is imminent Shift in power between domestic factions Costs of preserving the status quo o Credible Commitment Problems Example dividing apparently indivisible goods cant be divided with out destroying its value Territory like Jerusalem is hard to divide up Its more of a commitment problem then actually dividing it We ll give you access but the other state cant believe it III How to make war less likely Raising the costs of war o One of the main disincentives for engaging in war is the abhorrent human economic material and psychological costs it imposes So raise the costs of war to expand the set of settlements that all sides prefer to fighting o Trade and financial relations between states can also promote peace by increasing the economic costs of war o This allows for less information problems o Military capabilities are probably the easiest factor to vender transparent Can also enhance transparency by providing neutral observers of a states militaries activities Increase transparency o Third parties can play a role by monitoring enforcing Outside enforcement agreements o Ex powerful UN Power sharing This also raises the cost of war o There may be ways to allocate apparently indivisible goods Joint or shared control over the good Compensation on another issue This could be through money or another way o Socially agreed upon rules not backed by enforcers but by Norm development society Promote peaceful norms 04 14 2015 04 14 2015
View Full Document
Unlocking...