International Relations 01 25 2014 What does game theory tell us about international politics If we apply different games to politics then we have different beliefs and explanations for how the world works The payoffs and structure of games capture our assumption and beliefs about international politics Interactions Cooperation and Bargaining Strategic interactions fall into one of two categories Cooperation or bargaining Cooperation One or both actors become better off Neither becomes worse off Positive sum game When actors have a shared interest I achieving an outcome and work together the interaction is cooperative Opportunities for cooperation often arise in social and political life What don t actors always cooperate Coordination problems Once coordination is achieved no one benefits from defecting Why don t actors always cooperate 1 Coordination problems Once coordination is achieved no one benefits from defecting 2 Collaboration problems Consistent temptation to defect undermines cooperation The students dilemma is an example you know to cooperate but you still cheat on another students test Special type of collaboration problem Public goods Public goods means I can use them as much as I want not excludable cant prevent anyone from using them Ex public park Efforts to produce public goods are hindered by collective action problems Each individual has an incentive to free ride free ride meaning anyone can go enjoy any public goods When is it easier for actors to cooperate Smaller numbers Repeated play Information Institutions can help Bargaining Outcomes that make one better off at the expense of the other Zero sum game Bargaining conflict Institutions Do rules matter in world politics Institutions sets of rules known and shared by the relevant community that structure political interactions in particular ways Ex institution of marriage like the rules no cheating How do institutions affect cooperation Institutions usually promote cooperation through enforcement or imposing punishments on actors who fail to cooperate But international institutions lack the capacity to impose punishments due to anarchy so who can enforce rules Maybe the UN International institutions make cooperation easier by Setting standards of behavior Verifying compliance Reducing the costs of joint decision making just telling ppl to show up at whatever time Resolving disputes Whom do institutions benefit Institutions are a product of the cooperation and bargaining that created them They rarely benefit everyone equally US electoral institutions the international monetary Fund the United Nations Security council CHAPTER 3 Why do counties go to war War is costly Cost of war could be saved if countries achieved the same outcome without fighting Why don t countries settle beforehand instead of suffering the costs of war International Conflict Most of the time countries settle disputes without going to war If war is costly a bargain exists that both sides prefer to fighting If so war only arises as a result of some bargaining failure U S and Iraq could not reach a bargain Interests What states fight over Territory National Policy Regime type Ethnic or religious divisions Interests and War It is not enough to say that states fight because they have an interest in war States could achieve their interests by bargaining instead of going to war War happens when states are unable to reach a bargain Puzzle Mexican American War U S wants more territory In 1845 tension increases the U S annexes Texas against mexicos will They argue over where to mark the border The U S wins every battle and seizes mexico city Treaty of Gudalupse hidalgo U S got a whole bunch of territories and Mexico gets only 15 million dollars 10 million less than the U S offers Americans spend 100 million dollars on the way and a whole bunch of Americans died Bargaining failures arise from 1 Issue Indivisibilities 2 Incomplete information 3 Problems of credible commitment Bargaining failure 1 Incomplete information States have uncertainty about each others willingness to fight Do not know probability of victory p Do not know costs of fighting a or b Why can t they just tell each other about their capabilities and resolve Countries have incentives to misrepresent private information Costly Signals Costly signals are a way to send information to try and do better in bargaining Signals can communicate resolve and capabilities Signals must be credible to be effective but credibility is hard to achieve Mechanisms for sending costly signals brinkmanship or ship brinkmanship is making the other side back down by getting close to war Tying hands Increase the cost of backing down Iraq War Information problem Iraq depended on its WMD to deter attacks from Iran and domestic rebellion Dismantled its WMD programs under U N pressure but tried to hide this fact so as not to undermine its deterrent Hussein could not truthfully reveal the state of WMD programs Bargaining Failure 2 Problems of credible commitment Commitment problems occur when states cannot credibly promise not to use force Prevents them from agreeing not to fight When do commitment problems occur When states are bargaining over issues that affect their future power When power is changing The Peloponnesian way Athens and Sparta System of Alliances World War 1 Started with the assassination of Franz Ferdinand crown prince of Austria Hungary Germany s blank check Russia s reaction is concerned They mobilize troops and Germany freaks out Changing power in WWII At the time Germany had the largest economy in Europe Russia was growing quickly had large population and land mass Gave Germany an incentive to fight First strike advantage When do commitment problems occur States cannot commit to peaceful bargains when another country is rising in power Preventive war occurs when a country wants to prevent another one from becoming too powerful Preemptive war occurs when countries believe they will eventually be attacked by another They attack first because they have first strike advantage Bargaining Failure 3 Issue indivisibilities Bargaining model assumes that issues are easily divided There may not be possible divisions that within the bargaining space Ex Jerusalem The division issue Yet virtually all issues are divisible in practice sidepayments If bargaining problems cause war how can we pursue peace Make war more costly Make information more available Make commitments credible and transparent
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