NOTES CHAPTER 2 I Interests 3 categories 1 Power or security require a degree of personal security 2 Economic or Material Welfare desire higher standards 3 of living Ideological goals desire democracy human equality etc This shapes what characters believe in These 3 categories shape the schools of realism liberalism and constructivism Actors and Interests II Sovereignty States complete control over their own policies and political processes III Why can t actors get what they want Actors behave with the intention of desiring a specific outcome Actors develop strategies based on interests of others Best Response Strategy do as well as possible in light of the interests and likely strategies of the other relevant actors Game Theory understanding the outcomes produced by the often complex interplay of the strategies of two or more actors This term means to study strategic interactions IV Cooperation and Bargaining People benefit as a group most efficiently when things are done with cooperation New roads are safer for all drivers but not one person can make that happen Pareto Frontier decides who gets the most money how much money is shared between Actor A and B Someone can get it all someone can get none or income can be split Zero Sum Game gains from one side perfectly match the losses on the other This occurs during bargaining Bargaining interactions War V When can actors cooperate Coordination o Happens when actors coordinate their actions with one another and there is no potential benefit from defecting o Example Cars drive on the right side of the road If one car decides he wants to drive on the left side there will be no benefit from that Collaboration o Prisoner s Dilemma Prisoner A is offered to rat on Prisoner B If bother rat on each other they both are screwed If they both keep silent they get off free and split the money It s a guessing game on what the other actor will do o Issues with public goods Although something is available to you it might not be yours to be used If you have a sandwich and you leave it on the counter and someone sees it that does not mean he can take it Actors can enjoy these goods whether or not they are given to them o Example people would love to benefit from national security without paying taxes However people might also love to end genocide but would prefer others risk themselves o Public goods provided by governments Numbers and Relative Sizes of the Actors Easiest for small numbers of people to cooperate rather than large numbers Iteration Linkage and Strategies of Reciprocal Punishment Cooperation occurs better when actors have opportunities to cooperate over time Actors hold others from cheating by forcing to withhold items until further interactions Iteration allows victims to punish cheaters by withholding from future operations linkage allows victims to retaliate by withholding cooperation Main reason why U S and G B are bound together because they have so many ties VIII Information When information is lacked cooperation may fail due to uncertainty Power allows one side the advantage Who wins and loses in Bargaining Reversion Outcome no bargain is reached Actor that is more satisfied with the reversion outcome has less reason to make concessions in order to reach a successful bargain Vice versa Bargaining is based off how each actor evaluates the reversion outcome VI VII IX X Coercion The ability to impose costs on others and to defend them from that International coercion has a lot to do with military force derives from material capabilities like the military The size of a country s economy has a huge impact XI Outside Options In this case reversion outcome is the 2nd best case for the party with the outside option The actor with an attractive alternative can walk away from a crappy bargain more easily XII Agenda Setting Actors consent to painful concessions when the consequences of not agreeing are more painful Agenda setting allows actions to be taken prior to bargaining which makes the reversion outcome more favorable for one party XIII XIV XV XVI Institutions Do rules matter in World Politics Generally serve to facilitate cooperation among their own members How do Institutions Affect Cooperation When institutions have means of imposing punishments for defection they can effectively enforce cooperation Example a sales contract between a customer and a firm can be enforced through courts However the rulings are backed by police powers International institutions facilitate cooperation by making self enforcement easier 4 ways 1 Setting standards of behavior 2 Verifying compliance 3 Reducing the cost of joint decision making 4 Resolving disputes Setting Standards of Behavior Allow people to determine if someone is violating rules Example Your parents say Don t stay out late or else What is late What is or else This conflict is avoided by saying Be home by 9 or no television Self reporting is common Verifying Compliance However people lie in the reports Some international agreements involve on site inspections XVII Reducing the cost of joint decision making Imagine if EVERYONE in a state had to agree to a law in order for it to be formed Or would it be by majority rules As a result societies create political institutions that define how decisions are made XVIII Resolving Disputes When parties disagree about whether one or more of them violated an agreement it is nice to have a prior agreement to help handle the situation XIX Whom do Institutions benefit People with large population benefited more than small states because they had more say The compromise was House of Reps would be population advantageous and the Senate would help the small states by putting two seats reserved per state General Assembly of United Nations has rule one country one vote This means china population 1 3 billion has same say as Tuvalu 11 000 UNSC has voting privileges that help 5 states U S G B France Russia and China XX Why follow the rules Many problems in international relations combine both cooperation and bargaining therefore actors agree to the rules for the cooperation they facilitate even if it means the outcome goes against them Rules are already in place and cheaper to use CHAPTER 3 I What do States fight over Territory Policies Regime II Bargaining and War o Contributes to the wealth of the state economically valuable and militarily valuable Although bargaining usually helps both sides does not mean both sides are happy Some people have the all or
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