INR2002 Chapter 2 Interests Interactions Institutions Topic 3 4 Exam 1 Monday 09 26 2011 Rachel Kay 09 12 2011 09 14 2011 Contents CHAPTER 2 Interests Interactions and Institutions Lecture Notes 1 KEY TERMS 4 TEXTBOOK CHAPTER REVIEW 5 Chapter Quiz 8 INR2002 2 Interests Interactions and Institutions CHAPTER 2 Interests Interactions and Institutions Lecture Notes I Interests What actors want to achieve through political action 09 12 2011 a Ex US wants security b Actors are individuals or groups of people with common interests c Actors want power or security economic or material goals or ideological goals II Interactions the ways in which the choices of two or more actors combine to produce political outcomes a The Prisoners Dilemma The point of these exercises is that you can t always get what you want And people anticipate the reaction of others before they act Actors are purposive The best response strategy does not guarantee that an actor will get what it wants the most Page 1 INR2002 2 Interests Interactions and Institutions CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS Soviet Union Withdraw Missiles Keep Missiles coop Defect US CD C USSR 3 32 4 D 4 21 1 Back Down Stand Firm Back DownStand Firm Coop Defect coop Defect United States 3 32 44 21 1 4 is best 1 is worst III IV Why don t actor always cooperate a Coordination problems b How are we going to do this c Collaboration problems i Once coordination is achieved no one benefits from defecting 09 14 2011 i Consistent temptation to defect undermines cooperation ii The Student s Dilemma is an example iii Can you think of situations in international politics where states always have an incentive to defect d Special type of collaboration problem public goods i Efforts to produce public goods are hindered by collective action problems ii Each individual has an incentive to free ride V When is it easier for actors to cooperate a Smaller numbers b Repeated play c d Information Institutions can help VI Bargaining a Outcomes that make one better off at the expense of the other b Zero sum game c Bargaining is a form of conflict d Purely redistributive e Cooperation creates additional value while bargaining only allocates a fixed sum of value VII Who wins and who loses in bargaining a A core concept in international politics i Power the ability of actor A to get actor B do something that B would otherwise not do b The more power an actor has the more it can expect to get from others in bargaining c What makes actors powerful in international politics Page 2 INR2002 2 Interests Interactions and Institutions i Military power ii Resources iii Strong leadership iv Wealth v Geography as a liability VIII Elements of power a Freedom from invasion b Source of wealth or lack thereof c Population i Quantity ii Quality d Economic and military power IX Comparing States Power CINC X Other sources of bargaining power a Liking the status quo reversion outcome b Outside options c Agenda setting first mover s advantage XI Institutions Do rules matter in world politics XII How do institutions make cooperation easier by a Setting standards of behavior b Verifying compliance c Reducing the costs of joint decision making d Resolving disputes a Composite index of national capabilities reflects a state s share of global power b Demographic capabilities c Industrial capabilities d Military capabilities a Institutions sets of rules known and shared by the relevant community that structure political interactions in particular ways Page 3 INR2002 2 Interests Interactions and Institutions 1 Interests what actors want to achieve through political action their preferences over the outcomes that might result from their political choices 2 Actors the basic unit for the analysis of international politics can be individuals or groups of people with common KEY TERMS interests boundaries 3 State a central authority with the ability to make and enforce laws rules and decisions within a specified territory 4 Sovereignty the expectation that states have legal and political supremacy or ultimate authority within their territorial 5 National interests interests attributed to the state itself usually security and power 6 Interactions the ways in which the choices of two or more actors combine to produce political outcomes 7 Cooperation an interaction in which two or more actors adopt policies that make at least one actor better off relative to the status quo without making others worse off 8 Bargaining an interaction in which actors must choose outcomes that make one better off at the expense of another Bargaining is redistributive it involves allocating a fixed sum of value between different actors 9 Coordination a type of cooperation interaction in which actors benefit from all making the same choices and subsequently have no incent to not comply 10 Collaboration a type of cooperative interaction in which actors gain from working together but nonetheless have incentives to not comply with any agreement 11 Public goods individually and socially desirable goods that are nonexcludable and nontribal in consumption such as national defense 12 Collective action problems obstacles to cooperation that occur when actors have incentives to collaborate but ach acts in anticipation that others will pay the costs of cooperation 13 Free ride to fail to contribute to a public good while benefiting from the contribution of others 14 Iteration repeated interactions with the same partners 15 Linkage the linking of cooperation on one issue to interactions on a second issue 16 power the ability of actor A to get actor B to do something that B would otherwise not do The ability to get the other side to make concessions and to avoid having to make concessions oneself 17 coercion the threat of imposition of costs on other actors in order to change their behavior Means of international coercion include military force economic sanctions and embargos 18 Outside options the alternatives to bargaining with a specific actor 19 Agenda setting power a first mover advantage that helps an actor to secure a more favorable bargain 20 Institutions sets of rules known and shared by the community that structure political interactions in specific ways Page 4 21 INR2002 2 Interests Interactions and Institutions Page 5 INR2002 2 Interests Interactions and Institutions TEXTBOOK CHAPTER REVIEW 1 Analytical framework of the book a Parts and processes of interests interactions and institutions b Hypotheses and models of collective action i
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