Study guide for the midterm Preface Chapter 2 1 The definition of cooperation and bargaining Cooperation An interaction in which two or more actors adopt policies that make at least one actor better off relative to the status quo without making others worse off Bargaining an interaction in which actors must choose outcomes that make one better off at the expense of another Bargaining is redistributive it involves allocating a fixed sum of value between different actors 2 The conditions under which cooperation is promoted even without institution Number of members Size of privilege groups and so on Smaller numbers of actors and groups makes for better cooperation firms can organize easier to lobby their governments for trade protection than can consumers who are typically more numerous 3 The concepts of institutions and actors Institutions sets of rules known and shared by the community that structure political interactions in specific ways groups of people with common interests Actors the basic unit for the analysis of international politics can be individuals or 4 Definitions of the coordination collaboration problems and examples Prisoner s Dilemma Coordination Gain by making the same choices and subsequently have no incentive to not comply incentives to not comply with any agreement Collaboration Gain from working together but nonetheless have 5 Definition of public good and the example of collective action problem Public Good individually and socially desirable goods that are non excludable and non rival in consumption such as national defense Collective Action Problem Obstacles to cooperation that occur when actors have incentives to collaborate but each acts in anticipation that others will pay the costs of cooperation Working in groups if others are working why should you when you benefit from their work 6 The condition under which actors have an advantage from bargaining The concept of reversion outcome and how is it related to the advantage Reversion outcome is what happens when no bargain is reached Interests on reversion outcome affect the bargaining and the one more satisfied with the reversion outcome has less incentive to make concession 7 The definition of anarchy and how is it related to international cooperation With international cooperation there is lack of centralization therefore there is nobody to enforce the actions of others 8 The function and nature of international institutions 1 Facilitate cooperation Chapter 3 1 The cause of war War happens from bargaining failures incomplete information commitment problems indivisible goods 2 Why do people bargain To resolve disputes over the allocation of a good 3 What make bargaining fail How can we decrease the probability of war more information or less information o Less information bargaining failure o More information decreased probability costly signal or cheap signal o Cheap signal bargaining fail o Costly signal decrease probability future power shift or stable power distribution o Future power shift bargaining fail o Stable power distribution decrease probability preventive war o A war fought with the intention of preventing an adversary from becoming stronger in the future Preventive wars arise because states whose power is increasing cannot commit not to exploit that power in future bargaining interactions Chapter 4 1 Types of domestic actors a Bureaucracies Interest groups b 1 Leaders who make foreign policy decisions have the authority to make decisions 2 Organized groups 3 General Public matters when political leaders depend on public s support 2 Why would some domestic actors be willing to risk conflicts take the people s minds off of economic hardship secure their hold of power re election into office 3 General vs narrow interests General Something most actors within a country desire 2 security economic well being Narrow Only some within the state desire it or only some desire it very highly very difficult to distinguish between them 4 Definition of diversionary incentive why it occurs the incentive that state leaders have to start international crises in order to rally public support at home 5 How can interest groups influence foreign policy More precisely which problem do they face and how can they overcome it Influence foreign policy because they are small groups of highly motivated and informed people and are better able to organize Collective Action Problem cooperating organizing is more difficult as group size increases failure 6 Definition of democracy and democratic peace Democracy a political system in which candidates compete for political office through frequent fair elections in which a sizable portion of the adult population can vote Democratic Peace Democracies less likely to fight each other Less likely at bargaining 7 The mechanism of democratic peace interests explanation May have higher audience costs Leaders appear to pay higher political costs for making a challenge and then backing down Means challenges are more credible Less likely to engage in preemptive wars information explanation Less likely to fail at bargaining Better at information problem transparent Democracy can make more credible statements Chapter 5 1 Definition of alliance institutions that facilitate military cooperation offensive alliances defensive alliances 2 The reason of forming alliances Because of common interests Security 3 The conditions under which alliances are successful 1 Strong common interests 3 2 Alliance alters member preferences such that fighting is preferred to abandonment 3 Alliance is credible to the adversary 4 Alliance limits the risk of entrapment 4 Why might an alliance entrap a state may be more likely to be challenged A state can avoid entrapment by making ambiguous commitments but then the alliance 5 Alliance commitment is always credible why or why not Alliance commitment is NOT always credible carrying out an alliance commitment is costly alliances are not binding contracts there is no reliable punishment mechanism 6 Tradeoff between the credibility of alliances and keeping control of alliance partners Alliances involve a Credibility Entrapment Tradeoff Ironclad promises can deter challengers but they may make your ally more aggressive or intransigent in negotiations Example U S and Taiwan Taiwan and China do not get along US does business with both of them If USA supplies aircraft for Taiwan to build an extensive Air Force China may feel threatened by this May see this as Taiwan
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