533US2Unit:$U85[10-19-02 15:38:30] PAGES PGT:OPIN606 OCTOBER TERM, 2000SyllabusPALAZZOLO v. RHODE ISLAND et al.certiorari to the supreme court of rhode islandNo. 99–2047. Argued February 26, 2001—Decided June 28, 2001In order to acquire the waterfront parcel of Rhode Island land that is hereat issue, petitioner and associates formed Shore Gardens, Inc. (SGI),in 1959. After SGI purchased the property petitioner bought out hisassociates and became the sole shareholder. Most of the property wasthen, and is now, salt marsh subject to tidal flooding. The wet groundand permeable soil would require considerable fill before significantstructures could be built. Over the years, SGI’s intermittent applica-tions to develop the property were rejected by various governmentagencies. After 1966, no further applications were made for over a dec-ade. Two intervening events, however, become important to the issuespresented. First, in 1971, the State created respondent Rhode IslandCoastal Resources Management Council (Council) and charged it withprotecting the State’s coastal properties. The Council’s regulations,known as the Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Program(CRMP), designated salt marshes like those on SGI’s property as pro-tected “coastal wetlands” on which development is greatly limited.Second, in 1978, SGI’s corporate charter was revoked, and title to theproperty passed to petitioner as the corporation’s sole shareholder. In1983, petitioner applied to the Council for permission to construct awooden bulkhead and fill his entire marshland area. The Council re-jected the application, concluding, inter alia, that it would conflict withthe CRMP. In 1985, petitioner filed a new application with the Council,seeking permission to fill 11 of the property’s 18 wetland acres in orderto build a private beach club. The Council rejected this application aswell, ruling that the proposal did not satisfy the standards for obtaininga “special exception” to fill salt marsh, whereby the proposed activitymust serve a compelling public purpose. Subsequently, petitioner filedan inverse condemnation action in Rhode Island Superior Court, assert-ing that the State’s wetlands regulations, as applied by the Council tohis parcel, had taken the property without compensation in violation ofthe Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The suit alleged the Council’saction deprived him of “all economically beneficial use” of his property,resulting in a total taking requiring compensation under Lucas v. SouthCarolin a Coastal Council, 505 U. S. 1003, and sought $3,150,000 in dam-ages, a figure derived from an appraiser’s estimate as to the value of a74-lot residential subdivision on the property. The court ruled against533US2Unit:$U85[10-19-02 15:38:30] PAGES PGT:OPIN607Cite as: 533 U. S. 606 (2001)Syllabuspetitioner, and the State Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) peti-tioner’s takings claim was not ripe; (2) he had no right to challengeregulations predating 1978, when he succeeded to legal ownership of theproperty; (3) he could not assert a takings claim based on the denial ofall economic use of his property in light of undisputed evidence that hehad $200,000 in development value remaining on an upland parcel of theproperty; and (4) because the regulation at issue predated his acquisitionof title, he could have had no reasonable investment-backed expectationthat he could develop his property, and, therefore, he could not recoverunder Penn Central Transp. Co. v. NewYorkCity,438 U. S. 104, 124.Held:1. This case is ripe for review. Pp. 617–626.(a) A takings claim challenging application of land-use regulationsis not ripe unless the agency charged with implementing the regulationshas reached a final decision regarding their application to the propertyat issue. Williamson Count y Regional Planning Comm’n v. Ham-ilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U. S. 172, 186. A final decision doesnot occur until the responsible agency determines the extent of permit-ted development on the land. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yo loCounty, 477 U. S. 340, 351. Petitioner obtained such a final decisionwhen the Council denied his 1983 and 1985 applications. The State Su-preme Court erred in ruling that, notwithstanding those denials, doubtremained as to the extent of development the Council would allow onpetitioner’s parcel due to his failure to explore other uses for the prop-erty that would involve filling substantially less wetlands. This is be-lied by the unequivocal nature of the wetland regulations at issue andby the Council’s application of the regulations to the subject property.The CRMP permits the Council to grant a special exception to engagein a prohibited use only where a “compelling public purpose” is served.The proposal to fill the entire property was not accepted under Councilregulations and did not qualify for the special exception. The Councildetermined the use proposed in the second application (the beach club)did not satisfy the “compelling public purpose” standard. There is noindication the Council would have accepted the application had the pro-posed club occupied a smaller surface area. To the contrary, it ruledthat the proposed activity was not a “compelling public purpose.” Al-though a landowner may not establish a taking before the land-use au-thority has the opportunity, using its own reasonable procedures, to de-cide and explain the reach of a challenged regulation, e. g., MacDonald,supra, at 342, once it becomes clear that the permissible uses of theproperty are known to a reasonable degree of certainty, a takings claimis likely to have ripened. Here, the Council’s decisions make plain that533US2Unit:$U85[10-19-02 15:38:30] PAGES PGT:OPIN608 PALAZZOLO v. RHODE ISLANDSyllabusit interpreted its regulations to bar petitioner from engaging in anyfilling or development on the wetlands. Further permit applicationswere not necessary to establish this point. Pp. 618–621.(b) Contrary to the State Supreme Court’s ruling, petitioner’s claimis not unripe by virtue of his failure to seek permission for a use of theproperty that would involve development only of its upland portion. Itis true that there was uncontested testimony that an upland site wouldhave an estimated value of $200,000 if developed. And, while theCRMP requires Council approval to develop upland property lyingwithin 200 feet of protected waters, the strict “compelling public pur-pose”
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