GRACIELA B. DURAN, Appellant, v. FURR'S SUPERMARKETS, INC., d/b/a FURR'SSUPERMARKET NO. 939, and STEVE ROMERO, Appellees. No. 08-95-00169-CV COURT OF APPEALS OF TEXAS, EIGHTH DISTRICT, EL PASO 921 S.W.2d 778; 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 1345 April 4, 1996, Decided SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: [**1] Application for Writ of Error Denied March 21, 1997. PRIOR HISTORY: Appeal from 34th District Court of El Paso County, Texas. (TC# 92-12971). TRIAL COURT JUDGE: Hon. Herbert E. Marsh, Jr., Judge Presiding. COUNSEL: For Appellant: Hon. Evelina Ortega, Caballero & Ortega, L.L.P., El Paso, TX. For Appellees: Hon. Mark C. Walker, Mounce & Galatzan, El Paso, TX. Hon. E. K. Peticolas, Peticolasand Shapleigh, El Paso, TX. JUDGES: Before Panel No. 4, Barajas, C.J., Larsen and McClure, JJ. OPINIONBY: ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE OPINION: [*783] OPINION Graciela B. Duran (Duran), appeals from a summary judgment entered in favor of Appellees, Furr's Supermarkets, Inc. (d/b/a Furr's Supermarket No. 939 (Furr's) and Steve Romero (Romero). We reverseand remand for trial. FACTUAL SUMMARY Duran's causes of action against Furr's and Romero arose out of an incident which occurred in the parking lot of a Furr's supermarket. Duran alleges that Romero, an off-duty police officer working as a security guard for Furr's, became verbally abusive towards her when he asked her to move a vehicle in which she was a passenger from the fire lane located in front of the store. After moving [**2] the vehicle, Duran returned to where Romero was standing and asked Romero for his name. Romero walked over to the vehicle, opened the door, and while repeatedly threatening to arrest Duran, pulled and twisted on her left arm in an apparent effort to forcibly remove her from the vehicle. Duran suffered injuries to her arm which required surgery. She further alleges that the Furr's store manager watched the assault and did nothing to stop it. Romero, on the other hand, asserts that Duran became extremely upset and directed vulgar language at him because he asked her to move the car out of the fire lane. Romero admits opening the door to the vehicle and placing his hand on Duran's arm, but said that he did so only in an effort to calm her. Alleging that Romero is an employee or agent of Furr's, Duran filed suit against Furr's for negligent hiring and supervision of Romero. She also made claims against [*784] Furr's and Romero for assault and battery, false imprisonment, and defamation of character. The trial court granted Furr's and Romero's motions for summary judgment. STANDARD OF REVIEW In Point of Error No. One, Duran contends that the trial court erred in granting [**3] summary judgment in favor of Furr's. The standard of review on appeal is whether the successful movant at the trial level carried the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that a judgment should be granted as a matter of law. Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Perez, 819 S.W.2d 470, 471 (Tex. 1991); Nixon v. Mr. Property Mgmt. Co., Inc., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex. 1985); Victory v. Bills, 897 S.W.2d 506, 508 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1995, no writ); Hernandez v. Kasco Ventures, Inc., 832 S.W.2d 629, 631 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1992, no writ). Thus, the question on appeal is not whether the summaryjudgment proof raises fact issues as to required elements of the movant's cause or claim, but whether the summary judgment proof establishes, as a matter of law, that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to one or more elements of the movant's cause or claim. Gibbs v. General Motors Corp., 450 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Tex. 1970); Victory, 897 S.W.2d at 508. In resolving the issue of whether the movant has carried this burden, all evidence favorable to the non-movant must be taken as true and all reasonable inferences, including any doubts, must be resolved [**4] in the non-movant's favor. Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 548-49; Victory, 897 S.W.2d at 508; Stoker v. Furr's, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 719, 721 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1991, writ denied). When the defendant is the movant and submits summary evidence disproving at least one essential element of each of the plaintiffs causes of action, then summary judgment should be granted. Perez, 819 S.W.2d at 471; Victory, 897 S.W.2d at 508; Hernandez, 832 S.W.2d at 633. Where the summary judgment order does not state the specific grounds on which it was granted, the non-movant on appeal must show that each ground alleged in the motion is insufficient to support the granting of summary judgment. Southerland v. Northeast Datsun, Inc., 659 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1983, no writ). GENERAL GROUNDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Romero's Status as a Police Officer Furr's moved for summary judgment on the ground that it cannot be held liable because the alleged actsof Romero were committed in his sole capacity as a police officer of the El Paso Police Department. Citing City of Dallas v. Half Price Books, Records, Magazines, Inc., 883 S.W.2d 374, 377 (Tex.App.--Dallas [**5] 1994, no writ)(Half Price I), Leake v. Half Price Books, Records, Magazines, Inc., No. 05-95-00005- CV, 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 526 (Tex.App.--Dallas February 7, 1996)(Half Price II), and City of Phoenix v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 154 Ariz. 324, 742 P.2d 825 (Ariz.App. 1987), Furr's argues that when Romero observed the vehicle illegally parked in the fire lane or saw Duran committing disorderly conduct by using vulgar language in a public place, Romero ceased being an independent contractor or employee of Furr's and acted solely in his capacity as a police officer. The summary judgment evidence does not support Furr's contention that a violation of law occurred, and Furr's authorities are thus distinguishable. n1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - n1 We note that in Half Price II, Leake claimed that a fact issue existed as to whether the officer actually saw a crime being committed. Concluding that Leake had not raised that contention in Half Price I, the Court declined to revisit their earlier opinion and applied the law of the case doctrine. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - [**6] Furr's first argues that parking in a fire lane is a violation of El Paso Municipal Ordinance 9.76.050. According to Furr's, Ordinance 9.76.050 states that "it is unlawful to park any vehicle other than an authorized emergency vehicle in any fire lane established pursuant to this chapter." Furr's
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