(Slip Opinion) Cite as: 539 U. S. ____ (2003) 1 Per Curiam NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 02–575 _________________ NIKE, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v. MARC KASKY ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA [June 26, 2003] PER CURIAM. The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted.Cite as: 539 U. S. ____ (2003) 1 STEVENS, J., concurring SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 02–575 _________________ NIKE, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v. MARC KASKY ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA [June 26, 2003] JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG joins, and with whom JUSTICE SOUTER joins as to Part III, concurring. Beginning in 1996, Nike was besieged with a series of allegations that it was mistreating and underpaying workers at foreign facilities. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 3a. Nike responded to these charges in numerous ways, such as by sending out press releases, writing letters to the editors of various newspapers around the country, and mailing letters to university presidents and athletic direc-tors. See id., at 3a–4a. In addition, in 1997, Nike com-missioned a report by former Ambassador to the United Nations Andrew Young on the labor conditions at Nike production facilities. See id., at 67a. After visiting 12 factories, “Young issued a report that commented favora-bly on working conditions in the factories and found no evidence of widespread abuse or mistreatment of workers.” Ibid. In April 1998, respondent Marc Kasky, a California resident, sued Nike for unfair and deceptive practices under California’s Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Ann. §17200 et seq. (West 1997), and False Advertising Law, §17500 et seq. Respondent asserted that “in order to maintain and/or increase its sales,” Nike made a number of “false statements and/or material omissions of fact” concerning the working conditions under which Nike2 NIKE, INC. v. KASKY STEVENS, J., concurring products are manufactured. Lodging of Petitioners 2 (¶1). Respondent alleged “no harm or damages whatsoever regarding himself individually,” id., at 4–5 (¶8), but rather brought the suit “on behalf of the General Public of the State of California and on information and belief,” id., at 3 (¶3). Nike filed a demurrer to the complaint, contending that respondent’s suit was absolutely barred by the First Amendment. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dis-missal. App. to Pet. for Cert. 80a–81a. Respondent ap-pealed, and the California Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that Nike’s statements “form[ed] part of a public dialogue on a matter of public concern within the core area of expression protected by the First Amendment.” Id., at 79a. The California Court of Appeal also rejected respon-dent’s argument that it was error for the trial court to deny him leave to amend, reasoning that there was “no reasonable possibility” that the complaint could be amended to allege facts that would justify any restrictions on what was—in the court’s view—Nike’s “noncommercial speech.” Ibid. On appeal, the California Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that “[b]ecause the messages in question were directed by a commercial speaker to a commercial audience, and be-cause they made representations of fact about the speaker’s own business operations for the purpose of promoting sales of its products, . . . [the] messages are commercial speech.” 27 Cal. 4th 939, 946, 45 P. 3d 243, 247 (2002). However, the court emphasized that the suit “is still at a preliminary stage, and that whether any false representations were made is a disputed issue that has yet to be resolved.” Ibid. We granted certiorari to decide two questions: (1) whether a corporation participating in a public debateCite as: 539 U. S. ____ (2003) 3 STEVENS, J., concurring may “be subjected to liability for factual inaccuracies on the theory that its statements are ‘commercial speech’ because they might affect consumers’ opinions about the business as a good corporate citizen and thereby affect their purchasing decisions”; and (2) even assuming the California Supreme Court properly characterized such statements as commercial speech, whether the “First Amendment, as applied to the states through the Four-teenth Amendment, permit[s] subjecting speakers to the legal regime approved by that court in the decision below.” Pet. for Cert. i. Today, however, the Court dismisses the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. In my judgment, the Court’s decision to dismiss the writ of certiorari is supported by three independently sufficient reasons: (1) the judgment entered by the California Su-preme Court was not final within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. §1257; (2) neither party has standing to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court; and (3) the reasons for avoiding the premature adjudication of novel constitu-tional questions apply with special force to this case. I The first jurisdictional problem in this case revolves around the fact that the California Supreme Court never entered a final judgment. Congress has granted this Court appellate jurisdiction with respect to state litigation only after the highest state court in which judgment could be had has rendered a final judgment or decree. See ibid. A literal interpretation of the statute would preclude our review whenever further proceedings remain to be deter-mined in a state court, “no matter how disassociated from the only federal issue” in the case. Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120, 124 (1945). We have, how-ever, abjured such a “mechanical” construction of the statute, and accepted jurisdiction in certain exceptional “situations in which the highest court of a State has fi-4 NIKE, INC. v. KASKY STEVENS, J., concurring nally determined the federal issue present in a particular case, but in which there are further proceedings in the
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