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UNCW BLA 361 - Harris V Forklift SC

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TERESA HARRIS, PETITIONER v. FORKLIFT SYSTEMS, INC. No. 92-1168 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 510 U.S. 17; 114 S. Ct. 367; 1993 U.S. LEXIS 7155; 126 L. Ed. 2d 295; 62 U.S.L.W. 4004; 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 225; 62 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P42,623; 93 Cal. Daily Op. Service 8330; 93 Daily Journal DAR 14212; 7 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 655 October 13, 1993, Argued November 9, 1993, DecidedPRIOR HISTORY: [***1] ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OFAPPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.DISPOSITION: 976 F.2d 733, reversed and remanded.View References Turn Off Lawyers' Edition DisplayDECISION: Federal District Court held to have applied incorrect standardsunder Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 in rejecting female worker'sclaim alleging abusive work environment because of gender.SUMMARY: One of the provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964(42 USCS 2000e et seq.) is 42 USCS 2000e-2(a)(1), which in pertinent partprohibits an employer from discriminating against an individual withrespect to "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment," on the basisof race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. In Meritor Savings Bankv Vinson (1986) 477 US 57, 91 L Ed 2d 49, 106 S Ct 2399, which involved asexual harassment claim asserted under Title VII, the United States SupremeCourt held that pursuant to 2000e-2(a)(1), a plaintiff may establish aviolation of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on sex hascreated a hostile or abusive work environment. A female worker who had quita company filed suit against the company in the United States DistrictCourt for the Middle District of Tennessee and claimed that the conduct ofthe company's male president had created an abusive work environment forthe worker because of her gender. A magistrate found that the president hadoften (1) insulted the worker because of her gender, and (2) made her thetarget of unwanted sexual innuendos. The District Court, in adopting themagistrate's report and recommendation, found the case to be "close," butdecided that the president's conduct had not created a hostile workenvironment, as the court expressed the view that while some of thepresident's comments had offended the worker and would offend a reasonablewoman, (1) the comments had not been so severe as to be expected to affectseriously the worker's psychological well-being; and (2) the worker had notbeen subjectively so offended that she had suffered injury. The UnitedStates Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in a briefunpublished opinion.On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. In an opinion byO'Connor, J., expressing the unanimous view of the court, it was held that(1) pursuant to the 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibition, (a) when the workplace ispermeated by discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that issufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of a victim'semployment and to create an abusive working environment, Title VII isviolated, (b) this standard takes a middle path between making actionableany conduct that is merely offensive and requiring the conduct to cause atangible psychological injury, (c) so long as the environment wouldreasonably be perceived--and is perceived--as hostile or abusive, there isno need for the environment also to be psychologically injurious, and (d)whether an environment is "hostile" or "abusive" can be determined only bylooking at all the circumstances; (2) with respect to the case at hand, itwas improper for the District Court to rely on whether the president'sconduct had seriously affected the worker's psychological well-being or hadled her to suffer injury, for such an inquiry might needlessly focus thefactfinder's attention on concrete psychological harm; and (3) the DistrictCourt's application of these incorrect standards might well have influencedthat court's ultimate conclusion.Scalia, J., concurring, expressed the view that, with respect to sexualharassment that takes the form of a hostile work environment, he knew of notest more faithful to the inherently vague statutory language than the testthat the Supreme Court adopted in the case at hand.Ginsburg, J., concurring, expressed the view that (1) the Supreme Court'sopinion was in harmony with the view that it generally suffices to provethat a reasonable person subjected to the discriminatory conduct would findthat the harassment so altered working conditions as to make it moredifficult to do the job; and (2) under the court's equal protectionjurisprudence, it remains an open question as to whether classificationsbased on gender are inherently suspect.LEXIS HEADNOTES - Classified to U.S. Digest Lawyers' Edition:CIVIL RIGHTS §7.7sex discrimination -- abusive work environment --Headnote: [1A] [1B] [1C]In deciding, in a suit by a female worker against a company she quit,whether, for purposes of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USCS2000e et seq.), the conduct of the company's male president created anabusive work environment for the worker because of her gender, it isimproper for a Federal District Court to rely on whether the president'sconduct seriously affected the worker's psychological well-being or led herto suffer injury, for such an inquiry may needlessly focus the factfinder'sattention on concrete psychological harm, an element that Title VII doesnot require; while Title VII bars conduct that would seriously affect areasonable person's psychological well-being, the statute is not limited tosuch conduct.CIVIL RIGHTS §7.6discrimination -- race, sex, or other bases -- abusive work environment --Headnote: [2A] [2B] [2C] [2D]Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USCS 2000e et seq.),the language in 42 USCS 2000e-2(a)(1)--which in pertinent part prohibits anemployer from discriminating against an individual with respect to "terms,conditions, or privileges of employment," on the basis of race, color,religion, sex, or national origin--is not limited to "economic" or"tangible" discrimination and evinces a congressional intent to strike atthe entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in employment,which treatment includes requiring people to work in a discriminatorilyhostile or abusive environment; when the workplace is permeated bydiscriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficientlysevere or pervasive as to alter


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UNCW BLA 361 - Harris V Forklift SC

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