520US2Unit:$U54[09-10-99 19:36:34] PAGES PGT:OPIN564 OCTOBER TERM, 1996SyllabusCAMPS NEWFOUND/OWATONNA, INC. v. TOWNOF HARRISON et al.certiorari to the supreme judicial court of maineNo. 94–1988. Argued October 9, 1996—Decided May 19, 1997Petitioner, a Maine nonprofit corporation, operates a church camp for chil-dren, most of whom are not Maine residents. Petitioner is financedthrough camper tuition and other revenues. From 1989 to 1991, it paidover $20,000 per year in real estate and personal property taxes. Astate statute provides a general exemption from those taxes for chari-table institutions incorporated in Maine. With respect to institutionsoperated principally for the benefit of Maine nonresidents, however,a charity may only qualify for a more limited tax benefit, and thenonly if its weekly charge for services does not exceed $30 per person.Petitioner was ineligible for any exemption, because its campers werelargely nonresidents and its weekly tuition was roughly $400 percamper. After respondent town of Harrison (Town) rejected its re-quest for a refund of taxes already paid and a continuing exemptionfrom future taxes, which was based principally on a claim that the taxexemption statute violated the Commerce Clause, petitioner filed suitand was awarded summary judgment by the Superior Court. TheMaine Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that petitioner had notmet its burden of persuasion that the statute is unconstitutional.Held: An otherwise generally applicable state property tax violates theCommerce Clause if its exemption for property owned by charitableinstitutions excludes organizations operated principally for the benefitof nonresidents. Pp. 571–595.(a) Because the Government lacked power to regulate interstate com-merce during the Nation’s first years, the States freely adopted meas-ures fostering local interests without regard to possible prejudice tononresidents, resulting in a “conflict of commercial regulations, destruc-tive to the harmony of the States.” Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 224(Johnson, J., concurring in judgment). Arguably, this was the cause ofthe Constitutional Convention. Ibid. The Commerce Clause not onlygranted Congress express authority to override restrictive and conflict-ing state commercial regulations, but also effected a curtailment of statepower even absent congressional legislation. Pp. 571–572.(b) The Court is unpersuaded by the Town’s arguments that the dor-mant Commerce Clause is inapplicable here, either because campers are520US2Unit:$U54[09-10-99 19:36:34] PAGES PGT:OPIN565Cite as: 520 U. S. 564 (1997)Syllabusnot “articles of commerce,” or more generally because interstate com-merce is not implicated. The camp is unquestionably engaged in com-merce, not only as a purchaser, see, e. g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379U. S. 294, 300–301, but also as a provider of goods and services akin toa hotel, see, e. g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S.241, 244, 258. Although the latter case involved Congress’ affirmativepowers, its reasoning is applicable in the dormant Commerce Clausecontext. See, e. g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U. S. 322, 326, n. 2. TheTown’s further argument that the dormant Clause is inapplicable be-cause a real estate tax is at issue is also rejected. Even assuming, asthe Town argues, that Congress could not impose a national real estatetax, States are not free to levy such taxes in a manner that discriminatesagainst interstate commerce. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S.553, 596. Pp. 572–575.(c) There is no question that if this statute targeted profit-makingentities, it would violate the dormant Commerce Clause. The statutediscriminates on its face against interstate commerce: It expressly dis-tinguishes between entities that serve a principally interstate clienteleand those that primarily serve an intrastate market, singling out campsthat serve mostly in-staters for beneficial tax treatment, and penalizingthose camps that do a principally interstate business. Such laws arevirtually per se invalid. E. g., Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U. S. 325,331. Because the Town did not attempt to defend the statute by dem-onstrating that it advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot beadequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives, e. g.,Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Qualityof Ore., 511 U. S. 93, 101, the Court does not address this question. SeeFulton Corp., 516 U. S., at 333–334. Pp. 575–583.(d) The rule applicable to profit-making enterprises also applies toa discriminatory tax exemption for charitable and benevolent institu-tions. The dormant Commerce Clause’s applicability to the nonprofitsector follows from this Court’s decisions holding not-for-profit insti-tutions subject to laws regulating commerce, e. g., Associated Press v.NLRB, 301 U. S. 103, 129, and to the federal antitrust laws, e. g., Na-tional Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla.,468 U. S. 85, 100, n. 22. The Court has already held that the dormantClause applies to activities not intended to earn a profit, Edwards v.California, 314 U. S. 160, 172, n. 1, and there is no reason why an enter-prise’s nonprofit character should exclude it from the coverage of eitherthe affirmative or the negative aspect of the Clause, see, e. g., Hughes v.Oklahoma, 441 U. S., at 326, n. 2. Whether operated on a for-profit or520US2Unit:$U54[09-10-99 19:36:34] PAGES PGT:OPIN566 CAMPS NEWFOUND/OWATONNA, INC. v. TOWNOF HARRISONSyllabusnonprofit basis, camps such as petitioner’s purchase goods and servicesin competitive markets, offer their facilities to a variety of patrons, andderive revenues from a variety of local and out-of-state sources. Anycategorical distinction on the basis of profit is therefore wholly illusory.Pp. 583–588.(e) The Town’s arguments that the exemption statute should beviewed as either a legitimate discriminatory subsidy of those charitiesthat focus on local concerns, see, e. g., West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v.Healy, 512 U. S. 186, 199, or alternatively as a governmental “purchase”of charitable services falling within the narrow exception to the dor-mant Commerce Clause for States in their role as “market participants,”see, e. g., Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U. S. 794; Reeves, Inc.v. Stake, 447 U. S. 429, are unpersuasive. Although tax exemptions andsubsidies serve similar ends, they differ in important and
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