9 12 11 Geog 2412 Wed Sept 13 2009 Ins7tu7ons and Tragedy of the Commons Announcement Conserva on Indigenous Peoples in Tanzania Global Seminar Study Abroad Program Earn 3 upper level credits in a 3 week summer traveling Global Seminar Learn more details at the following info sessions Wednesday Sept 14 5 6 PM Hale 450 Wednesday Oct 12 5 6pm UMC 382 386 For ques7ons feel free to contact E mail laura deluca yahoo com Phone 303 938 0731 cell 720 291 9301 An Ins7tu7ons Perspec7ve 1 Ins7tu7ons Important de ni7ons ques7ons Individual vs group behavior 2 Tragedy of the Commons Theory TOC Assump7ons proposed solu7ons Cri7que of TOC Di erent kinds of commons 3 How ins7tu7ons can work Common property theory Key words prisoners dilemma Garret Hardin common Property collec7ve ac7on open access 1 9 12 11 Ins7tu7ons The rules and norms governing our interac7ons with nature and resources Ins7tu7onal ways of thinking about the Environment TOC as s7ll linked to Popula7on and Markets Carrying Capacity private property free riders Using Ins7tu7ons for sustainable management Examples of common property management Ins7tu7ons Behavior How if at all can rules and norms of behavior be fashioned to encourage shared costs and collec7ve bene ts At what scale is coopera7on possible Community Global Assump7on that behavior is oeen ruled by personal private rewards Prisoner s Dilemma Game Theory TOC Tragedy of the Commons TOC Garref Hardin 1968 Popula7on growth advantages to the family are personal and immediate the environmental costs are di use and global Individual behavior will destroy the global commons all ac7ng for personal gain and no one coopera7ng for the good of all 2 9 12 11 Tragedy of the Commons TOC Resources held in common rivers fisheries oceans air parks forests are subject to massive degradation free unregulated Each individual will seek to maximize his her gain eg more sheep while the costs will be shared by all degradation Solution all resources land forests should be under private or state ownership management Tragedy of the commons The tragedy of the commons develops in this way Picture a pasture open to all It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons As a rational being each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain Explicitly or implicitly more or less consciously he asks What is the utility to me of adding one more animal to my herd The rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd And another and another but this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing the commons Therein lies the tragedy Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit in a world that is limited Freedom in a commons brings ruin for all Hardin 1968 1244 Assumptions People act as rational economic men i e individual rationality Property rights are the only institutional force affecting resource use Commonly held resources are not managed but are open access resources Private property and state ownership are the only legitimate sources of management 3 9 12 11 TOC Why is it appealing If we start from the premise that nobody wants to damage or lower the productive potential of environment and that people are rational the Hardin model provides an explanation for why it occurs It s elegant simplicity and intuitive logic Its explanatory power to explain over use of common pool resources atmosphere oceans rivers etc BUT What are the commons Forests deforestation Rangelands degradation desertification Wildlife over hunting extinction Water rivers oceans ground water pollution depletion Air pollution Are all commons equal Community Forests not open access common property Community Rangelands not open access common property Fisheries often managed as common pool resources Air Water 4 9 12 11 Critiques 1 Questioning the assumptions of the model Assumes superiority of private property modern and not universal Assumes Common property open access Assumes that individual economic rational decision making always prevails No room for collaboration or even discussion 2 Questioning the prescribed solutions private or state property ownership Critiquing the assumptions 1 Community norms responsibilities and shared values can override individual freedom profit seeking 2 Rights to a resource may be linked to other rights control over water points in pastoral systems rules norms of extraction technology control over access to marketing outlets within fishing and forest product communities effort benefit ratio may decline and reduce extraction prior to permanent resource decline 3 Series of regulations social norms sanctions regulating resource use Land Tenure Type of property institution related to the enforceable claims to the stream of benefits from the land Western European views of land tenure which allow for an individual to have full exclusive rights to all products of land to buy and sell Historically unique and revolutionary 5 9 12 11 There are many different categories of ownership Open Access absence of well defined property rights free unregulated access to all Private Property Rights to exclude others from resource and regulate use Recognized and enforced by the state to be effective Common Property Resource managed by a recognizable community which regulated rights of access e g fisheries rangelands forests Sate Property Rights to resource vested exclusively with the state Limited enforcement can lead to an open access like situation Pasture overgrazing pasture erosion but Is it open Fishing over exploita7on can lead to smaller sh But controls oeen exist 6 9 12 11 Forests deforesta7on overharves7ng degrada7on but really open and unmanaged Questioning the proposed solutions from TOC 1 State control or nationalization Often limited resources to control enforce Competing interests eg BLM lands National Parks forest reserves Fines and fences vs shared responsibility 2 Privatization Incentives to protect not guaranteed inter generational sale change in production May not support ecologically appropriate livelihoods dividing the range into private parcels can accelerate degradation Lack of institutional support Common Property Management Boundaries over the resource users and outsiders Proportionality costs accrued should be in line with benefits Collective Choice the users decide together on use rules Monitoring by users Sanctions for use violations