POL 202 Int. Relations Lecture 6 Outline of Last Lecture II. Game TheoryA. Tool for analyzing interactionsa. Two actors, C &DB. Strategiesa. Dominance (definition of dominant strategy)i. 3 Games1. Prisoners Dilemma2. Chicken3. Stag HuntIII. Value of Game Theory: how these games apply to the relations internationallyIV. Cooperation and Bargainingi. Definition of cooperationii. Definition of Bargainingiii. Parecto FrontierOutline of Current Lecture I. Regulation of Gene TranscriptionII. Definition of regulon III. Alternative Methods of Gene Regulation at the Transcriptional Level (Quorum Sensing and the Two- Component System)IV. Methods of Gene Regulation at the Translational LevelV. Introduction to MutationsCurrent LectureI. The Prisoners dilemmaa. If you take the role of A1 and wanting to decide what choice you want to pick, if you know that A2 will cooperate then you know that it will defect. You as A1 will be better off defecting. Even though both would be better off defecting.b. Individual incentive to defect undermines the collective interest to cooperatec. An example during the cold war, the best strategy for both the US and Soviet Union was to defect and keep building weaponsi. In international logics if you sign an agreement you are not fully bound to the agreement; nothing else countsii. There is a lateral incentive to break agreements if you are better offiii. Soviet and US started signing agreements; Ronald Raegan trust but verifya. Only way to verify arms agreement was to spy; technology without going into their country and then we started signing agreements; used missiles to take picturesd. A collaboration Problemi. Public Goods: are socially desirable products defined by two qualities:1. Nonexcludable2. Nonrival in consumptiona. National defense is a private goodii. Some examples: national defense, clean air and water and environmental issuesiii. Efforts to produce public goods are hindered by collective action problems1. Each actor aims to benefit from the good without bearing the costs for itiv. Each individual has and incentive to free ride:1. Failing to contribute while benefiting from the efforts of othersv. Factors that facilitate cooperation:1. Number and relative size linkage of actorsvi. Number and relative size of actors1. It is easier for a smaller number of actors to cooperate:a. Easier to monitor each other’s behaviorsb. Communicate more readily2. The smaller the number of actors the more likely they are to cooperate3. Iteration, linkage, and strategies of reciprocal Punishmenta. Cheating can be overcome id actors expect to be involved in multiple repeated inactionsi. Iteration: actors can prevent one another from cheating but threatening to withhold cooperation in the futureii. Linkage: tie a production to a public good to an outside issue1. Allows victims to retaliate by withholding cooperation on other issues4. Information: the availability of information affects the likelihood of cooperationa. May be ready to observe whether a partner cooperates or defectsb. May be hard to observe or distinguishi. Cooperation may fail because of uncertainty and misconception5. Who wins and who loses in bargaining?a. A core concept: i. Power: the ability to get someone to do what the other person has not doneb. Reversion outcome: the outcome that occurs when no bargain isreachedi. The influences power and the outcome of bargaining of any bargaining interactionc. Bargaining power belongs to actors mist satisfied with or mist willing to endure the reversion outcome6. Shifting the Reversion outcome:a. Coercion: the threat or imposition of costs on others to reduce the value of the coercion outcome and thus change their behaviorb. Means of international coercionc. Outside options: alternatives to reaching a bargain with a particularly partner that are more attractive that the status quoi. It is the relative attractiveness of each actors outside options that matterd. Agenda Settingi. Able to say what is at stake, how the agenda will be carried out; get to the issue first and make it favorable to you when set upii. Institutions: Do rules Matter in the world?1. Exist for relevant community2. Can be formal orgs with rules and procedures written down3. Or can be informal that states have engaged in in the past4. Must have 9 affirmative votes, plus 5 votes in the affirmative of the security council5. How do they promote cooperation?a. Enforcement, imposing punishments and people may fail to cooperateb. Anarchy: absence of formal government7. Cooperationa. International level has to be self-enforcingi. Institutions make self-enforcement easier by:1. Setting standards of behavior2. Verifying compliance3. Reducing the costs of joint decision making4. Resolving disputes8. Why follow rules?a. Actors comply with institutions because:i. Facilitate cooperationii. Maintaining an institution would be less costlyiii. It’s in the countries best interest to follow the rules9. World Politics:a. Iraq War of 2003, the US and Iraq were in pure bargaining and that caused a