POL 202 Int. Relations Lecture 9 Outline of Last Lecture II. War and PeaceA. The Bargaining Rangea. When it failsB. Do Wars Happen by mistake?a. Poor information from one anotherb. Wars incomplete informationi. Capabilities definitionii. Resolve definitioniii. In a total war, states mobilize all of their resourcesiv. In a limited war states fight with less than their full potentialv. When states have incomplete information about the capabilities and/or resolve their opponents, bargaining may failC. Communicating Resolve: The Language CoercionD. Communicating Resolvea. Mechanismsi. Brinksmanshipii. Tying handsiii. Paying for PowerOutline of Current Lecture I. War from Commitment Problemsa. Commitment Problem definitionII. Bargaining over Goods that are a source of bargaining powera. ExamplesIII. PreventionIV. Bargaining Shifting Powera. Graphsb. Preventive War definitionV. Preemptiona. First-strike advantage definitionVI. Prevention and Preemptiona. When war is more likely to occurVII. Is compromise always possible? War and Indivisibilitya. Indivisible good definitioni. Exampleb. GraphVIII. How can we make war less likely?a. Raising the costs of warb. Increasing Transparencyc. Providing outside enforcement of commitmentsd. Diving apparently invisible goodsIX. Providing Outside Enforcement of Commitmentsa. What states should doX. Dividing Apparently Indivisible Goodsa. Joint or shared controlb. Compensation on another issueXI. Conclusiona. Why war?Current LectureI. War from Commitment Problemsa. States may have difficulty in making credible promises not to revise the terms of a deal/treaty later.b. This is called a commitment problemi. Commitment problems are common in the absence of any enforcement mechanismII. Bargaining Over Goods That Are A Source of Future Bargaining Powera. Examples: strategically important pieces of territory and weapons programs.b. States reluctant to make concessions if the adversary, who is made stronger by the deal, might press for more concessions in futurec. Threatened state may choose to fight today rather than face a future in which it is weaker.III. Prevention: War in Response to Changing Powera. A problem arises if the balance of military capabilities is expected to change because of factors external to the bargaining processb. Anticipated shifts in economic and military capabilities may present dilemmas in crisis bargaining.c. Suppose State A’s power is expected to increase so that, at some time in the future, the new war outcome (p2) will be closer to State A’s ideal point.d. In the initial period, the states may agree to some distribution – but everyone can anticipate that in the future State A will demand a new dealIV. Bargaining and Shifting Powera.b. State B prefers the war outcome it could obtain under the initial power distribution (p1 + b) over any outcome it could obtain in the future bargaining range.c. State B would rather fight a war now than face worse terms in the future.d. This logic works only if war will halt or significantly delay a shift in power.e. If the shift will happen anyway, then there is nothing to be gained by fighting nowf. Preventive war: a war that is fought with the intention of preventing an adversary from becoming stronger in the futureV. Preemption: War in Response to First-Strike Advantagesa. First-strike advantage: when there is a benefit to being the first to launch an attack.i. Arises when technology enables a state to launch a blow that disarms the other state’s military or renders it incapable of responding effectivelyb. Creates a commitment problem unless each state can credibly promise to not actfirst.c.d. There are two different war outcomes depending on which state lands the first blowi. Each state expects to do better in war it startsii. There exists a set of deals that both states prefer to a war started by StateA and a set of deals that both prefer to a war started by State Be. But there is no deal that is mutually preferable to both possible wars.f. Neither state will make concessions to the other at the bargaining table; both willtry to beat the other to the punch.i. Negotiations may be seen as nothing more than ploy to delay other side from mobilizingg. A war that arises in this way is a preemptive warh. Preemption and prevention both arise from the difficulty of making credible commitments not to use one’s military power.i. Prevention is a response to anticipated threats in the more distant futureii. Preemption is a response to an imminent threati. The difference between the two revolves around timing and the inevitability of warVI. Prevention and Preemptiona. Common root of commitment problems:i. The difficulty of committing not to use one’s power in the futureb. War is more likely to occur when:i. The good in dispute is a source of powerii. Dramatic changes in military balance are likelyiii. The military-strategic situation create substantial advantages for first-strikesVII. Is Compromise Always Possible? War and Invisibilitya. Indivisible good: a good that cannot be divided without destroying its valuei. An example; the difference between 100 pennies and $1 billb. Compromise solutions impossible to reachc. Bargaining becomes “all or nothing”d. What goods are truly indivisible?i. Indivisibility is usually not a physical property, but rather due to the way itis valuede. An example: The city of Jerusalemi. Contains some of the holiest sites of Christianity, Islam and Judaismf. How to divide the city has defied resolutiong.h. It is important not to exaggerate indivisibility as a source of bargaining failure: i. There are ways of dividing goods that do not ii. States may have strategic incentives to claim they cannot compromise on a particular issue involve physical divisioni. A claim of indivisibility can be a bargaining position used for strategic reasonsVIII. How can we make wars less likely?a. Raising the costs of warb. Increasing Transparencyc. Providing outside enforcement of commitmentsd. Diving apparently invisible goodsi. Raising the Costs Of War1. A war becomes less attractive, states will be more willing to make compromises to avoid ita. Raising the sots of war can expand the set of settlements that all sides prefer fighting2. Nuclear weapons do this quite wella. Threat of “mutually assured destruction”3. Drones: Lowering the costs of war?a. Since 9/11 US had identified suspected terrorist for Presidents classified “kill