POL 202 Int. Relations Lecture 5 Outline of Last Lecture I. Preventive War against IraqII. Important Questionsa. Why do state leaders make certain decisions?i. Interestsii. Interactionsiii. Institutionsb. Actors and Interestsi. Stateii. The concept of Sovereigntyiii. States as actorsiv. Origins of interestc. Interactionsi.What actors have to doii.Strategyiii.UnderstandingIII. Methods of Gene Regulation at the Translational LevelIV. Introduction to MutationsOutline of Current Lecture II. Game TheoryA. Tool for analyzing interactionsa. Two actors, C &DB. Strategiesa. Dominance (definition of dominant strategy)i. 3 Games1. Prisoners Dilemma2. Chicken3. Stag HuntIII. Value of Game Theory: how these games apply to the relations internationallyIV. Cooperation and Bargainingi. Definition of cooperationii. Definition of Bargainingiii. Parecto FrontierCurrent LectureI. A Primer on Game Theorya. A tool for analyzing strategic interactionsb. Two actors, actor 1 and actor 2 can either cooperate (C) or defect (D) i. The mapping of choices into outcomes is the best depicting using a 2x2 matrixii. There are 4 possibilities to the game1. Both cooperate (CC)2. Both defect (DD)3. I and One (CD)4. And vice versa (DC)iii. Both actors choose simultaneously without knowledge of the others choice1. Strategic interaction depends on the choices of all relevant actorsiv. Outcomes are contingent on the choices of all parties1. Rational actors choose strategies that are a best response to anticipated actions of othersv. Dominant Strategy: an actor makes the same choice regardless of what opponent does1. Although sometimes a players best choice depends on what the opponent does2. Equilibrium: an outcome that arises from each side playing best response strategiesa. Actors have no incentive to unilaterally 3. Three distinct gamesa. Prisoners Dilemmab. Chickenc. Stage Hunt4. Prisoners Dilemmaa. Two criminals robbed bank and hide the moneyb. Put them in separate cells i. The can either cooperate or defect1. If you rate on your partner we’ll let you go free and the other partner will go to prison (partner is defected) one defects and one cooperates2. If they both cooperate they both remain silent they can leave with the money3. If both defect they both go to jailii. If you take rational options you might end up in a dilemmaiii. Examples1. Arms race during Cold Wara. Each side wanted dominance but with least costb. Tariff negotiations, each side wants to access to markets while protecting their own5. Chickena. Two drivers driving down the middle of a road toward one anotheri. The first to turn aside becomes the “chicken” & the other driver wins (A1 C & A2D- A1 D and Vice versaii. If they both swerve neither loses (CC)iii. If they don’t they die (DD)b. There is no dominant strategyi. The key is to do the opposite of what the other driver will doii. The winner is the one who convinces the other thatshe is more willing to risk a crashiii. Can be used as a metaphor of coercive driving6. Stag Hunta. Two hunters can work together to kill a stag and feed the family a well of individually hunt the rabbiti. 4 outcomes:1. Cooperate and share the stag2. Get a rabbit and the other try for the stag3. Both get the rabbit and stag4. Try for the stag and the other gets the rabbitii. There is not dominant strategy and a coordination dilemma arisesiii. The Stag hunt resembles the problem of settling international standardsvi. Value of Game Theory1. Game theory helps clarify the core dilemmas in certain strategic interactionsvii. Cooperation and Bargaining1. Strategic interactions can be grouped in to two broad categoriesa. Cooperation2. The Rational choice for each of the actors is to defect3. Be grouped into 2 categoriesa. Cooperation: occurs when two or more actors adopt policies that make at least one actor better off than it would otherwise bei. When actors have a shared interest in achieving an outcome and must work together the interaction is cooperatingii. Opportunities for cooperating often arise in social and political lifeiii. Not always an unmitigated good 1. Its benefits exist only for those who becomebetter off by adjusting their policies2. An example in case of Iraq, the US and Great Britain chose to cooperate in the military effort to oust Hussein’s regime3. Imagine two actors enacting policies that may potentially increase their overall welfare4. Income is depicted along two dimensionsa. Actors As income increases align horizontal axisb. And actor Bs increases along vertical axisiv. Parecto Frontier1. At status quo: actors are not doing as well as they coulda. Any policy combination that leads toan outcome in the area quo makes both actors better offb.b. Bargaining: Describes an interaction in which actors must choose outcomesc. That make one better off the expenses of