PSC 124 1st Edition Lecture 5 Outline of Last Lecture I. Intro to theoryII. Realism and idealismIII. Power politics - theoristsIV. Understanding power – defining, estimating, identifying elementsV. Concepts re the international system - a realist perspectiveOutline of Current Lecture I. Alliances and alignmentsII. Statecraft, strategy, and rationalityIII. Game theory and the Prisoner’s Dilemma Current LectureI. Alliances and alignments- Alliance cohesion: the ease with which the members hold together an alliances1. tends to be high when national interests coverage and when cooperation within the alliance becomes institutionalized and habitual- Extended deterrence: a strong state’s use of threats to deter attacks on weaker clients - North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): most powerful alliance, dominates the international security scene, western Europe and North America - US Japanese Security Treaty: US maintains nearly 35000 troops in Japan- Non aligned movement: refusing to take sides during the Cold WarII. Statecraft, strategy, and rationality- arms race: reciprocal process in which 2 or more states build up military capabilities in response to each other- statecraft: the art of making decisions concerning state affairs in a world of power politics 1. choosing capabilities2. choosing strategies+ reciprocity+deterrence: using a threat to punish another actor if it takes a certain negative action+compellence: threat of force to make another actor take some action+escalation:- realism and rationalityThese notes represent a detailed interpretation of the professor’s lecture. GradeBuddy is best used as a supplement to your own notes, not as a substitute.1. realists see strategy choices as being made from a rational choice position2. human behavior guided by rational decision making3. based on cost-benefit analysis4. choose what is considered to “maximize” possibility of getting what you want (“utility”)- Implications for IR 1. implies that states can identify their interests and prioritize those interests2. implies that states are able to perform a cost- benefit analysis- calculating the costs and benefits that are likely results of particular actionsIII. Game theory and the Prisoner’s Dilemma- prediction of bargaining outcomes- different classes of games:1. zero-sum vs. non zero sum: in zero sum games, one player’s gain is by definition equal to the other’s loss2. single vs. repeated3. prisoner’s Dilemma- prisoner’s dilemma 1. 2 parties: they can either behave in a cooperative way (choose the action that gives the best mutual outcome) or “defect” (behave in way that hurts the other party, but that avoids the maximum hurt to oneself) 2. to avoid the worst outcome, most people confess rather than cooperate- Axelrod and Rapaport 1. axelrod: political scientist2. rapaport: psychologist3. prisoner’s dilemma tournaments 1980a4. tit for tat strategy (reciprocity) was the most