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UW CSEP 590 - Biological Weapons A Counterterrorism Perspective

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Biological Weapons A Counterterrorism PerspectiveThe public is exposed to a lot of information about potential biological attacksBiosecurity is a multifaceted problem that requires integrating many disparate componentsWe would like to know even more!The human and economic impact of endemic pathogens can be amplifiedA stratified view of bioterrorist threatsLooking for solutions: there are significant benefits to early detection of a biological attackExamples for preventing, detecting, and responding to WMD eventsSlide 9Slide 10Slide 11Developing new operational capabilities took several years and integration across multiple disciplinesEarly detection combined with models of dispersion are valuableWhat community norms can be established, promoted or enforced?There are critical shortfalls in the nation’s infrastructure for dealing with bio-terrorismAn example of rapid response 2003 Exotic Newcastle Disease Virus outbreakDisclaimerBiological WeaponsA Counterterrorism PerspectiveUniversity of CaliforniaLawrence Livermore National LaboratoryJ. Patrick Fitch, Ph.D.Program LeaderChemical & Biological National SecurityOctober 19, 2005UCRL-PRES-151152 Version 051019For additional information contact J.P. Fitch at [email protected] work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by the University of California, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under Contract No. W-7405-Eng-48.Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 2The public is exposed to a lot of information about potential biological attacksInitiation of BioWatch at the State of the Union on January 28, 2003: “…deploying the nation's first early warning network of sensors to detect biological attack”What are the key issues around BW and BW defense? What are distractions?What are the key issues around BW and BW defense? What are distractions?Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 3Biosecurity is a multifaceted problem that requires integrating many disparate componentsLink all of these components into a coherent architectureLink all of these components into a coherent architectureVaccines•Development•Efficacy•DeploymentPathogen biology•Infectivity•Signatures•ManipulationData•Collections•All source•Directed discoveryValidation•Signatures•Assays•Processes•Chain-of-custodyThreats•Weaponized•GM•Individual•State sponsoredEpidemiology•Early detection•PrivacyInterpretation•Feasibility•IntentBackgrounds•Natural•ManufacturingSurveillance•Sensitivity•Specificity•ResponseThreatAssessmentsS&TKnowledge ManagementBiosecurity ComponentsAnticipate Prepare Prevent Detect Response AttributeLawrence Livermore National Laboratory 4We would like to know even more!BW attacks sound scaryGenetically modified threatBio Terror & Bio Error“Mother Nature” as terroristRe-emergent diseasesInfluenzaDiscovery of 5 virulence-associated signaturesNorthern Arizona University studenttesting prairie dog colonyLawrence Livermore National Laboratory 5DifficultyImpactEndemicCleverUseModified• Genetic mods• WeaponizedThe human and economic impact of endemic pathogens can be amplifiedThe systems-level challenge is to counter numerous potential threatsThe systems-level challenge is to counter numerous potential threatsLawrence Livermore National Laboratory 6A stratified view of bioterrorist threatsLevel II (1000 – 10,000)Level I (1 – 1000)Level III (>10,000)• Scale?To PreventTo ProtectTo Treat & / or Isolate • Detect?ContagiousNon-ContagiousTreatable (Plague)Non-Treatable (Ebola)Treatable (Anthrax)Non-Treatable (EEV)• Agent?AerosolFood supplyWater supplyCarrierLawrence Livermore National Laboratory 7Looking for solutions: there are significant benefits to early detection of a biological attackTreatments and quarantines must be administered early13 to 4Plague32 to 5Influenza1 to 25 to 7Pulmonary Anthrax3 to 412 to 14SmallpoxIntervention window (days)Incubation period (days)DiseaseA combination of complementary strategies are needed for early detectionA combination of complementary strategies are needed for early detectionLawrence Livermore National Laboratory 8ContagiousExposedExamples for preventing, detecting, and responding to WMD eventsTimePrevent Environmental detection Response and restorationLawrence Livermore National Laboratory 9ContagiousExposedExamples for preventing, detecting, and responding to WMD eventsSignaturesBackgroundsForensics andattributionPrevent Environmental detection Response and restorationLawrence Livermore National Laboratory 10ContagiousExposedExamples for preventing, detecting, and responding to WMD eventsSignaturesBackgroundsForensics andattributionDetect to prophylax Detect to warnPrevent Environmental detection Response and restorationLawrence Livermore National Laboratory 11ContagiousExposedExamples for preventing, detecting, and responding to WMD eventsSignaturesBackgroundsForensics andattributionDetect to prophylax Detect to warnEpidemiology to treatConsequencemanagementTriage DxNew strategies?EmergingThreatPrevent Environmental detection Response and restorationLawrence Livermore National Laboratory 12Developing new operational capabilities took several years and integration across multiple disciplinesnnttNTCepheidSmithsGACAAAAGCGACAAAGGTTTTGTTCTTGGTCAATCCTCTCCTTTGCACGCCGTGGGACCATAGCTACAGATCACTTTACCTGCG.TGGGTGAACGCCGTGTGCGGTechGenomicsValidated assaysEnablinginstrumentationLawrence Livermore National Laboratory 13Early detection combined with models of dispersion are valuableBio attacks may not be visibleWant to act before symptoms presentIdentify affected area / people / livestockProphylax, treat and clean-upBUT timelines are not short enough!>15- and >150-g/m3 contoursStaten Island Fire(Feb. 21, 2003)Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 14What community norms can be established, promoted or enforced?Biological Weapons Convention is intent-basedUS offensive BW program terminated in 1969-‘Frozen’ perspective on BW-Recent investments in biodefenseAre BW the “poor man’s” nuke?-Role of deterrence?-What value does attribution provide?-When would a nation turn to BW?-When would a terrorist group?-Latency?Contrast to other areas-OPCW, for exampleOrganization for the Prohibition of Chemical WeaponsLawrence Livermore National Laboratory 15There are critical shortfalls in the nation’s infrastructure for


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