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Protocols Part IAgendaIntroduction to ProtocolsMotivationSlide 5Slide 6Slide 7Security Protocol PropertiesKerberosKerberos HistorySlide 11The Kerberos ModelPicture of a Kerberos RealmJoining a Kerberos RealmKerberos CredentialsThe Basic Kerberos ProtocolProtocol DefinitionsThe Basic Kerberos Protocol (1)The Basic Kerberos Protocol (2)Slide 20The Basic Kerberos Protocol (3)The Basic Kerberos Protocol (4)Slide 23The Basic Kerberos Protocol (5)The Basic Kerberos Protocol (6)Slide 26Slide 27Thoughts on Kerberos...PKINIT in Windows 2K/2K3Thoughts on Kerberos...(2)Thoughts on Kerberos...(3)Thoughts on Kerberos...(4)Thoughts on Kerberos...(5)Thoughts on Kerberos...(6)RNGs in Kerberos v4RNGs in Kerberos v4 (continued)Slide 37Securing Internet TrafficCommon ThemesSSL/TLSApp-Level Security: SSL/TLSSSL/PCT/TLS HistoryTypical ScenarioSlide 44Slide 45Slide 46Slide 47Slide 48The five phases of SSL/TLSPhase 1: Ciphersuite NegotiationTLS V1.0 ciphersuitesTLS-With-AES ciphersuites (RFC 3268)Phase 2: Establish the shared session keyTLS’s PRFPhases 3 & 4: AuthenticationPhase 5: Authenticate previously exchanged dataWhy do I trust the server key?Slide 58Slide 59What’s the “some other stuff”What is a certificate?Defeating MalletServer & Client Authentication with CertificatesIPSECProtocol-Level Security: IPSECIdeal Protection: End-to-EndSlide 67IPSEC Key ManagementIPSEC ArchitectureIPSEC Protection ProtocolsIPSEC Modes of OperationIPsec Scenario 1 Firewall to FirewallIPsec Scenario 2 Endnode to FirewallIPsec Scenario 3 End to EndAuthentication Header (AH)IPSEC Authentication Header (AH) in Transport ModeIPSEC AH in Tunnel ModeEncapsulated Security Payload (ESP)IPSEC ESP in Transport ModeSlide 80IPSEC ESP Tunnel ModeSlide 82Security Associations (SA)General idea of IKEv2Slide 85Internet Key Exchange (IKE)IKE ContendersISAKMPSlide 89Slide 90Imagine 150 pages of this!IKEGeneral Idea of Aggressive ModeGeneral Idea of Main ModeGeneral idea of Quick ModeMain-Mode-Preshared key SAdditional IPSEC Topics (if we have time)IPSEC Bundling/WrappingSending in Transport ModeSending in Tunnel ModeReceiving in Tunnel ModeReceiving in Transport ModeWhat is Network Address Translation (NAT) ?NATs Rewrite Address/Port PairsIPSEC AH and NATIPSEC ESP and NATProtocolsProtocolsPart IPart IBrian A. LaMacchiaBrian A. [email protected]@[email protected]@microsoft.comPortions © 2002-2006, Brian A. LaMacchia. This material is provided without warranty of any kind including, without limitation, warranty of non-infringement or suitability for any purpose. This material is not guaranteed to be error free and is intended for instructional use only.January 24, 2006January 24, 2006Practical Aspects of Modern CryptographyPractical Aspects of Modern Cryptography22AgendaAgendaIntroduction to protocolsIntroduction to protocolsSession-based protocolsSession-based protocolsKerberosKerberosSSL/TLSSSL/TLSIPSECIPSECMessage-based protocolsMessage-based protocolsS/MIMES/MIMEXMLDSIG & XMLENCXMLDSIG & XMLENCAdvanced Key Exchange Advanced Key Exchange AlgorithmsAlgorithmsIntroduction to Introduction to ProtocolsProtocolsJanuary 24, 2006January 24, 2006Practical Aspects of Modern CryptographyPractical Aspects of Modern Cryptography44MotivationMotivationJanuary 24, 2006January 24, 2006Practical Aspects of Modern CryptographyPractical Aspects of Modern Cryptography55MotivationMotivationJanuary 24, 2006January 24, 2006Practical Aspects of Modern CryptographyPractical Aspects of Modern Cryptography66MotivationMotivationJanuary 24, 2006January 24, 2006Practical Aspects of Modern CryptographyPractical Aspects of Modern Cryptography77MotivationMotivationHow do I know the web site I’m How do I know the web site I’m talking to is really who I think it talking to is really who I think it is?is?Is it safe to view to give Is it safe to view to give sensitive information over the sensitive information over the Web?Web?What keeps my CC#, SSN, financial What keeps my CC#, SSN, financial information or medical records out information or medical records out of the hands of the bad guys?of the hands of the bad guys?How do I know that the How do I know that the information I’m looking at information I’m looking at hasn’t been malicious modified? hasn’t been malicious modified? Has someone tampered with it?Has someone tampered with it?January 24, 2006January 24, 2006Practical Aspects of Modern CryptographyPractical Aspects of Modern Cryptography88Security Protocol Security Protocol PropertiesPropertiesConfidentialityConfidentialityKeeping message content secret, Keeping message content secret, even if the information passes even if the information passes over a public channelover a public channelIntegrityIntegrityKeeping messages tamper-free Keeping messages tamper-free from origin to destinationfrom origin to destinationAuthenticationAuthenticationDetermining the origin of Determining the origin of messages (author and/or sender)messages (author and/or sender)KerberosKerberosJanuary 24, 2006January 24, 2006Practical Aspects of Modern CryptographyPractical Aspects of Modern Cryptography1010Kerberos HistoryKerberos HistoryDesigned as part of MIT’s Designed as part of MIT’s Project Athena in the 1980’sProject Athena in the 1980’sKerberos v4 published in 1987Kerberos v4 published in 1987Migration to the IETFMigration to the IETFRFC 1510 (Kerberos v5, 1993)RFC 1510 (Kerberos v5, 1993)Used in a number of productsUsed in a number of productsExample: part of Windows 2000Example: part of Windows 2000MS Passport is essentially MS Passport is essentially Kerberos done w/ client-side Kerberos done w/ client-side cookies over HTTPcookies over HTTPJanuary 24, 2006January 24, 2006Practical Aspects of Modern CryptographyPractical Aspects of Modern Cryptography1111KerberosKerberosDesigned for single Designed for single “administration domain” of “administration domain” of machines & users: users, client machines & users: users, client machines, server machines, and machines, server machines, and the Key Distribution Center the Key Distribution Center (KDC)(KDC)No public key crypto No public key crypto Provides authentication & Provides authentication & encryption servicesencryption services““Kerberized” servers provide Kerberized” servers provide authorization on top of the authorization on top of the
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