How Serious is the “WMD Terrorism”Threat?: Terrorist Motivations and Capabilities for Using Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear WeaponsGary AckermanDirector, WMD Terrorism Research ProgramCenter for Nonproliferation StudiesMonterey Institute of International StudiesE-mail: [email protected] 28, 2005Jeffrey BaleSenior Research Associate, WMD Terrorism Research ProgramCenter for Nonproliferation StudiesMonterey Institute of International StudiesE-mail: [email protected] TerrorismHypeHypeHype• Security condition upgrades• Government warningsHow far we have come … from 1950s ‘Duck & Cover’ to 2003 ‘Duct tape & Cover your windows’Hype or Threat?• Media want to inform us but inevitably sensationalize things.• After Sept 11, government officials don’t want to be accused of being complacent or not warning public, so tend to dwell on worst-case scenarios.Conflating Events?Conflating Events Again?WMD Terrorism DatabaseIncidents per Year693237200545172820049541542003124685620023072396820011042777200012976531999TotalHoaxesExcluding HoaxesYearThe Empirical Record0100200300400500600700biological chemical combination nuclear radiological unknownCBRN Weapon Type Distribution (all incidents)The Empirical Record050100150200250300350400biological chemical combination nuclear radiological unknownCBRN Weapon Type Distribution (hoaxes / threats excluded)The Empirical Record050100150200250biological chemical combination radiological unknownWeapon Type Distribution (Use only)The Empirical Record02468101214161820biological chemicalIncidents With > 5 FatalitiesThe Empirical Record: Casualties1080216633150607500100020003000400050006000700080009000biological chemical nuclear radiologicalCasualties vs. Weapon TypeInjuries FatalitiesDistribution by Event Type1572014617742255261315151145050100150200250300350AttemptedAcquisitionFalse Case Hoax / Prank /ThreatPlot Only Possession Threat withPossessionUse of AgentDistribution - Event Type1975 - September 2000 (814 cases)Type 2: Criminally MotivatedType 1: Politically / Ideologically MotivatedFalse case: Not ApplicableThe Empirical Record: GeographyChemical Incident DistributionNumber of cases by Group Type all biological chemical combination nuclear radiological unknownCriminal Organization 10 2 % Left-wing 36 7 % Lone actor (s) 79 15 % N/A 7 1 % Nationalists / Separatists 100 18 % Religious (cults) 40 7 % Religious (fundamentalists) 54 10 % Right-wing 26 5 % Single-issue 33 6 % Unknown 157 29 % Total 542 100 %Number of cases by Motive all biological chemical combination nuclear radiological unknown False Case 1 0 % To Act Because of an Ideology/Belief System 162 30 % To Act on a Personal/Professional Grudge 15 3 % To Establish Ethno-Nationalist Sovereignty 98 18 % To Express Abortion-Related Sentiment 39 7 % To Extort Money/Pure Financial Gain 41 8 % To Fulfill Individualized Objective 43 8 % To Protest Treatment of Animals 9 2 % To Support Other Single-Issue 25 5 % Unknown 110 20 % Total 543 100 %Delivery Type for CBRN Attacks050100150Number of AttacksDelivery TypeWater SupplyVentilation SystemUnknownReaction DeviceN/AMail/Letter/PackageJug/Jar/CanisterInjection/ProjectileFood/DrinkExplosive DeviceConsumer ProductTamperingCasual/Personal/DirectContactAerosol/SprayKey Motivational FactorsRelevant determinants of terrorist behavior:Factors Relating to the Nature of the GroupIdeology, Organizational Structure, Organizational Dynamics, Organizational Lifecycle Status, Demographics, Resources, Operational Capabilities Factors External to the GroupHistorical Events, Relations w/ External Actors (media; other extremists; state apparatus; targeted audience; non-targeted audience; supporters), Security Environment, (Potential) Target CharacteristicsFactors Relating to Decision-MakingGeneral Planning Characteristics (risk thresholds; time horizons), Perceptual Filter, Operational ObjectivesWho makes the Decisions?Decision to carry out attack XIndividual terroristSub-group Organization LeadershipAll members (democracy)CommitteeIndividual terroristIndividual terroristIndividual terroristCommitteeIndividual terroristIndividual terroristIndividual terroristIndividual terroristIndividual terroristSub-groupsCapabilitiesMain questions:– Do terrorists currently have the capability to engage in true WMD attacks?– Is the capability of terrorists with regard to WMD increasing?– If terrorists’ WMD capabilities are increasing, what is the rate of this change?CapabilitiesBroad Trends– Terrorist capabilities in general are increasing– Societal changes can increase vulnerabilities and facilitate terrorist capabilitiesCapabilities• Organizational Capabilities• Logistical Resources• Financial Resources• Knowledge/Skill Acquisition• Materials and Technology Acquisition– C,B,R, and N differ• Initial Production of Agent– C,B,R, and N differ• Weaponization of Agent– C,B,R, and N differDesiderata• Insiders• State sponsorship• Attacks on FacilitiesRadiologicalBiologicalNuclearChemicalConventional ExplosivesProbability (based on capability considerations only)ConsequenceCBRN Terrorism Risk PlaneRISK = Probability x Consequence• Traditionally, terrorists have tended in their use of weapons and tactics to be both:– Conservative • “Path of least resistance” – terrorists generally seek to use the easiest, cheapest, tried-and-true methods– Imitative• Terrorists often utilize the successful tactics and weapons types of other groups (albeit with some localization, e.g. Mao to Carlos Marighella)•Why?– Most groups have limited resources and there are costs associated with identifying, researching and implementing new technologies, in terms of time, finances, personnel etc. – There are also often uncertainties about the reliability of any new technology in terms of achieving desired effects.– Soft targets vulnerable to traditional weapons are plentiful.Terrorists and Technology• BUT, there are exceptions to the above (may be becoming more common)where terrorists will seek new technologies:A. Specific ideological orientation towards innovating technologically• Examples: Aum Shinrikyo sending operatives to explore the documents of Nikola Tesla in hopes of building an earthquake generating machine; in some groups ideology may drive members to push the technological envelope, such as in a conceivably violent version of the Raelian cult
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