POLSC 135 1st Edition Lecture31Outline of Last Lecture: Democratic TransitionsOutline of Current Lecture: Varieties of DemocracyCurrent Lecture: I. Loyalty Norm - W/S Generates a loyalty norm - When W/S is small, members of the winning coalition will be extremely loyal to the leader. - When the W/S is large, members of the winning coalition will be less loyal. - System with small W/S are rigged election dictatorships - Systems with a large W/S are democracies, monarchies, and military juntas - Example: Let’s think of two countries, A & B where both leaders have 1 billion to distribute to their winning coalition of 1,000 people and each receive 1 million. However,their selectorates are different. A B Winning coalition: 1,000 1,000Selectorate: 100,000 10,000Loyalty Norm (W/S): .01 % .1 %- Kleptocracy = corruption Example of Kleptocrat: - President Mobutu Sese Seko of Congo who ruled from 1965 to 1997. - President Marcos of Philippines from 1965 to 1986- The loyalty norm affects the performance of leaders. - If there is a strong loyalty norm (small W/S) then leaders do not need to pay members of W much to keep them loyal. As a result, leaders can engage in kleptocracy and corruption. - Leaders in small W/S systems have little incentive to produce good public policy, it does not help them stay in power. - Government performance should be better in large W/S systems than small W/S systems. - As the size of the winning coalition increased, the share of the private goods going to each member declines.- When W is small, leaders will want to provide private goods rather than public goods. - When W is large, leaders will want to provide public goods rather than private goods. - This is because private goods would not be worth much to each individual because they must be distributed among the public. - Good things happen when W is large and W/S is large. - Middling things happen when W is small but W/S is large. - Bad things happen when W is small and W/S is small. End
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