POLSC 135 1st Edition Lecture31 Outline of Last Lecture Democratic Transitions Outline of Current Lecture Varieties of Democracy Current Lecture I Loyalty Norm W S Generates a loyalty norm When W S is small members of the winning coalition will be extremely loyal to the leader When the W S is large members of the winning coalition will be less loyal System with small W S are rigged election dictatorships Systems with a large W S are democracies monarchies and military juntas Example Let s think of two countries A B where both leaders have 1 billion to distribute to their winning coalition of 1 000 people and each receive 1 million However their selectorates are different A Winning coalition 1 000 Selectorate 100 000 Loyalty Norm W S 01 B 1 000 10 000 1 Kleptocracy corruption Example of Kleptocrat President Mobutu Sese Seko of Congo who ruled from 1965 to 1997 President Marcos of Philippines from 1965 to 1986 The loyalty norm affects the performance of leaders If there is a strong loyalty norm small W S then leaders do not need to pay members of W much to keep them loyal As a result leaders can engage in kleptocracy and corruption Leaders in small W S systems have little incentive to produce good public policy it does not help them stay in power Government performance should be better in large W S systems than small W S systems As the size of the winning coalition increased the share of the private goods going to each member declines When W is small leaders will want to provide private goods rather than public goods When W is large leaders will want to provide public goods rather than private goods This is because private goods would not be worth much to each individual because they must be distributed among the public Good things happen when W is large and W S is large Middling things happen when W is small but W S is large Bad things happen when W is small and W S is small End Lecture
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