Political Science Notes Bargaining Failures and Civil War Barbra F Walters Introduction A Bargains are harder to attain in civil war than in interstate war a Walter s argument i I argue that the low rate of settlement in civil wars is due to particulary severe bargaining problems that can occur at every stage in a dispute before fighting breaks out as a war is being fought and once a war ends I also argue that certain countries have more trouble overcoming these problems and that these countries are more likely to experience violence as a result ii Why are bargains so rare b Three basic explanations for why states in the international system might pursue a war despite the existence of a less costly alternative i Private information governments have about their capabilities and resolve 1 Benefits form withholding or misrepresenting this information ii Commitment problems 1 Credibly committing to peace agreement iii Divisibility of stakes 1 Who gets what and how much are people willing to sacrifice in order to reach an agreement B Why Civil Wars Begin why do rebel groups and governments are willing to pursue these wars despite the existence of less costly alternatives a Less costly alternative i Governments can offer groups sufficiently large concessions to win their submission 1 Macedonia Nicaragua Ecuador Panama Peru Bolivia all of these states offered degrees of autonomy to appease the rising discontent with in the country b Information Problems and the Outbreak of War i Information Problems offer partial reason why more settlements are not reached between governments and domestic groups ii Uncertainty regarding rebel financing 1 Governments do not know how powerful a rebel group is whether or not a group has the capacity to inflict war 2 Funding comes from third parties other diaspora groups and from access to and trade in natural resources or for the production of agricultural products a Groups vary this uncertainty creates disincentives to settle with every group that threatens war i Governments do not want to settle if they don t have to they so don t want to appear weak ii Hard to distinguish between different rebel group threats without engaging in battle first 3 Some rebel groups can acquire strength with the onset of war In this case shallow pocketed rebel groups that do not have the a lot of resources can attain financial popular political third party support iii Uncertainty regarding government s willingness to fight and signal toughness when many potential challengers exist 1 Committed governments high resolve governments who are willing to fight to maintain the status quo a Stronger the domestic support is for the current government the more committed it is likely to be to maintain its current policies 2 Uncommitted governments low resolve governments who are willing to give concession for peace a Governments with tenuous domestic support or constituencies unwilling to bear the cost of war are likely to be under greater pressure to settle 3 Governments know how eager they are to fight or settle rebel groups do not know how eager a governments is to fight or settle a Offering concessions signals to other groups that the government is uncommitted and likely to fold b Incentive for governments to act tough war is a means by which governments can manipulate private information about their own resolve to convince future rivals to stay quiet c Bluffing is not universal i Reputation building makes sense in countries whose government anticipates a series of rebellions over time but not in a country with only limited number of unhappy groups 1 Greater number of potential challengers the greater need to buff the more likely a government is to go to war iv War might be a rational alternative f it means it is less costly than appeasement c Commitment problems and the Outbreak of War i Weak Political and Legal Institutions 1 Commitment problems are problems in treaty enforcement now and in the future a Governments renege on their promises and the rebel groups have little power to punish offenders of the treaty since rebel groups usually have to disarm as a part of the treaty agreement b Happens in countries where political an legal institutions are not strong enough to regulate and check executive control ii Cemented Clevages the majority almost always had the numbers to override the weaker rival and the minority can do nothing to prevent this 1 In cases where governments do not have significant domestic political support for concessions credible commitments to such deals are difficult to make iii Relative power can shift 1 Changes in territorial boundaries some ethnic groups are on the wrong side of the line a Rising birthrate changes demographics b Changes in distribution can arise from settlements i Israel and the Palestinians iv Without strong institutions negotiations are highly unlikely C Why Some Civil Wars Last Longer than Others a Information problems i Guerilla wars guerilla or terrorist tactics unconventional 1 Takes longer to expose true nature of rebel strength and resolve than if it were fought using more observable conventional means ii Multiple shifting factions make it harder to get to a settlement because the information about the factions is so uncertain b Commitment problems why agreements are not reached even when the government has all of the information and offers concessions to the rebel groups i Treaties are almost always signed when the central government is in a period of weakness 1 As governments gain strength they will have elss of an incentive to honor this agreement and everyone know it 2 Almost always as a part of the agreement the rebel groups have to disarm and this leaves them extremely vulnerable to exploitation 3 These tow reasons together governments getting stronger and the rebels getting weaker make it difficult for governments to credibly commit to even the most munificent terms 4 Countries with clear asymmetries of power and those with no chance of third party intervention will have great difficulty overcoming these commitment problems c Why Do Some Civil Wars Recur and Other Do Not i Whether a country enters in to a second civil war depends greatly on the information they acquired in the first war 1 Duration of the war 2 The outcome ii Decisive Military Victories help reduce chances of second civil war 1 They offer more information about the winning side 2 Results in longer periods of peace 3 For settlements to remain they must be