Neo-Liberal InstitutionalismThe Prisoners’ DilemmaNeo-Liberal InstitutionalismCentral QuestionIterationConditions for CooperationCooperation dilemmasInternational RegimesInstitutions Facilitate CooperationGrowth in the Number of International Regimes Environmental Treaties 1968-1998Realist CritiqueImpact of Ozone RegimeImpact of Whaling Regime?Neo-Liberal InstitutionalismThe Prisoners’ DilemmaPlayer 2Player 1Neo-Liberal InstitutionalismAccepts the basic assumptions of realism –States: main actors–States: unitary, rational actors–Goals: states follow their interests»-but have multiple interests in addition to security and power»-power not always fungible–System: anarchical, no central authorityCentral QuestionWhat Facilitates Cooperation in an Anarchical System?IterationRobert Axelrod The Evolution of Cooperation (1984)If you play the PD repeatedly the winning/dominant strategy is TIT FOR TAT, not DEFECTImplications:–Cooperation can get started even in a world of unconditional defection;–Iteration, long term horizons important;–Strategy of reciprocity can thrive where many other strategies of cooperation fail–Once established cooperation based on reciprocity can protect itself from invasion of other strategiesConditions for CooperationHegemonic Interest (Realism and Institutionalism)Repeated interaction–Repeated PD: dominant strategy is “Tit-for-Tat”; NOT “Defect”No immediate threat to state survivalSmaller number of actorsType of cooperation dilemmaCooperation dilemmasPD: problems of cheating, credible commitmentBattle of the Sexes: coordination problemsGame OperaGame 1;2 0;0Opera 0;0 2;1CooperateDefectCooperate3;3 4;1Defect 1;4 2;2International Regimes“…implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.”Stephen Krasner (1983) International Regimes, p.2.Example: GATT/WTOInstitutions Facilitate CooperationInstitutionalize iteration Provide information Credible commitmentsIssue linkage Reduce transaction costs –make agreements and monitoring less costly to administerResolve distribution conflictsGrowth in the Number of International RegimesEnvironmental Treaties 1968-1998Realist Critique Institutions reflect the distribution of power and interests and therefore are irrelevantNeo-liberal have ignored the problem of relative gains that would inhibit or shape cooperationLittle empirical evidence that institutions matterImpact of Ozone RegimeImpact of Whaling
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