COLBY GO 131 - Neo-Liberal Institutionalism

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Neo-Liberal InstitutionalismThe Prisoners’ DilemmaNeo-Liberal InstitutionalismCentral QuestionIterationConditions for CooperationCooperation dilemmasInternational RegimesInstitutions Facilitate CooperationGrowth in the Number of International Regimes Environmental Treaties 1968-1998Realist CritiqueImpact of Ozone RegimeImpact of Whaling Regime?Neo-Liberal InstitutionalismThe Prisoners’ DilemmaPlayer 2Player 1Neo-Liberal InstitutionalismAccepts the basic assumptions of realism –States: main actors–States: unitary, rational actors–Goals: states follow their interests»-but have multiple interests in addition to security and power»-power not always fungible–System: anarchical, no central authorityCentral QuestionWhat Facilitates Cooperation in an Anarchical System?IterationRobert Axelrod The Evolution of Cooperation (1984)If you play the PD repeatedly the winning/dominant strategy is TIT FOR TAT, not DEFECTImplications:–Cooperation can get started even in a world of unconditional defection;–Iteration, long term horizons important;–Strategy of reciprocity can thrive where many other strategies of cooperation fail–Once established cooperation based on reciprocity can protect itself from invasion of other strategiesConditions for CooperationHegemonic Interest (Realism and Institutionalism)Repeated interaction–Repeated PD: dominant strategy is “Tit-for-Tat”; NOT “Defect”No immediate threat to state survivalSmaller number of actorsType of cooperation dilemmaCooperation dilemmasPD: problems of cheating, credible commitmentBattle of the Sexes: coordination problemsGame OperaGame 1;2 0;0Opera 0;0 2;1CooperateDefectCooperate3;3 4;1Defect 1;4 2;2International Regimes“…implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.”Stephen Krasner (1983) International Regimes, p.2.Example: GATT/WTOInstitutions Facilitate CooperationInstitutionalize iteration Provide information Credible commitmentsIssue linkage Reduce transaction costs –make agreements and monitoring less costly to administerResolve distribution conflictsGrowth in the Number of International RegimesEnvironmental Treaties 1968-1998Realist Critique Institutions reflect the distribution of power and interests and therefore are irrelevantNeo-liberal have ignored the problem of relative gains that would inhibit or shape cooperationLittle empirical evidence that institutions matterImpact of Ozone RegimeImpact of Whaling


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COLBY GO 131 - Neo-Liberal Institutionalism

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