JOHN HARVEY NELSON v. DARYL DEAN C. FREELAND and BELINDA BRITTAIN FREELAND No. 216A98 (Filed 31 December 1998) Negligence § 105 (NCI4th)-- premises liability -- invitee and licensee distinction -- abolished The distinction between licensees and invitees is eliminated and a standard of reasonable care toward all lawful visitors is adopted. Adoption of a true negligence standard eliminates the complex, confusing, and unpredictable state of premises-liability law and replaces it with a rule which focuses the jury's attention upon the pertinent issue of whether the landowner acted as a reasonable person under the circumstances. The duty imposed upon owners and occupiers of land is only the duty to exercise a reasonable care in the maintenance of the premises for the protection of lawful visitors; owners and occupiers of land are not now insurers of their premises and the intent is not for owners and occupiers of land to undergo unwarranted burdens in maintaining their premises. It is further emphasized that a separate classification for trespassers is maintained. This rule is given prospective and retroactive application. Chief Justice MITCHELL concurring in the result. Justices LAKE and ORR join in this concurring opinion. Appeal of right by plaintiff pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from an unpublished decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 129 N.C. App. 427, 500 S.E.2d 778 (1998), affirming an order granting defendants' motion for summary judgment entered by Burke, J., on 15 July 1997 in Superior Court, Guilford County. Heard in the Supreme Court 16 November1998. Maddox & Gorham, P.A., by E. Thomas Maddox, Jr.; and Harrison, North, Cooke & Landreth, by A. Wayland Cooke, for plaintiff-appellant. Burton & Sue, L.L.P., by Walter K. Burton, David K. Williams, Jr., and James D. Secor, III, for defendant- appellees. WYNN, Justice. The sole issue arising out of the case sub judice is whether defendant Dean Freeland's ("Freeland") act of leaving a stick on his porch constitutednegligence. Indeed, this case presents us with the simplest of factual scenarios-- Freeland requested that plaintiff John Harvey Nelson ("Nelson")pick him up at his house for a business meeting the two were attending, and Nelson, while doing so, tripped over a stick that Freeland had inadvertently left lying on his porch. Nelson brought this action against Freeland and his wife seeking damages for the injuries he sustained in the fall. The trial courtgranted summary judgment for the defendants, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. See Nelson v. Freeland, 129 N.C. App. 427, 500 S.E.2d 778 (1998). Although the most basic principles of tort law should provide an easy answer to this case, our current premises- liability trichotomy-- that is, the invitee, licensee, and trespasser classifications-- provides no clear solution and has created dissension and confusion amongst the attorneys and judges involved. Thus, once again, this Court confronts the problem of clarifying our enigmatic premises-liability scheme-- a problem that we have addressedover fourteen times. See, e.g., Cassell v. Collins, 344 N.C. 160, 472 S.E.2d 770 (1996); Newton v. New Hanover County Bd. of Educ., 342 N.C. 554, 467 S.E.2d 58 (1996); Roumillat v. Simplistic Enters., 331 N.C. 57, 414 S.E.2d 339 (1992); Pulley v. Rex Hosp., 326 N.C. 701, 392 S.E.2d 380 (1990); Branks v. Kern, 320 N.C. 621, 359 S.E.2d 780 (1987); Mazzacco v. Purcell, 303 N.C. 493, 279 S.E.2d 583 (1981); Norwood v. Sherman- Williams Co., 303 N.C. 462, 279 S.E.2d 559 (1981); Rappaport v. Days Inn of Am., Inc., 296 N.C. 382, 250 S.E.2d 245 (1979); Husketh v. Convenient Sys., Inc., 295 N.C. 459, 245 S.E.2d 507 (1978); Anderson v. Butler, 284 N.C. 723, 202 S.E.2d 585 (1974); Freeze v. Congleton, 276 N.C. 178, 171 S.E.2d 424 (1970); Game v. Charles Stores Co., 268 N.C. 676, 151 S.E.2d 560 (1966); Thames v. Nello L. Teer Co., 267 N.C. 565, 148 S.E.2d 527 (1966); Jones v. Kinston Hous. Auth., 262 N.C. 604, 138 S.E.2d 235 (1964). As the aforementioned cases demonstrate, we have repeatedly waded through the mire of North Carolina premises-liability law. Nonetheless, despite our numerous attempts to clarify this liability scheme and transform it into a system capable of guiding North Carolina landowners toward appropriate conduct, this case and its similarly situated predecessors convincingly demonstrate that our current premises-liability scheme has failed to establish a stable and predictable system of laws. Significantly, despite over one hundred years of utilizing the common-law trichotomy, we still are unable to determine unquestionably whether a man who trips over astick at a friend/business partner's house is entitled to a jury trial-- a question ostensibly answerable by the most basic tenet and duty under tort law: the reasonable-person standard of care. Given that our current premises-liability scheme has confounded our judiciary, we can only assume that it has inadequately apprised landownersof their respective duties of care. Thus, it befalls us to examine the continuing utility of the common-law trichotomy as a means of determininglandowner liability in North Carolina. In analyzing this question, we will consider the effectiveness of our current scheme of premises- liability law, the nationwide trend of abandoning the common-law trichotomy in favor of a reasonable-care standard, and the policy reasons for and against abandoning the trichotomy in this state. I. ANALYSIS A. CURRENT NORTH CAROLINA PREMISES-LIABILITY LAW Under current North Carolina law, the standard of care a landownerSee footnote 1 owes to persons entering upon his land depends upon the entrant's status, that is, whether the entrant is a licensee, invitee, or trespasser. See Newton, 342 N.C. at 560, 467 S.E.2d at 63. An invitee is one who goes onto another's premises in response to an express or implied invitation and does so for the mutual benefit of both the owner and himself. Id. The classic example of an invitee is a store customer. See, e.g., Rives v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 68 N.C. App. 594, 315 S.E.2d 724 (1984). A licensee, on the other hand, "is one who enters onto another's premises with the possessor's permission, express or implied, solely for his own purposes rather than the possessor's benefit." Mazzacco, 303 N.C. at 497, 279 S.E.2d at 586-87. The classic example of a licensee is a social guest. See, e.g., Crane v. Caldwell, 113 N.C. App. 362,
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