An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. NO. COA03-455 NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS Filed: 06 April 2004 ELIZABETH SLOAN, Plaintiff, v. JOHN F. HITT, Defendant. Pitt County No. 98 CVD 394 Appeal by plaintiff from orders entered 1 May 2002, 2 May 2002, and 7 October 2002 by Judge P. Gwynett Hilburn in Pitt County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 January 2004. Michelle D. Reingold for plaintiff-appellant. Jeffrey L. Miller for defendant-appellee. STEELMAN, Judge. Plaintiff, Elizabeth Sloan Hitt, appeals the trial court's determination that an equal division and distribution of the marital and divisible estate was equitable following her divorce from defendant, John F. Hitt. For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm. Plaintiff and defendant were married on 19 July 1986. No children were born of the marriage. Plaintiff and defendant separated on 24 January 1997 and were divorced on 8 June 1998. Prior to the marriage, plaintiff owned considerable property. She was the owner of a residence, several farms, a shopping center, an apartment complex, lots at Ocracoke, and several financial accounts. Defendant came to the marriage with approximately $50,000, a retirement account, some personal items, and a house inherited from his brother. Additional facts will be discussed in the context of plaintiff's assignments of error. We first note that the distribution of marital property is in the discretion of the trial court, and the exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed in the absence of clear abuse. White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985). Thus, the trial court's ruling in equitable distribution cases receives great deference and may be upset only if it is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision. Id.The trial court's findings of fact are conclusive if supported by any competent evidence. Humphries v. City of Jacksonville, 300 N.C. 186, 187, 265 S.E.2d 189, 190 (1980). The mere existence of conflicting evidence or discrepancies in evidence will not justify reversal. Coble v. Richardson Corp. of Greensboro, 71 N.C. App. 511, 518, 322 S.E.2d 817, 822 (1984). In her first assignment of error, plaintiff argues her due process rights were violated because the trial court did not enter an order until some eight months after the conclusion of the trial. We disagree. In Wall v. Wall, this Court held a delay of nineteen months from the date of trial to the entry of an equitable distribution judgment was not a de minimis delay and a further hearing should be conducted upon remand of the case. 140 N.C. App. 303, 314, 536 S.E.2d 647, 654 (2000). At that hearing, the parties were to be given the opportunity to present “additional evidence as to any substantial changes in their respective conditions or post-trial changes, if any, in the value of items of marital property.” Id. We find the instant case to be distinguishable from Wall. In this case, the trial judge circulated proposed findings of fact to the parties on 30 November 2001, approximately three and a half months after the final hearing. After reviewing the proposed findings, counsel for defendant noted some omissions of property values. A further hearing was held on 22 March 2002 regarding the omissions. After the hearing, the trial court made adjustments in its original calculations and entered a final order and judgment on 1 May 2002. Following entry of judgment, plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial under Rule 59 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. This motion alleged substantial and significant changes in the conditions of the parties “[d]ue to the length of time between the beginning of the trial of this matter in March, 2001, the announcement of the Order, and the actual entry of the final Order....” On 2 August 2002 a hearing was held on this motion, at which time the trial court received evidence from both parties concerning the alleged changes in their circumstances. The trial court entered an order on 3 October 2002, which concluded that plaintiff had shown no prejudice as a result of the delay in the entry of the judgment and denied the motion for a new trial. In Wall, there was a nineteen month delay from the date of trial and the entry of judgment. 140 N.C. App. at 314, 536 S.E.2d at 654. In this case there was a delay of approximately seven and a half months - from 20 August 2001, the date of the final hearing until 1 May 2002, the date of the entry of judgment, with one hearing conducted during the interim on 22 March 2002. This was a complex case, involving a substantial amount of property and very difficult issues. Taking all of this into consideration, a seven and a half month delay is still too long a delay between trial and entry of judgment. However, in this case we do not find the delay to be prejudicial. Upon the filing of the plaintiff's motion for a new trial, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing where both parties were allowed to present evidence on the issue of whether there had been any substantial or material changes in the positions of the parties. The trial court found plaintiff to have suffered no prejudice. In Wall, the remedy for an unjustified delay in the entry of an equitable distribution judgment was for the trial court to conduct further hearings where the parties could offer evidence of changes in their respective conditions following the original hearing. 140 N.C. App. at 314, 536 S.E.2d at 654. We find that such a hearing took place here,pursuant to plaintiff's Rule 59 motion and thus, an additional hearing is not required. This assignment of error is without merit. In her second assignment of error, plaintiff argues the trial court erred by failing to: (1) classify and distribute a check from FEMA; and (2) make findings and conclusions concerning a certificate of deposit that was in the husband's name. We disagree. In 1996, real estate belonging to plaintiff was damaged by hurricane Fran. In October 1996, FEMA issued a check to Mr. Hitt in the amount of $5914.00. At trial, plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Miller, examined the defendant concerning this check as follows: [Mr. Miller]: You didn't
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