DOC PREVIEW
NCSU ARE 306 - CASE - LITLLE v. STOGNER

This preview shows page 1-2-3 out of 8 pages.

Save
View full document
View full document
Premium Document
Do you want full access? Go Premium and unlock all 8 pages.
Access to all documents
Download any document
Ad free experience
View full document
Premium Document
Do you want full access? Go Premium and unlock all 8 pages.
Access to all documents
Download any document
Ad free experience
View full document
Premium Document
Do you want full access? Go Premium and unlock all 8 pages.
Access to all documents
Download any document
Ad free experience
Premium Document
Do you want full access? Go Premium and unlock all 8 pages.
Access to all documents
Download any document
Ad free experience

Unformatted text preview:

http://www.aoc.state.nc.us/www/public/coa/opinions/2004/021704-1.htm All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the North Carolina Reports and North Carolina Court of Appeals Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the North Carolina Reports and North Carolina Court of Appeals Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. MARY ELLISON LITTLE and ROBERT J. ELLISON, Plaintiffs v. JACK DOUGLAS STOGNER, individually, and JACK DOUGLAS STOGNER, as Administrator of the Estate of Peggy W. Stogner, Defendant NO. COA02-1704 Filed: 6 January 2004 1. Fraud_sale of real property_failure to perk--reasonable reliance on representations The trial court erred by directing a verdict for defendant on a fraud claim arising from the sale of real property where there was sufficient evidence that defendant knowingly made false representations that the property perked and that existing septic tanks had been grandfathered. These representations were not merely vague indications, but definite representations upon which a reasonable person would rely. Moreover, defendant's assertions induced plaintiffs to accept “as is” terms with no residential disclosure statement. 2. Real Property_Residential Property Disclosure Act_remedy The trial court did not err by dismissing a claim for damages under the Residential Property Disclosure Act. The sole remedy was cancellation of the contract. 3. Vendor and Purchaser; Warranties_implied_restrictive covenants_failure of property to perk The trial court erred by dismissing a claim for breach of implied warranty which arose from the sale of residential property that failed to perk where there was sufficient evidence that the property was not suitable for any conventional, modified, or alternative sewage system and could not be used to construct a residence in compliance with restrictive covenants. The defect was not reasonably discoverable because of defendant's misrepresentations and assurances. 4. Fraud_sale of real property_damages The calculation of damages for fraud in the sale of real property is based upon thedifference between the value of the property when the contract was made and the value it would have had without the fraudulent representation. Appeal by plaintiffs from judgment entered 11 March 2002 and an order entered 14 November 2002 by Judges Robert P. Johnston and J. Gentry Caudill, respectively, in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 October 2003. Andresen & Associates, by Christopher M. Vann and John W. Gresham, for plaintiff-appellants. Helms Mulliss & Wicker, P.L.L.C., by Robert A. Muckenfuss, Thomas D. Myrick, and Jill C. Griset, for defendant-appellee. HUNTER, Judge. Mary Ellison Little (“Little”) and Robert J. Ellison (“Ellison”) (collectively “plaintiffs”) appeal from a Directed Verdict and Judgment entered against them filed 11 March 2002 and an order denying plaintiffs' motion for relief from judgment filed 14 November 2002. Plaintiffs also petition this Court for certiorari to review a consent judgment dated 11 June 2002 and an order awarding bond and denying plaintiffs' motion to restore the injunction filed 6 August 2002. We grant plaintiffs' petition for certiorari in order to fully review this appeal. Because the trial court erred in granting a directed verdict against plaintiffs on their fraud claim and in dismissing plaintiffs' breach of implied warranty claim, we reverse in part and vacate the award of costs to defendant. We also vacate the order lifting the preliminary injunction and awarding the injunction bond to defendant. However, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claim under the Residential Property Disclosure Act and the exclusion of evidence on the valuation of the property at the time of trial. The evidence presented at trial tends to show Jack Douglas Stogner (“defendant”) sold two lots located on Lake Wylie in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, to plaintiffs. Defendant on various occasions represented to plaintiffs and others that he had soil tests performed on the property and those tests revealed that the soil “perked,” meaning the soil was suitable to support a septic tank system because it could filtrate water at an acceptable rate. In early May 1998, after Little had initially shown interest in buying the property from defendant, defendant called Little and made an appointment for her to view the lots. Defendant walked the property showing Little where the boundaries of the lots corresponded to copies of recorded plats. He informed Little that a lot of soil work had been performed on the property and that the property would “perk.” Defendant also told Little that there were two septic tanks and that Mecklenburg County had “grandfathered” both of the tanks. Defendant also represented that Little could connect houses she planned to build to the septic tanks without the expense of any additional septic system. Defendant reminded Little that her property next to the lots perked, that the next door neighbor's property perked, and that another property down the road also perked, and that his land was the same, he had all the soil work done and there would be no problem with the property. There was also evidence that defendant made similar representations to other potential buyers. Little and defendant initially entered into a standard form offer to purchase and contract for the property on 1 June 1998. In that standard form contract, however,provisions related to property disclosure and inspections were crossed out. Further, the contract stated Little waived her right to receive a Residential Property Disclosure Statement and that the property was being sold “as is.” Little was told by defendant and Malickson, the attorney advising defendant and who performed the closing, that the Residential Property Disclosure Statement only applied to a cabin located on the property, which was going to be removed, and dealt only with termites, chimney inspections, electrical wiring, and lead paint disclosures. Following the signing of the offer to purchase and contract, Ellison, Little's brother, decided he would join Little in purchasing the lots, and plaintiffs and defendant once again viewed the property. Defendant again pointed


View Full Document

NCSU ARE 306 - CASE - LITLLE v. STOGNER

Documents in this Course
SYLLABUS

SYLLABUS

14 pages

CASE

CASE

19 pages

CASE

CASE

11 pages

CASE

CASE

4 pages

CASE

CASE

5 pages

CASE

CASE

9 pages

CASE

CASE

10 pages

CASE

CASE

19 pages

Load more
Download CASE - LITLLE v. STOGNER
Our administrator received your request to download this document. We will send you the file to your email shortly.
Loading Unlocking...
Login

Join to view CASE - LITLLE v. STOGNER and access 3M+ class-specific study document.

or
We will never post anything without your permission.
Don't have an account?
Sign Up

Join to view CASE - LITLLE v. STOGNER 2 2 and access 3M+ class-specific study document.

or

By creating an account you agree to our Privacy Policy and Terms Of Use

Already a member?