Phil 1101 1st Edition Lecture 15Outline of Last Lecture I. Descartes’ Conceivability Argument for DualismII. Cartesian ArgumentIII. ObjectionsIV. General Problems for DualismOutline of Current Lecture I. Mind-Brain PhysicalismII. Physicalism: Identity TheoryIII. The Causal Closure Argument for IDIV. Arguments against IDV. PuzzleVI. Eliminative MaterialismVII. FunctionalismCurrent LectureI. Mind-Brain Physicalisma. All facts about the mind SUPERVENE on neurobiological factsb. Mental facts supervene on physical facts if there can be no changes in the mentalfacts without changes in the neurobiological factsc. What would explain supervenience?i. Obvious answer: The mind is identical to the brianII. Physicalism: Identity Theorya. Every mental state or event is identical to a brain state or eventb. ID is reductive: it reduces all the facts of one typeThese notes represent a detailed interpretation of the professor’s lecture. GradeBuddy is best used as a supplement to your own notes, not as a substitute.c. Evidence for IDi. Simplicityii. Coheres with evolutionary dataiii. Success of neuroscienceIII. The Causal Closure Argument for IDa. Thinking sometimes causes physical behaviorb. Every physical event has a physical causec. No event can have multiple independent causesd. Therefore, some mental events are physical eventsIV. Arguments against IDa. I can know my mental states by introspectionb. I can’t know my brian states by introspectionc. Therefore, my mental states are not my brian statesi. Reply: the argument points to a limitation of our knowledge. Introspection isn’t a very powerful tool for knowing about the mind.V. Puzzlea. It seems possible that something that doesn’t have a brain or nervous system could still think i. But this isn’t possible according to IDVI. Eliminative Materialisma. Common sense or ‘folk’ psychology contains a radically false theoryb. Mental states like belief or desire won’t be REDUCED to neurobiological states, they will be eliminated from future sciencec. Analogy:i. Minds are like witchesii. We can explain why people might have thought they existed, but they don’t in fact existd. Problemi. If there are no mental states like beliefs, how can we imagine or believe eliminative materialism without contradicting the theory?VII. Functionalisma. What makes a mind is not what it is made of, but its functionb. Different people, same type of job:: different physical states, same mental
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