Phil 1101 1st Edition Lecture 14Outline of Last Lecture I. The Mind/Body ProblemII. Two ViewsIII. What is a non-physical object?IV. Cartesian DualismOutline of Current Lecture I. Descartes’ Conceivability Argument for DualismII. Cartesian ArgumentIII. ObjectionsIV. General Problems for DualismCurrent LectureI. Descartes’ Conceivability Argument for Dualisma. The fact that I can clearly and distinctly conceive of two things as separate is “enough to make me certain they are distinct”II. Cartesian Argumenta. Argument:i. can conceive of myself without a body.ii. I cannot conceive of myself without a mind.iii. So my body has a different property than my mind.iv. Therefore my mind is not identical with my body.b. Leibniz’s law: for any x and any y, if x is identical to y, then x and y share all the same propertiesi. Thus, for any x and y, if x and y do not share all the same properties, then x is not yc. So, what in general do you consider propertiesIII. ObjectionsThese notes represent a detailed interpretation of the professor’s lecture. GradeBuddy is best used as a supplement to your own notes, not as a substitute.a. Can we conceive of not having a bodyb. Consider this argument:i. I can’t conceive (or imagine) that water is not waterii. I can conceive (or imagine) that water is H2Oiii. Therefore water isn’t H2OIV. General Problems for Dualisma. The brain-damage objectioni. If Dualism were true, then damaging the brain should not damage the mindii. But damaging the brain does not damage the mindiii. Therefore, dualism is falseb. Response: the relation between the mind and the body is “not that of a sailor to his ship”. They are ‘intermingled’.c. Mind/brian Causalityi. How does a particular non-physical thing or event cause a particular physical thing or
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