POL 202 1st Edition Lecture 11Current LectureI. The Bargaining Rangea. Both states want more territoryb. A and B denote costs that State A/State B will have to pay if war breaks outi. Expected value of outcome of a war minus the cost of the war1. Cost of lives vs. amount of territory2. Used to figure out why war occursc. For any A & B:i. War is costlyii. Object of contention is divisibled. Always at least one negotiated settlement that A and B will both prefer to warII. Compellence/Deterrencea. Precrisis Distributioni. Status quo1. Represented as point on the line 2. Determines which states might have an interest in using force3. If state expects to get more through war—dissatisfied with the status quob. Compellencei. Effort to change status quo through forcec. Deterrencei. Preventing change in status quo through forceii. Extended deterrence1. An attempt to extend protection to another stateIII. Wars By Mistake—Incomplete Informationa. Poor information leads to mistakesi. Make mistakes about capabilities the other side hasThese notes represent a detailed interpretation of the professor’s lecture. GradeBuddy is best used as a supplement to your own notes, not as a substitute.ii. Make mistakes about resolve/willingness of other side to go to war1. May “overreach or under reach” in bargaining based off mistakesa. “Incomplete information”b. Two Classes of Unknown:i. Capabilities: physical ability to winii. Resolvec. In total war, states mobilize all of their resourcesd. In limited war, states fight with less than their full potentiale. Risk-Return Tradeoffi. Tradeoff between trying to get a good deal and trying to minimize the possibility that war will break outIV. Incentives to Misrepresent/Problem of Credibility a. Credibilityi. Credible threat—threat that target believes will be carried out1. Based on beliefs of target, not intentions of acting state2. Carrying through threats is costly3. Conflicting interests lies at the heart of bargaining reactionsb. Iraq invading Kuwaiti. Made sense for US to “hide strongest cards”—troops ii. In other cases, states may hide weakest cards—in attempt to bluff, acting stronger than realityV. Communicating Resolvea. The Language of Coercioni. For threats to be credible, they must be costly in some way1. Brinksmanship: “slippery slope”a. Provocative actions approaches the “brink of war”b. Separates resolute from irresolute adversariesc. Each side “moves down slippery slope until one stops moving down or both fall”2. Tying of Handsa. Send credible signs of willingness to fight by making threats that would make backing down difficulti. Audience costs: negative repercussions that arise—“ties hands”ii. Based on Homer’s Odysseyiii. Each side might eliminate its ability to compromise VI. Paying for Powera. Spend to raise visible capabilitiesi. Reduces cost/time to mount threatsb. Costly actions demonstrate resolvei. Berlin