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UA POL 202 - Game Theory
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POL 202 1st Edition Lecture 8February 2ndA Primer On Game Theorya. 4 Outcomesi. Both cooperate (CC)ii. Both defect (DD)iii. Actor 1 cooperates, Actor 2 defects (CD)iv. Actor 2 cooperates, Actor 1 defects (DC)b. Both actors choose simultaneously without knowledge of others’ choicei. Strategic interaction depends on choices of all relevant actorsc. Outcomes are contingent on choices of all partiesi. Rational actors choose strategies that are best response to other actord. Dominant Theoryi. An actor makes the same choice regardless of what other opponent does1. Sometimes, player’s best choice depends on what opponent doese. Equilibriumi. Outcome that arises from each side playing best response strategies1. Actors have no incentive to unilaterally change their choicef. Three Distinct Gamesi. Prisoner’s Dilemmaii. Chickeniii. Stag HuntII. The Prisoner’s Dilemmaa. Each prisoner can either cooperate with or defect against his partner in the telling of a crime i. Cooperation: partner does not exploit other partnerii. Defecting: partner does tell police what happenedThese notes represent a detailed interpretation of the professor’s lecture. GradeBuddy is best used as a supplement to your own notes, not as a substitute.iii. Making “rational decisions” of both defecting causes less desirable outcomes than if each side cooperated b. Examplesi. Arms race during the Cold War1. Each side wanted dominance but with least amount of costii. Tariff negotiation1. Each side wanted access to markets while protecting their owniii. Higher tariffs/keeping tariffs would be cooperatingiv. Lowering tariffs would be defecting III. Chickena. 2 drivers speed toward one anotheri. First to turn becomes “chicken” and is humiliated1. Other driver wins2. Both swerve—no ending3. Neither swerve—crash 4. Swerving is cooperating5. Not swerving is defectingb. Not a dominant strategy i. Do opposite of what other driver is likely to do 1. Coercive bargaining IV. The Stag Hunta. Hunters can work together to kill stag. Vs. individually hunt rabbiti. Cooperating: share stag between familiesii. Defecting: share rabbit between families b. Continuing to cooperate is the best outcome for everyone c. No dominant strategyi. Coordination dilemma1. The problem of international standards V. Value of Game Theorya. Helps clarify the core dilemmas in certain strategic interactionsi. More like metaphors than accurate representations of realityVI. Cooperation/Bargaininga. Cooperation: 2+ actors adopt policies that make at least one actor better off thanthey were beforei. Has a shared interest/goalb. Bargaining: actors must choose outcomes that make one better off at the expense of the other VII. Cooperationa. One player cannot become better off without making other player worse offi. Paneto Frontier1. Cooperation consists of mutual policyVIII. Bargaininga. “Zero sum game”i.


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UA POL 202 - Game Theory

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