Katherine HeenanEnglish 472Spring 2007April 19, 2007Berlin, James. "Revisionary History: The Dialectical Method." Rethinking the History of Rhetoric.Ed. Takis Poulakos. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993: 135-51.- here Berlin calls for plurality in rhetorical history- argues that historical investigations need to explore “multiple and disparate rhetorics, rather than any single, universal, and timeless formation” (135)- refers to Douglas Ehninger’s 1968 “On Systems of Rhetoric” as an inaugural call for revisionary histories of rhetoric- notes that the “guiding principle for analyzing a rhetoric should be a concern for the role it fulfilled for its users at its own historical time and place,” but that doesn’t mean that “rhetorics never share certain properties” (135)- so, despite the historical variability of rhetorics, “we can group certain rhetorics together in terms of the systemic principles they demonstrate. . .” (135)- Ehninger discusses three periods:1. classical with a concern for the grammar of the speech act2. the 18th century with its development of psychological dimensions of the message mind relations3. and contemporary—post 1930—with its focus on the social and the effects of language in human communication- Berlin notes, however, that Ehninger’s call for revision is in itself in need of revision (135)- In order to offer such a revision, Berlin begins with a rethinking of the history of rhetoric via Foucault- Foucault’s concerned with the ways in which the creation of history—historical accounts of persons and events—are part of the existing discursive formations and therefore “part of the endless play for power” inherent in language use- Berlin uses this as a frame for his analysis- Basic problem is this: until recently, historians of rhetoric have looked for “the common origin of all rhetorical systems,” with the assumption that there “have been moments of time in which the essential features of one true rhetoric can be directly observed”—thesemoments differ for classicists and modernists (137)- yet both histories operate within a concept of descent—of a ruling temporal development- and for both, the work of the historian is to go back in time to restore an unbroken continuity—to demonstrate that the past actively exists in the present- the historian is supposed to “objectively” record this history—which is, of course, of greatindividuals, heroic rhetoricians with the courage and wisdom to change the way people of the past have deliberated and represented their experience- in these studies, the emergence of new rhetorics is attributable to the greatness of individuals and the irresistible wisdom of their recommendations- that certain rhetorics become “dominant as a result of a play of forces—of dominations, to use Foucault’s terms”—is unthinkable- our histories of rhetoric then, have always sought the great, wise, and exceptional individual and the important and profound activities and in doing so have denied the historian’s own role in shaping the events presentedBerlin Notes- to summarize: “our present histories of rhetoric assume a neutral space outside of time from which the objective historian can record a completed history. . .” (139) - This history requires “the permanent, the constant, the universal” (139)New Histories- now, in writing new histories, Berlin argues, “it is not enough to locate and consider rhetorics that reproduce the ideology of the established power structure—in other words,the rhetorics that have dominated at schools, the courts, and the law making bodies” (144)- since there are always “ideologies that arise in opposition to the dominant formation,” wemust look to those too in developing new histories- “the rhetorics that dominate in a particular society represent the winners in an economic,social, and political contest” in their own historical moment - “the rhetorics that prevail represent the success of establishing a particular set of rules for discourse, rules that sanction one ideology at the expense of others” (145)- argues that seeing rhetorical systems in this way—as the scenes of conflict—results in the construction of different kinds of histories- the historian of rhetoric, then, must search for the rhetorics—not for the rhetoric—of a particular historical moment- she must identify both those who succeed—the Platos and Aristotles—and those who fail—the sophists until recently- the writers of these new histories of rhetorics will need to acknowledge that they “are involved in a rhetorical enterprise, relying on the rules of a specific rhetoric inscribed witha particular ideology. . .” (146)- histories—of rhetoric or other areas—are never neutral; they are all