45 Cards in this Set
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Good theory should do this
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1) Simplify much
2) Explain much
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Theory
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General statements that describe and explain the causes or effects of classes of phenomena. They are composed of causal laws or hypotheses, explanations, and antecedent conditions. (Reasoned and precise speculation intended to explain something)
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Law
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An observed regular relationship between two phenomena
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Hypotheses
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A conjectured relationship between two phenomena
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Antecedent Conditions
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A phenomenon whose presence activates or magnifies the action of a causal law or hypothesis.
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Ways to make a theory good
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1) Large explanatory power
2)Parsimony
3)Satisfying
4)Clearly Framed
5)Falsifiable
6)Explains important phenomena
7)Prescriptive richness
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Van Evera
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-9 aids to theory making
-Theories are tested by observing, experimenting, case studies
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Waltz's theory
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-Structural Realism
-"3 schools of thought" (realism, liberalism, constructivism)
-"Distribution of power/capabilities
-Concentrate on relative arrangement and position
-States are functionally undifferentiated
-Ordered anarchically
-Prime concern is security
-States are: central, …
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Power
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The potential to influence the behavior and/or beliefs of others
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Distribution of capabilities (Waltz)
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Have polarity, great powers
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Polarity
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How power is distributed across states in the international system
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Great Power
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A state capable of projecting power globally
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Types of polarity
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1) Multipolar
2) Bipolar
3) Unipolar (hegemonic)
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Waltz vs. FLS(Textbook)
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Waltz: Explains world politics via structure, and outcomes via the distribution of capabilities (power structures the system)
FLS: Explains world politics as the interaction of actors with different interests (institutions matter)
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3 Levels of Analysis
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1) Individual
2) Domestic (FLS)
3) Systemic (FLS&Waltz)
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Interests
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-What actors want to achieve through political action,
-The preferences of actors over the possible outcomes that might result from their political choices
-Determine how actors rank the desirability of potential outcomes
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Interactions
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The ways in which the decisions of two or more actors combine to produce political outcomes
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2 Types of Social Interactions
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1) Cooperation (mutualistic, occurs when two or more actors adopt policies that make at least one actor better than it would otherwise be)
2) Bargaining (parasitic, occurs when two or more actors must choose outcomes that make one better off at the expense of another)
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Institutions
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Sets of rules, known and shared by the relevant community that structure political interactions in specific ways
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FLS Structure
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Interactions, interests, institutions--> outcomes)
-Anarchic structure influences states to be self-interested security seekers, but they can overcome this influence somewhat through cooperative interactions, bargaining, and institutions
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Hobbes and Thucydides
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-First "realist" international relations theorists
-Differ from Waltz (Waltz=structural realist)
-Hobbes: glory, diffidence, resources, human behavior is conflictual in a "state of nature", humans are motivated by emotions (classical realist)
-Thucydides: the growth of Athenian power a…
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Game Theory
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A tool for analyzing strategic interactions
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Prisoners' Dilemma
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Two prisoners seeking "collaboration" but neither knows the other's strategy for sure
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Stag Hunt
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Two hunters seeking "coordination" but neither knows the other's strategy, issue of trust
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Jervis
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-Security Dilemma (an increase in one state's military can "scare" other states if not clearly defensive, leading them to increase their militaries, which continues as an arms race that decreases the security of everyone)
-Outcome can change by clarification of offense or defense (distin…
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War
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An event involving the organized use of military force by at least two parties that satisfies some minimum threshold of severity
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Purpose of War
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Conflict over things states value
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Things states value
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1) Territory
2) Resources
3) Strategic Value
4) Cultural Value
5) Policies
6) Regime Type
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Types of Bargaining
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-Crisis bargaining
-Coercive Diplomacy (compellence and deterrence)
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When is cooperation not possible
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Indivisible goods/interests
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Ways to prevent war
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1) Raise the cost
2) Increase transparency
3) Outside enforcement of agreements (third party state)
4) Dividing indivisible goods (rotating ownership)
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Schelling
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-"The Diplomacy of Violence"
-Violence is not always a part of a bargaining process, may be for purposeless destruction
-Strategic role of pure pain and damage (pure strength, pure hurt)
-Use of force instead of bargaining, in the event of it's failure
--"Future effect of violence" do…
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Realist Scenarios
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-Varied polarities of states
-Balanced power
-Balance occurs through alliances (inherently trustworthy)
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Liberalist Scenarios
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-Varying degrees of state interdependence
-Type of government and economy are important factors when determining relations between states
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Liberalist Theory
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-"Open up the black box of the state"
-States are more complicated then like units with the same function
-Behavior of states is a product of interest
-Interests come from what happens inside the state (domestic politics)
-Domestic institutions change the interests that a state will p…
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Democratic Peace Theory (Liberalism)
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-Democracies have historically tended to cooperate rather than fight each other
-Civillian control
-Similar interests
-May be due to the coincidence of common threats
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Constructivism
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-Mutual constitution of structure and agents
-Identity (who you are, who others think you are)
-Norms (standard pattern of behavior expected, part of ideational structure that constrains behavior)
-Wendt: people act towards others on the basis of the meanings they have for them
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Intersubjective meanings
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Shared understandings of and beliefs about meaning, significance, and the nature of things (Norms are one type, ex: paper money)
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Mutual Constitution of Structures and Agents
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-Structures shape what agents do (Realism, Constructivism)
-Structures result from agents
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Oye
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-Payoff structure changes concept of cooperation
-Iteration (shadow of the future)
-Number of players affects cooperation (the more, the more difficult)
-No interest in cooperation if future is known
Reliability between cooperation and defection
-Ability to punish defectors
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Keohane
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-International institutions can be both effective and not
-Issue between alliances and collective security
-League of security vs. balanced power
-Neutralism
-Potential joint gains
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Constructivist:
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Wendt (social constructivist)
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Realists:
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Hobbes (classical)
-Machiavelli (classical)
-Thucydides (classical)
-Jervis (defensive)
-Waltz (structural)
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Liberalists:
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-Kant
-Keohane
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Mercantilism
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An economic doctrine based on a belief that military power and economic influence were compliments
-Favored the mother country over its colonies and its competitors
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PSC 124: Exam 1