PHIL 1175: FINAL EXAM
147 Cards in this Set
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True
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According to Douglass Soccio, one general rule in philosophy is that philosophical questions cannot be settled by the empirical sciences or by appeals to religious faith or personal conviction.
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False
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According to Douglass Soccio, philosophy classes almost never focus on extended arguments.
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False
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According to Douglass Soccio, philosophy instructors want to help students obtain philosophical understanding and expect them to “solve” or “settle” great philosophical issues.
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True
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According to Douglass Soccio, philosophy has been characterized as the art of questioning.
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False
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All philosophy in the world began in Ancient Greece.
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False
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The word ‘philosophy’ is derived from the Latin words ‘philo’ and ‘sophia.’
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True
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Ontology is concerned with being and existence, and is a part of metaphysics.
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False
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Logic and epistemology are totally indistinguishable.
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False
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Philosophers of science are concerned with questions like “what causes cancer?”
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True
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Epistemology is concerned with theories of knowledge.
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True
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Philosophy pursues questions in every dimension of human life, and its techniques apply to problems in any field of study or endeavor.
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False
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Philosophy cannot examine concepts and views drawn from science, art, religion, politics, or any other realm.
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False
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No area of philosophy is concerned with the meanings of moral concepts like right action and obligation, and with formulating principles to guide moral decisions.
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True
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The title of the highest degree granted in most scholarly and scientific disciplines—“Doctor of Philosophy”—is evidence that philosophy once embraced nearly all forms of inquiry
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True
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The study of philosophy serves to develop intellectual abilities important for life as a whole, beyond the knowledge and skills required for any particular profession.
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True
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Shedding light on an accepted fact is not the aim of an argument.
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True
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‘Since’ and ‘because’ are indicator words for a premise.
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False
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A warning is a non-argument
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False
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The following is not a valid argument:
P1: All human beings require H20 to live
P2: Quigley is a human being
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C: Quigley requires H20 to live
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True
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The following is not a cogent argument:
P1: Most human beings are marsupials
P2: Artimus is a human being
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C: Artimus is a marsupial
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True
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Arguments cannot be either true or false.
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True
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The conclusion is the statement in an argument that the premises are claimed to support or imply.
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False
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Typical kinds of arguments includes warnings, reports, explanations and conditional statements.
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False
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Deductive arguments are never valid when it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false.
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False
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A valid deductive argument that has true premises is unsound.
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True
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Inductive arguments only claim that it is improbable that the premises be true and the conclusion false.
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False
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Cogent arguments are always deductive arguments.
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False
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The following argument is invalid:
P1: Rawls thinks that justice necessarily adheres to the Difference Principle
P2: The Difference Principle is an egalitarian principle
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C: Rawls thinks that jus…
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False
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All arguments that contain fallacies are good arguments.
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False
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No fallacies involve a mistake in reasoning.
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True
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Formal fallacies are found only in deductive arguments that have identifiable forms.
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False
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All valid arguments are fallacious.
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True
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Informal fallacies cannot be detected through mere inspection of the form or structure of an argument.
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True
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In an Appeal to Pity the support provided is not relevant to the argument’s conclusion.
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False
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When an argument “begs the question,” it means that the argument provides adequate premises that give adequate support for its conclusion.
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True
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Ethics, or moral philosophy, is the branch of philosophy that is concerned with conduct and character.
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False
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Moral philosophy is not concerned with the question of what makes right actions right.
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False
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Ethical theories try to elucidate the distinction between the existence and non-existence of material objects.
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False
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Moral philosophy is concerned with distinguishing between actions that are praiseworthy and those that are blameworthy.
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True
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Distinguishing between good and evil is not a concern of moral philosophy.
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False
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An ethical theory need only be clear to be appropriately characterized as a good ethical theory.
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True
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Good ethical theories provide enlightenment, i.e., they provide guidance for solving moral problems.
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True
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The question of whether we can ever know the difference between right and wrong is a good example of an interconnection between ethics and epistemology.
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False
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It is impossible to distinguish between ethics and axiology.
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True
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Supererogatory acts are always morally permissible.
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False
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Axiology is another name for economics.
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True
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Morally permissible acts are not morally wrong.
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True
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Currency is extrinsically valuable.
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False
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Doing the wrong thing is always supererogatory.
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False
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The aim of normative ethics is descriptive.
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True
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A normative ethical rule may also be prudential.
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False
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Metaethics always aims to be normative.
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True
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Metaethics is the analytical study of the discipline of ethics itself.
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True
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The is/ought problem raises the question of distinguishing between moral judgments and statements of fact.
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False
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Moral skepticism is the same thing as moral diversity.
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True
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Moral skepticism is an uncontroversial empirical fact.
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True
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Ethical relativism denies that there are absolutes in ethics.
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True
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Ethical relativists tend to reject the is/ought distinction.
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False
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Cultural relativism holds that, at the most, there are ethical truths relative to an individual believer.
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False
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Kant’s aim in the Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals is to establish several important moral principles.
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True
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Kant thinks that pure philosophy sets forth doctrines depending entirely on a priori principles.
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True
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For Kant, the laws of freedom are those laws in accordance with which everything ought to happen.
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False
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Kant’s idea of a metaphysics of morals is not the pure part of ethics.
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False
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According to Kant, all wills are good wills.
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False
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The good will is extrinsically valuable.
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True
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The good will is not the same as altruism.
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False
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Unlike securing one’s own happiness, manifesting a will good in itself is a conditioned good.
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True
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A perfectly good will always acts in accordance with duty.
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False
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The reason Kant thinks moral commands are unnecessary for divine wills is because divine wills are so powerful.
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True
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It is possible to act from self-interest and at the same time act in accordance with duty.
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True
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The moral worth of an action is not dependant upon the purpose that is to be attained by it.
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False
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An action can be done from duty only when the object of the action is realized.
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True
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All morally good acts are morally right.
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False
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All morally right acts are morally good.
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True
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Respect for the (moral) law includes doing one’s duty.
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False
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Inclination has nothing to do with desire.
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False
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Inclination always indicates something necessary, e.g., H2O.
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False
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A maxim is never a subjective rule.
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True
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We always act on maxims.
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True
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Ideally, our maxims can act as practical laws.
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False
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Practical laws are always prudential.
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True
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Unlike prudence, morality is “other-regarding.”
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True
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We should never act on maxims that should not become universal laws.
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False .
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Kant derives the supreme moral principle from examples of morality and popular moral positions.
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True
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Pure philosophy does not reject a priori reasoning in favor of a posteriori reasoning.
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True
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The reason the will is practical reason is because the derivation of actions from laws requires reason.
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False
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A divine will is imperfectly rational.
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True
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Hypothetical imperatives are addressed to imperfectly rational beings.
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True
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A hypothetical imperative which represents the practical necessity of an action as means for the promotion of happiness is assertoric.
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False
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Hypothetical imperatives hold as apodictic practical principles.
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True
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Hypothetical imperatives can hold as assertoric practical principles.
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True
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In an analytic proposition, the concept of willing the necessary action is contained within the concept of willing a presupposed end towards which we are inclined.
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False
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The CI is not a synthetic a priori proposition.
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True
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Imperatives of skill are hypothetical/analytic.
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False
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When a contradiction in will results from the application of the CI to a personal maxim, a contradiction in conception always follows.
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False
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All maxims are moral laws.
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True
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The 2nd formulation of the CI is less abstract than the 1st.
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False
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Like Kant, Hume believes that a moral principle can by itself give an incentive and produce an interest which could be called purely moral.
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True
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Hume thinks that the controversy over the general foundation of morals is between reason and sentiment.
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False
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A specious argument is one in which a great deal of space is given for alternative points of view.
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False
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Hume thinks that as long as our understanding stays cool, we will probably do the right thing.
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True
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Part of the telos of moral speculation is to help us get in the habit of doing the right thing.
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True
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According to Hume, proper reasoning is sufficient to give rise to the proper sentiment.
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True
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Reasoning is often necessary to give the sentiment a suitable influence on the mind.
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False
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Hume thinks that personal merit is a fundamental moral principle.
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False
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The qualities that should be ascribed to people are of no use to Hume’s inquiry into the principles of morals.
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True
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Claiming that the foundation of ethics is a question of fact, is a metaethical claim.
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True
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Kant disagreed with Hume as to the appropriate means to finding the fundamental principle(s) of morals.
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True
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Hume’s use of the experimental scientific method is also a naturalistic approach to ethics.
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False
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According to Hume, several qualities other than those which proceed from a tender sympathy with others and a generous concern for our species, are more entitled to the general good-will and approbation of humankind.
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True
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The merit of benevolence arises from its tendency to promote the interests of our species and bestow happiness on human society.
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True
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Utility is at least part of the merit of social virtues.
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False
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When making a moral judgment, utility is the last consideration.
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False
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The reason utility has nothing to do with questions concerning moral duty, is that Hume is not a deontologist.
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True
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Utility is not a virtue in both people and inanimate objects.
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False
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All moral affections or dislikes are not from education, and it follows from this that no moral affections or dislikes are from education.
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True
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Benevolence engages the affections of persons before any moral education occurs.
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False
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The end promoted by the social virtues is agreeable to us because of what we have been taught by society.
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False
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The end of social virtues is pleasing because it promotes self-interest.
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False
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Utility and self-love are nearly identical.
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False
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Utility alone accounts for the origin of morality.
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True
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Hume’s philosophy is appropriately thought of as a kind of naturalism because he relies on principles of human nature.
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True
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No one can be entirely indifferent to a well-represented passion, because everyone has the seeds and first principles of every passion.
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True
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A reductio is a deductive argument.
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False
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Assuming the opposite of the claim to be proven is not a part of arguing by reductio.
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False
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Reductio ad absurdum is a direct proof.
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False
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Previously established premises and axioms cannot be used in a reductio.
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True
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Kant was not an empiricist.
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False
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Hume’s moral philosophy is not an example of empiricism.
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True
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Claiming something about every moral theory constitutes a metaethical claim.
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True
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It is possible to reach a conclusion a priori from a principle that has already been proven a posteriori.
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True
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Happiness is the summum bonum.
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False
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All useful goods are goods in their own right.
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True
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Both animate and inanimate objects have functions.
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False
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Eudaimonia is complete with qualification.
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True
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Good fortune is not a sufficient condition for happiness.
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False
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The soul is an ontologically distinct entity from the body.
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True
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Both the rational and nonrational parts of the soul have a function.
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True
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Wisdom and prudence are not virtues of character.
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False
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Virtue of character is attained wholly a priori.
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True
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Virtue is intrinsically valuable.
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True
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The doctrine of the Mean applies to some ethical virtues.
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False
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Prudent people naturally know what happiness is.
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True
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Prudence is a necessary condition for full virtue.
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False
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Having the virtues of thought means that you can be moved to action by thought alone.
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False
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Akrasia is the combination of eudaimonia and virtuous action.
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False
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Being overcome by pleasure is a necessary condition for happiness.
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PHIL 1175: FINAL EXAM