The Nuclear DilemmaHow could another war in Europe be avoided?Military & strategic planners did not like such uncertainty--and not “using” the nuclear arsenalLawrence Freedman argues that there are four forms of deterrenceThese offer the possibility of “using” nuclear weapons without ever detonating them—but it’s a tricky businessYou want your enemy to have no doubts that you would go nuclearCredibility of threats thus rest on your willingness to go to the bringBut you don’t really want nuclear warGame theory was devised, in part, to understand & predict behavior in situations of constrained or uncertain choiceKahn speculated on how nuclear war might begin and proceedOther techniques to enhance nuclear deterrence include:And does nuclear deterrence “work” against non-nuclear states or “non-state actors?”How seriously should we take theories & practices of nuclear “deterrence?”Atomic Strategy, Deterrence & Discourse• The nuclear dilemma• What is nuclear deterrence?• Is nuclear deterrence credible?• Atomic weapons are extremely destructive• An atomic war could kill hundreds of millions or more• War is about politics, not annihilation• Atomic war is not a political actThe Nuclear Dilemmahttp://www.conelrad.com/index.phpHow could another war in Europe be avoided?• The situation required preparing for both conventional & nuclear conflict• A conventional war in Europe would be far more destructive than WW II• Europeans preferred the threat of nuclear war in order to avoid conventional war• Americans preferred threat of conventional war in order to avoid nuclear war • Either would have been a disasterMilitary & strategic planners did not like such uncertainty--and not “using” the nuclear arsenal• Out of such necessity was born nuclear deterrence theory•Deterrenceis a fairly simple concept– You threaten to hurt your enemy if attacked– The costs to the enemy of retaliation are very high– Therefore, your enemy will not attack for fear of being badly hurt• One problem is convincing your enemy that you will actually initiate nuclear warLawrence Freedman argues that there are four forms of deterrence•Denialinvolves preventing an enemy from realizing success in war by inflicting damage•Punishmentinvolves inflicting damage on an enemy in the event of war•Coercioninvolves threats to inflict harm on an enemy who fails to act in a desired way•Compellenceinvolves pressures on another whom you want to act in a desired wayThese offer the possibility of “using” nuclear weapons without ever detonating them—but it’s a tricky business• You must behave in ways that convince the enemy you will launch if provoked• You must convince yourself that you will launch, and not question your commitment• You must issue “threats that leave something to chance”• You must configure your systems so that they cannot fail, even if you are dead and goneYou want your enemy to have no doubts that you would go nuclear•You must act& talk as if you would launch• You should stockpile “small” weapons that can be “used” in war• You should remove the human element as much as possible • You should not have public discussions or policies that suggest otherwiseCredibility of threats thus rest on your willingness to go to the bring• Draw a symbolic “line in the sand”--e.g., invasion of West Germany• Tell your enemy that if line is crossed, you will reply with nuclear weapons• First use will result in nuclear reply & escalation• The outcome is global nuclear warBut you don’t reallywant nuclear war• It would be very nasty• It could spread• It could reach the United States• Would the President sacrifice New York to save Paris?•This is “self-deterrence”Game theory was devised, in part, to understand & predict behavior in situations of constrained or uncertain choice• There is no direct communication & talk is cheap• Empirical observations are the only evidence allowed• Players are assumed to be “rational”and to make self-interested choices• But players also seek to maximize outcomes and save face and self• Such games do not allow for history, norms, contracts, etc.• The results tend toward negative outcomes• Deterrence can be crudely modeled in this waypol80t-12.w98Herman Kahn• Worked at the RAND (BLAND) Corporation in the ‘50s & ‘60s• Was relatively well-known at the time• Wrote & spoke about nuclear strategy, war-fighting, missile & civil defenseKahn speculated on how nuclear war might begin and proceed• He believed it was important to talk about them and what might happen• Be initiated: counter-threats along a “ladder of escalation”• Start: accident was very likely• Be fought: “orgiastic spasm of destruction”• End: People could survive, rebuild & restore pre-war conditions within 20-30 years• Asked “Will the survivors envy the dead?” (he thought not)Other techniques to enhance nuclear deterrence include:• Maintain bombers on airborne alert• Go to “launch-on-warning”• Deploy highly-accurate warheads• And, of course, the “Doomsday Machine”• The USSR might have had oneAnd does nuclear deterrence “work” against non-nuclear states or “non-state actors?”•The “nuclear taboo”permits implicit or explicit threats, but not actual use•“Rogue”states and others are thought to be irrational and not value assets or lives• There may be no high-value targets that can be the focus of nuclear attackHow seriously should we take theories & practices of nuclear “deterrence?”• Carol Cohn’s article suggests some fundamental and fatal flaws in regarding it as “scientific”• Deterrence claims rest not on what the other believes, but what you believe the other believes, were she like you and in your place• Strategists and practitioners come to rely on a consensual set of beliefs about what is required to deter, but also on interpretations of what they think has successfully deterred others• Deterrence theory becomes a “discourse,” rather than Truth—which means it might even be a form of magical