Moving Toward Life in a Nuclear-Armed Crowd? The primary concerns about nuclear proliferation are:Let us consider the followingWhat do we know about nuclear proliferation?What are the incentives for acquiring an atomic bomb?Others are less sanguineWhy would North Korea want to challenge China, Russia and the United States?From a structural perspective, the United States “needs” to be able to “manage” all nuclear arsenals throughout the “Empire”—aNuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: is it advisory, regulatory or constitutional?What can be done to prevent further nuclear proliferation?12Moving Toward Life in a Nuclear-Armed Crowd?3Must we expect the worst possible future, a world of 17 or more nuclear powers?4The basic problem: Nuclear technology and expertise are widely available as a result of Atoms for Peace, commercial competition, poorly-guarded nuclear materials, black markets, knowledge5Nuclear materials & technology are widespread in global commerce & there is interest in reviving nuclear power as an energy source. 30 countries operate 439 power reactors; 56 operate some 280 research reactors6But is the bomb available to everybody? How difficult is it to build or acquire one? And under what circumstances might it be used?7The primary concerns about nuclear proliferation are:• Emergence of new nuclear weapons states• Diffusion of nuclear materials & technology• Diffusion of nuclear delivery systems• Access to nuclear stuff by non-state actors• Capabilities of non-state actors to detonate weapons8Let us consider the following• What do we know about nuclear proliferation?• What are the incentives for acquiring an atomic bomb?• Whom is most threatened by nuclear proliferation and why?• What can be done to prevent further nuclear proliferation?• What should be done about nuclear “breakout?”9What do we know about nuclear proliferation?• There are nine known nuclear weapons states (NWS) in the world (US, Russia, UK, France, PRC, Israel, India, Pakistan, N. Korea • A large number of countries have studied or pursued acquisition of atomic weapons– Four Non-NWS have actually developed them (India, Pakistan, N. Korea, Israel)– One might be developing them (Iran)– At least four have abandoned them (Libya, S. Africa, Brazil, Argentina)– Others have investigated the possibility of weapons development• The most difficult part of the fuel cycle is acquiring the nuclear explosive (U or Pu)• The NNPT has been fairly, if not entirely, effective• But it lacks “teeth” and the intrusive elements of the Chemical Weapons Conv.10What are the incentives for acquiring an atomic bomb?• Security concerns & deterrence: fear of neighbors, neighbors with atomic bombs, Great Powers with atomic bombs• Status: to be respected and reckoned with, to bargain for position and material benefits• Commerce: Market nuclear research, skills, technology to other countries11Nuclear weapons could offer the potential for stable deterrenceKenneth Waltz has argued for 30 years that “more may be better”: nuclear weapons make governments rational and cautious, and theyare unlikely to use nukes if their enemies have the capacity to retaliate—stable deterrence can prevent wars12Others are less sanguine• The assumption of rationality & caution are not always borne out by experience• Some governments might strike out pre-emptively in a crisis• Security of weapons is much weaker in new NWS & theft is a possibility• Governments could transfer nukes to non-state actors in order to threaten enemies• International movement of nuclear materials is neither safe nor desirable13Countries explain nuclear acquisition and possession as necessary for national defense—very broadly defined14Some countries do have valid security concerns: they have poor relations with their neighbors, or neighbors have threatened them in one way or another15Although India and Pakistan have come close to war in recent years, they have not resorted to nuclear mobilizationAnd, although Iran might be developing nuclear weapons as a hedge against Israel and the United States, other states in the region have not—are the reasons fear, economic, U.S. pressure & assistance?16Might Iran might be interested in tapping the international market for nuclear energy technology, including enrichment?This could only be to the disadvantage of the West, for both economic and security reasons (even if it is legal)17Why would North Korea want to challenge China, Russia and the United States?18Possession of nuclear weapons means that other states must pay attention to the new nuclear weapons state’s demands19These are North Korean propaganda posters.North Korea may have domestic concerns in mind, as well…20Moreover, better-armed countries cannot simply impose theirdesires on a weak nuclear-armed opponent—deterrence may be mutual21North Korea could be a threat to American allies close to China, and Iran could be a threat to Persian Gulf oil producers—but this gets back to intentions: why acquire the bomb? And why challenge overwhelming nuclear capacity?22The United States sees its interests as extending far beyond their borders, and security threats originate from many sources: nuclear armed opponents within those “bordoids” may be an existential problem23From a structural perspective, the United States “needs” to be able to “manage” all nuclear arsenals throughout the “Empire”—and can do so only via quid pro quos (military force has not worked very well)24There are other countries that might have reason to pursue nuclear weapons related research, but don’t—why not?25Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: is it advisory, regulatory or constitutional?• The NNPT does not confer the right to inspect all nuclear facilities—only those registered with the IAEA (unless UNSC agrees)• It does not allow inspection on demand, and governments must agree to any limits• There are no enforcement or punishment mechanisms• There are no penalties for failure to join (cf. India, Israel) or withdrawal (cf. N. Korea)• London Suppliers Group (45 members) is not part of the IAEA or NNPT26• Strengthen the NNPT, especially provisions for monitoring nuclear trade and nuclear research• Provide concrete incentives for countries to eschew actual production of nuclear weapons—even if they choose to conduct research• Address the regional tensions that may motivate countries to seek