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Berkeley ELENG 228A - The Market for Lemons

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The Market for “Lemons”:The Market for “Lemons”:Quality Uncertainty and the Market Quality Uncertainty and the Market MechanismMechanismGeorge A. George A. AkerlofAkerlofNiels Hoven9/30/2003IntroductionIntroductionQuality vs. uncertaintyQuality vs. uncertaintyEconomic costs of dishonestyEconomic costs of dishonestyCounteracting institutionsCounteracting institutionsAssumptionsAssumptionsGoodsGoodsVarying qualityVarying qualityBuyersBuyersJudge goods by market statisticJudge goods by market statisticSellersSellersKnow quality of own goodsKnow quality of own goodsAutomobile MarketAutomobile MarketLeaving the showroomLeaving the showroomAsymmetry in available informationAsymmetry in available informationOwners locked inOwners locked inGresham’s lawGresham’s lawAsymmetrical InformationAsymmetrical Informationp = pricep = priceµ = average quality of traded carsµ = average quality of traded carsD = demandD = demandS = supplyS = supplyµ = µ(p)µ = µ(p)D = D = D(pD(p, µ) = , µ) = D(pD(p, µ(p)), µ(p))S = S = S(pS(p))D(pD(p, µ(p)) = , µ(p)) = S(pS(p))AssumptionsAssumptionsUU11= M + = M + ΣΣxxiiUU22= M + = M + ΣΣ(3/2)x(3/2)xiiYY11, Y, Y22= income= incomeAssumptionsAssumptionsLinear utilityLinear utilitykk--ththcar adds same utility as 1car adds same utility as 1ststAll traders wish to maximize utilityAll traders wish to maximize utilityGroup 1 has N carsGroup 1 has N carsQuality = x ~ unif(0,2)Quality = x ~ unif(0,2)DemandDemandDD11= Y= Y11/ p/ pp < µp < µDD11= 0= 0p > µp > µDD22= Y= Y22/ p/ pp < 3µ / 2p < 3µ / 2DD22= 0= 0p > 3µ / 2p > 3µ / 2Problem:Problem:Price = pPrice = pµ = p/2µ = p/2Symmetric InformationSymmetric InformationS(pS(p) = N) = Np > 1p > 1S(pS(p) = 0) = 0p < 1p < 1D(pD(p) = (Y) = (Y22+ Y+ Y11)/ p)/ pp < 1p < 1D(pD(p) = Y) = Y2 2 / p/ p1 < p < 3/21 < p < 3/2D(pD(p) = 0) = 03/2 < p3/2 < pEquilibriumEquilibriumSymmetric caseSymmetric casep = 3/2p = 3/2if N < Yif N < Y2 2 / (3/2)/ (3/2)p = Yp = Y2 2 / N / N if Yif Y22/ (3/2) < N < Y/ (3/2) < N < Y22p = 1p = 1if Yif Y2 2 < N< NGain in utilityGain in utilityN / 2 N / 2 if N < Yif N < Y22YY22/2/2if Yif Y22< N< NInsuranceInsurancePeople over 65People over 65Difficult to buy insuranceDifficult to buy insuranceWhy doesn’t price rise to match the risk?Why doesn’t price rise to match the risk?Average medical condition vs. priceAverage medical condition vs. priceToo many lemons!Too many lemons!MedicareMedicareMoneylendersMoneylendersLeading factor in landlessnessLeading factor in landlessnessLarge banksLarge banks6, 8, or 10% interest6, 8, or 10% interestcan enforce contractcan enforce contractLocal moneylendersLocal moneylenders15, 25, 50% interest15, 25, 50% interestknows borrower’s characterknows borrower’s characterMinority EmploymentMinority EmploymentRace may serve as statisticRace may serve as statisticSocial backgroundSocial backgroundQuality of schoolingQuality of schoolingGeneral job capabilitiesGeneral job capabilitiesSlum schoolsSlum schoolsGrades unreliableGrades unreliableRewards for work accrue to groupRewards for work accrue to groupCostCost--benefit analysis problematicbenefit analysis problematicCosts of DishonestyCosts of DishonestyPurchasers cheatedPurchasers cheatedHonest dealings driven out of marketHonest dealings driven out of market½ unit of utility / automobile½ unit of utility / automobileUnderdeveloped countriesUnderdeveloped countriesQuality variation greaterQuality variation greaterVariation impedes developmentVariation impedes developmentMerchant tradersMerchant tradersEntrepreneurshipEntrepreneurshipCounteracting institutionsCounteracting institutionsGuaranteesGuaranteesBrandBrand--name goodname goodChainsChainsLicensing practicesLicensing practicesIndian industrial sceneIndian industrial sceneManaging agenciesManaging agenciesReputation for “honest dealing”Reputation for “honest dealing”Communal groupsCommunal groupsConclusionConclusion“Informal unwritten guarantees are preconditions “Informal unwritten guarantees are preconditions for trade and production. Where these for trade and production. Where these guarantees are indefinite, business will suffer.”guarantees are indefinite, business will


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