Communication NetworksNetwork Bandwidth ExchangeThe FrameworkA Mechanism for Indivisible GoodsAn ExampleBasics of Mechanism DesignNash Equilibrium AnalysisBack to ExampleEvery Nash Equilibrium is efficientThe Network CaseBayesian-Nash EquilibriumStep 1Step 2Step 2, contd.Putting it togetherCommunication NetworksA Second CourseRahul Jain (Guest Lecture)Department of EECSUniversity of California at BerkeleyNetwork Bandwidth ExchangeJain and Varaiya, “The Combinatorial Seller’s Bid Double Auction: An Asymptotically Efficient Market Mechanism”, JET submission, 2006The FrameworkA Mechanism for Indivisible GoodsAn ExampleBasics of Mechanism DesignNash Equilibrium AnalysisBack to Exampleak=min {ck+1,vk }Every Nash Equilibrium is efficientThe Network CaseBayesian-Nash EquilibriumStep 1Step 2Step 2, contd.Putting it
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