Proliferation-Resistance (and Terror-Managing the Atom Project, Harvard University Lecture for “Nuclear Energy Economics and Policy Analysis” April 12, 2004 Resistance) of Nuclear Energy Systems Matthew Bunn http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/bcsia/atom u Definition: A nuclear energy system is proliferation-resistant if its envisioned by proponents, would not significantly increase the probability of proliferation of nuclear weapons. – Considering the full system life cycle (including all aspects of the fuel cycle) – Considering both intrinsic factors (e.g., difficulty of producing weapons material from material and facilities used in the system) and extrinsic factors (e.g., types of safeguards and security measures to be applied) What is proliferation resistance? deployment and use, on the scale and with the distribution 1u Ask yourself: Would the U.S. (and Israeli) governments be comfortable if it was this system, rather than a once-through LWR under international safeguards, that Russia was building in Iran? If yes, If no, there may still be aspects to be debated. (More on this case and its implications in a moment.) Proliferation resistance rule of thumb system is clearly “proliferation-resistant.” Proliferation-resistance: u Pro-nuclear view: – Existing safeguards provide sufficient protection against use of civilian nuclear energy for weapons – no country has ever used safeguarded nuclear material to make a bomb – Proliferation is a political issue, not a technical one – countries that are determined to get nuclear weapons will eventually do so, regardless of technology of civilian nuclear energy system u Anti-nuclear view: – All nuclear energy systems pose proliferation risks – relying on enrichment, producing plutonium (or at least producing neutrons that could be used to produce plutonium) – These dangers cannot be substantially reduced without abandoning nuclear energy u A middle view: – Real nuclear energy contribution to spread of nuclear weapons can be reduced substantially by technical and institutional measures neither side of the nuclear debate much interested 2u Civilian nuclear energy system has already made major contributions to spread of nuclear weapons u To make a major contribution to meeting 21st century carbon-free energy needs, nuclear would have to grow 3-10 times over next 50-100 yrs (Future of Nuclear Power, MIT, 2003) – most new electricity demand in developing world u Governments and publics unlikely to accept such a massive nuclear expansion unless convinced that the expansion will not u more widely, without contributing to weapons programs – significant focus of current R&D (Gen IV, AFCI)? u Cost, safety, waste management must also be addressed for large expansion to be acceptable Proliferation-resistance: one key to acceptable expansion lead to additional spread of nuclear weapons How can nuclear energy be greatly expanded, deployed far u energy became widely established have had crucial contributions from the civilian sector u Most programs: dedicated military production facilities for – source for open or covert technology acquisition – – buildup of infrastructure and expertise u A few programs: Pu or HEU directly from ostensibly civilian facilities -- or consideration of purchase of stolen Nuclear energy and proliferation Most nuclear weapons programs since civilian nuclear Pu or HEU, but civilian sector provided: “cover” for purchases actually intended for weapons program fissile material 3u Iraq purchased the “Osiraq” research reactor from France – produce plutonium u Pre-1991, Iraq was an NPT member in good standing u Nuclear experts trained in U.S. and Europe – Iraqis sent to u Iraq had a massive secret nuclear weapons program – with a buy technology illegally from sources around the world (for example centrifuge technology from civil programs in Europe) u build one bomb using French-supplied and Soviet-supplied HEU fuel for its safeguarded civilian research reactors Case I: Iraq Israel destroyed it in an airstrike, so it could not be used to work at IAEA to learn how to evade inspections huge web of procurement agents and front companies to After invading Kuwait, Iraq launched a “crash program” to u and a secret nuclear weapons program under the Shah – both were dormant for a period after 1979 revolution u Large numbers of nuclear experts trained in U.S. and Europe (esp. MIT) in pre-revolutionary period u the Germans had begun at Bushehr – throughout 1990s, U.S.-Russian disagreements over this deal and more u We now know that Iran was receiving centrifuge technology from the AQ Khan network – technology that originated in Urenco – with components from all over the world – in 2002, Iran’s Natanz enrichment facility revealed Case II: Iran Iran started both an open civilian nuclear power program In early 1990s, Russia agreed to complete a power reactor sensitive transfers – 100s of experts trained in Russia 4u Iran has always claimed that its program is entirely for peaceful purposes – using the civilian program as a cover for technology purchases and facility construction whose weapons purpose would otherwise be obvious u Iran has remained within the NPT, but violated its safeguards agreement by lying to the IAEA for decades u U.S. has sought to cut off all civilian nuclear cooperation with Iran, arguing that any such cooperation will contribute to a bomb program – Russia and Europe do not agree u October 2003: European foreign ministers negotiate a deal – Iran agrees to Additional Protocol, suspends enrichment and reprocessing, in return for trade deal, possible nuclear technology access u Controversy continues – not clear which way it will go Case II: Iran (II) u India’s civilian and military nuclear programs have been deeply integrated from their inception u Large numbers of nuclear experts trained in U.S. and Europe u India received a Canadian research reactor (CIRUS), with peaceful use – but no safeguards to verify assurances u India built a reprocessing plant with a U.S.-provided design u India used that reactor and plant to produce material for its u India has been under nuclear sanctions ever since, which prevent fuel sales, reactor sales, technology coop. – though Case III: India U.S. heavy water and training, provided with assurances of “peaceful” nuclear explosion in 1974 Russia now providing fuel and reactors