MIT 22 812J - International Safeguards (7 pages)

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International Safeguards



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International Safeguards

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Pages:
7
School:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Course:
22 812j - Managing Nuclear Technology

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International Safeguards Summarizing Traditional and New Measures Matthew Bunn Summary of INFCIRC 153 The traditional IAEA safeguards system for the NPT is laid out in INFCIRC 153 The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection With the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons The goal of safeguards under INFCIRC 153 is to provide timely detection of diversion of significant quantities defined as 8kg of Pu or U 233 or 25 kg of U 235 contained in HEU of nuclear material from peaceful activities for use in explosives and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection The basic tools to be used are material accountancy and containment and surveillance Written at a time when nuclear energy was expected to become a central element of the economies of many states INFCIRC 153 represents a compromise between those states who sought highly intrusive nonproliferation verification largely states that would not have been subject to it such as the United States and the then Soviet Union and those who sought to minimize the intrusiveness of the verification regime and its interference with civilian nuclear energy programs Hence INFCIRC 153 lays out a regime based primarily on following nuclear material at selected key strategic points at declared sites INFCIRC 153 is replete with provisions designed to ensure that safeguards would not be too intrusive They are to be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering technological development to avoid undue interference in civilian nuclear energy and to reduce to a minimum the possible inconvenience and disturbance to the State The IAEA is not to ask for more from the state than the minimum amount of information and data consistent with carrying out its responsibilities and specific upper bounds are placed on the number of person days of inspection permitted at various types of nuclear facilities Under INFCIRC 153 each non nuclear weapon state party to the NPT is



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