Managing the Atom Project, Harvard University Lecture for “Nuclear Energy Economics and Policy Analysis” April 7, 2004 http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/bcsia/atom Nonproliferation, Safeguards, and Export Controls Matthew Bunn u How to keep hostile states and terrorist groups from getting nuclear weapons? 1945 technology… how to control? u Essential ingredients of nuclear weapons – HEU and produce (some other isotopes also weapons-usable, but even harder to produce) u If they can get enough HEU or plutonium, most states – and potentially even some well-organized terrorist groups, such as al Qaida – could make at least a crude nuclear bomb u So, approach has been: (a) control HEU + Pu, (b) limit the spread of facilities to make them, (c) make sure no material is diverted from the facilities to make them that do exist u Technology for nuclear weapons and nuclear energy inherently linked The Proliferation Problem separated plutonium – do not occur in nature and are hard to 1u including limiting civilian nuclear energy’s contribution to weapons u Combines political demand for nuclear weapons) and technical measures (designed to restrict supply technologies) u weapons powers predicted by now, only 8-9 -- many more states have started weapons programs and then backed . Dozens of states have the capability to produce nuclear weapons but have verifiably committed not to do so The Nonproliferation Regime Global effort to stem the spread of nuclear weapons -- measures (designed to reduce of nuclear weapons materials and Surprisingly successful: rather than many dozens of nuclear away than now have nuclear weaponsu Nearly 190 parties u Essentially all countries except India, Pakistan, and Israel are parties to the NPT or comparable commitments u 5 accepted weapon states: U.S., Russia, France, UK, China u Basic provisions: – Non-nuclear-weapon states agree not to acquire nuclear weapons and to accept IAEA safeguards on all their civilian nuclear activities – Nuclear-weapon states agree not to provide nuclear weapons technology to non-nuclear-weapon states, and to negotiate in good faith toward disarmament – All parties to cooperate in the peaceful use of nuclear energy u Now under substantial stress – North Korean withdrawal, AQ Khan global black-market network, Iranian exploitation The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of loopholes – but unlikely to collapse 2u Technically sophisticated states (e.g., India, Israel) Have the technology to produce fissile material, fission weapons; safeguards can detect diversion of material, construction of secret facilities (maybe), political measures can help reduce demand for weapons u Less sophisticated states (e.g., Iraq, North Korea) Technology controls can add substantial time and cost to efforts to produce weapons materials; stolen nuclear material could greatly accelerate acquisition of 1st bomb; other measures as above u Subnational groups (e.g., Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda) Conceivable could produce crude but effective explosives if they acquired fissile material (esp. HEU), or could sell stolen material to a state -- risk of theft of nuclear material Categories of Proliferation Threats u No non-weapons obligation, material produced in dedicated military facilities with no safeguards – All 5 NPT weapon states, India, Pakistan, Israel (though some non-verified peaceful use assurances in latter cases) u Join NPT, accept safeguards, build needed facilities, then – N. Korea (sort of -- never had full safeguards) -- Iran in the future? u Join NPT, accept safeguards, divert material from declared, – This is only path traditional IAEA safeguards designed to detect u Join NPT, accept safeguards, build covert facilities – Iraq, N. Korea (U program) -- Iran??? – Additional Protocol designed to help detect u Purchase or steal weapon or weapon material 5 Paths to the Bomb withdraw and expel inspectors safeguarded facility 3u 1100 nuclear installations in >70 states, thousands of tons of material (>123,000 significant quantities) under safeguards u 10,000 person-days of inspection/yr, ~$90M IAEA u Designed to detectcannot prevent the state, or subnational parties, from removing material for weapons u Primarily implemented in non-nuclear-weapon states; a few facilities in non-NPT states safeguarded when supplier u NPT member states have repeatedly expressed confidence IAEA Safeguards safeguards budget (same as Indianopolis police department) diversion of material for weapons --facilities in weapon states under “voluntary offer”; some required it that IAEA safeguards verify states are complying u Traditional safeguards use “material accountancy” and “containment and surveillance” to provide timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material, deter u Significant quantities: – Pu or U233: 8 kg – HEU: 25 kg contained U-235 – Bombs can be made with less -- a key issue u Timeliness goal: – 1 month for unirradiated Pu or HEU (incl. MOX) u Traditional safeguards focus almost exclusively on detecting diversion from declared facilities – not on finding secret facilities Traditional Safeguards and to such diversion by the risk of detection 4u INFCIRC/153 -- traditional safeguards agreement --negotiated at a time when nuclear energy expected to be crucial to national economies, non-nuclear-weapon states concerned to prevent safeguards from interfering, or offering commercial advantage to weapon states u verification mainly limited to few “strategic points” in declared facilities u questions, not being aggressive investigators (over-generalization -- contrary cases exist, such as Taiwan) Traditional Safeguards (II) INFCIRC/153 -- limits IAEA to “minimum” info “consistent with carrying out its responsibilities” --Result: IAEA inspectors’ culture of not asking too many MUF (Material Unaccounted For) = + Additions to inventory - Ending inventory - Removals from inventory u s2MUF precision u If MUF > than some threshold level -- usually 3 s2MUF --IAEA rejects the hypothesis that real MUF is zero, investigates possibility that diversion has occurred u For item facility (e.g., LWR), MUF=0 unless something is missing Material Accountancy Beginning inventory -- standard deviation of MUF -- is measurement 5u Destructive Analysis – Take a chemical sample of the material to laboratory for analysis. Highly accurate, but expensive and long delays. u