Balancing the Needs for Space Research and National Security in the Context of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations Draft Report Final Revision 11 22 04 Draft Final Course Report ESD 10 Introduction to Technology and Policy 8 December 2004 Prepared by David Andr Broniatowski Nicole Jordan Andrew Long Matthew Richards Roland Weibel Balancing the Needs for Space Research and National Security in the Context of ITAR Draft Introduction 1 Export Control in a Changing Environment 1 Precautionary and Reactionary Approaches 2 Significance of Export Control in National Security 3 Current Precautionary Perspective 3 Military Superiority by Technological Superiority 3 Emergence of Asymmetric Threats to National Security 7 Summary 8 ITAR and its Effect on Space Research Institutions 9 Creation of Export Restrictions 9 Key Concepts in ITAR 10 Formal Political Process of ITAR 14 Informal Political Process of ITAR 15 Innovation in Research Institutions and the Free Exchange of Knowledge 16 Reactionary Perspective 16 Universities and Collaboration 16 ITAR and Socioeconomics 20 Liability for Violations 21 Striking a Balance between Openness in Research and National Security Improving ITAR 22 Dynamics of Innovation Technical Superiority and National Security 22 Improving ITAR Policy 26 Resolving Ambiguities Surrounding ITAR 26 Improving the ITAR Approval Process 30 Summary of Recommendations 34 ii Balancing the Needs for Space Research and National Security in the Context of ITAR Draft Striking a Balance between Openness in Research and National Security Improving ITAR 1 Introduction United States export control laws have become a salient issue for academic space research institutions Although export control has been used as a policy lever since the Cold War the state of modern technology brought about by the computer revolution and shifts in the world economy have resulted in the categorization of some information as deemed exports Academic space research institutions now find themselves in a climate of uncertainty This chapter posits two fundamentally different ways of operating within this uncertain climate are identified a precautionary stance and a reactionary stance Export Control in a Changing Environment Since the beginning of the Cold War the national security implications of exporting technology with military applications have concerned the United States The concern over the export of technology stems from the fear that those devices could one day be used against the United States During the Cold War the United States concern over the export of technology was focused on the export of hardware that could potentially be used by the Soviet Union As a result of these security concerns the United States created strict export controls to both assess the potential threats caused by exported technology and to restrict exports as needed Today s security and technological environments are dramatically different from those of the Cold War The United States no longer faces one single threat but must protect itself from a variety of possible adversaries including nations and terrorists Additionally sharing information across nations has become much easier both through the increased ease with which information is communicated through the Internet and with the reduced cost of transportation Information can be transferred to a potential threat with the click of a mouse the punch of an airline ticket or the push of a mobile phone button As a result of shifts in the world economy the United States has adapted export control laws to respond to the potential security threats from the export of technical information The current United States policy with respect to the export of nonphysical technical information is identical to the regulations governing the export of technological hardware The potential risks posed by the export of hardware is often clear The security risks associated with the export of information however is often more difficult to assess because of imperfect understanding regarding potential uses of exported data The uncertainty surrounding this risk potential has inspired significant debate 1 Balancing the Needs for Space Research and National Security in the Context of ITAR Draft Striking a Balance between Openness in Research and National Security Improving ITAR These social changes have heavily impacted scientific institutions which seek to provide public benefit through the sharing of information and the creation of new technologies Export control laws have affected space research in particular because of the international nature and the military potential of using the resulting technologies The aspect of export control most relevant to space research is the Department of State s International Traffic in Arms Regulations ITAR which regards all satellites and most space systems as munitions subject to export control and licensing restrictions This committee was tasked with determining the effect of ITAR on space research at U S Universities Precautionary and Reactionary Approaches The uncertainty surrounding the potential security risks inherent in academic space research activities can be resolved in two ways a precautionary approach and a reactionary approach The main difference between these two solutions is dissimilar perceptions of risk A precautionary stance to national security is one in which a decision maker deems a potential but as yet unrealized risk as important and responds by using restrictions and controls to mitigate any chance of future risk Since the Cold War the United States has primarily relied on precautionary policy by restricting the export of technical hardware In following with past practice the United States has adopted the same restrictive policy to handle the current potential security threats inherent in the transfer of technical space based information The second response to future threats is a reactionary stance or a proof before action policy The basis of a reactionary stance is that present threats should be eliminated if they exist however there must be proof of the existence of future threats before regulations or restrictions are developed In a reactionary stance the decision maker understands the potential for future risk but is willing to accept that risk in return for less oversight and control Academic institutions traditionally take on a more reactionary stance with respect to the potential risk from the export of technical